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ABSTRACT
While the admissibility of psychological expert testimony varies from one
common law country to another, evidentiary analyses dealing with the impact of such
testimony are invariably opinion-based and lack empirical support. Predictions
from theoretical models of communication/persuasion processes suggest that
psychological expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases may be given considerable
weight by jurors, but the experimental literature investigating the impact of such
testimony is scant.
This thesis reports four experiments designed to investigate the juridical impact
of psychological expert testimony in a simulated child sexual abuse case, using
gender-balanced juries throughout. In the first study, presence or absence of a
psychologist's generalised testimony concerning children's cognitive abilities was
varied across three ages of child victim/witness. Subjects viewing the expert
testimony rated the child higher on memory ability, resistance to suggestion and
reality monitoring ability and gave higher ratings of defendant guilt.
In the second experiment, the same expert testimony was presented by male and
female experts in either an adversarial or nonadversarial role. Significant
interaction effects indicated that, for the male expert only, ratings of the dependent
variables were significantly lower in the adversarial role.
The third experiment investigated whether expert testimony presented before and
after the child's testimony is differentially utilized. Ratings of the child-based
variables and verdict ratings did not differ as a function of the sequence of testimony,
but regardless of temporal order, presence of expert testimony led to significantly
higher child-based ratings than the absence of such testimony.
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In the fourth experiment, the differential impact of three types of expert
testimony were studied; testimony concerning children's general cognitive abilities,
testimony concerning characteristic behavioural reactions to sexual abuse, and
testimony assessing the validity of the child's statement. The quality of the child's
statement was varied, using content-based criteria. Subjects viewing the cognitive
abilities testimony rated the child higher on memory, resistance to suggestion and
reality monitoring, but there were no significant differences on verdicts by type of
testimony. Those who viewed the child's enhanced statement gave higher ratings of
defendant guilt on the aggravated sexual assault charge. Results indicated greater
acceptance but less scrutiny of nonadversarial expert testimony.
In all four studies, the prime predictor of child credibility and verdict ratings
were the jurors' perceptions of whether the child had misinterpreted the defendant's
actions. Juror gender effects were also consistent in all studies, with females more
likely to rate the child's credibility higher and to find the defendant guilty.
In general, results indicated that psychological expert testimony which details
research findings concerning children's cognitive abilities seems less likely to
change verdicts than to increase the degree of certainty felt by those voting guilty,
and may therefore serve to improve the juridical decision-making process. The
impact of psychological expert testimony appears to vary with expert role when the
psychologist is male. Changing the order in which testimony is presented appears to
have no significant impact on verdicts or jurors' perceptions of the child witness.
The implications of the thesis findings for psychological theory and legal practice are
discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
As sexually abusive acts perpetrated against children generally occur in secret,
the testimony of the alleged victim in a criminal case involving child sexual abuse
may be the focus of the prosecution's case. Such cases are regarded by many
prosecutors (Peters, 1991) and acknowledged by courts (pennsylyania y, Ritchie,
1987), as the most difficult in which to secure convictions. Retractions and delayed
disclosures are common (Sorensen & Snow, 1991) but jurors who lack this
knowledge may interpret these as indicia of fabrication (Morison & Greene, 1992).
There is frequently no corroborative physical evidence and the triers of fact may
have appropriate concerns about the memory and credibility of a child witness, who
also lacks the verbal, cognitive and self-presentational skills of an adult defendant.
If the alleged perpetrator is a relative or once trusted adult, the child may be
particularly anxious, ambivalent, or reluctant to testify.
Although much has been done recently to minimize the trauma associated with the
child's courtroom appearance, it is still" the case that the child's evidence must be
given, and viewed by jUdge and jurors, whether that evidence be received by way of
closed circuit television or videotaped deposition or by live court appearance. In
Israel, a "youth examiner" having decided that a child should not give evidence, may
then give evidence as a surrogate for the child based on pre-trial investigations and
interviews (David, 1990; Harnon, 1990; Reifen, 1958). In the Anglo-American
common law system, such surrogate testimony is not permitted, but both sides in a
criminal case are allowed to lead expert testimony, under conditions which vary
•from one country to another, and internally, from one state or province to another.
Analyses of the admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases in
American jurisdictions (Askowitz, 1992; Lorenzen, 1988; McCord, 1986; Myers
et aI., 1989; Sagatun, 1991; Serrato, 1988) vary in terms of their typologies of
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expert testimony but agree that certain forms of testimony, such as vouching for the
complainant's credibility is, almost without exception, inadmissible and likely to
remain so, yet other forms of expert testimony such as that which seeks to explicate
delayed disclosure or recantations, have been generally admitted in American courts
but not by jurisdictions adopting extreme positions (Askowitz, 1992).
Chapter 2 reviews and compares the general scope and admissibility of
psychological expert testimony in major Anglo-American common law countries
with adversarial legal systems, and in some European countries with inquisitorial
systems of law. In Chapter 3, psychological expert testimony in child sexual abuse
cases is discussed from a number of perspectives, including the concerns raised in
the psycho-legal literature about such testimony, and the relative lack of empirical
investigations. A form of psychological expert testimony, consistent with Monahan
and Walker's (1988) conception of social frameworks for evaluating the facts of a
particular case, is the provision of generalised testimony concerning children's
cognitive competence, focussing on the extensive research concerning children's
abilities as witnesses. This form of testimony has been recommended (Mason,
1991; Myers et aI., 1989; Perry & Wrightsman, 1991) but has not been the
subject of any published empirical investigations. Chapter 3 details the rationale
and research basis for such expert testimony.
Chapter 4 reviews empirical studies of jurors' reactions to child witnesses and
theoretical models and hypotheses concerning jurors' responses to child and expert
witnesses. Social psychological theories which pertain to the likely interplay of
child and expert evidence are reviewed. Convergence from social psychological
theories of communication and persuasion lead to the formulation of a number of
hypotheses which are tested by the experiments reported in this thesis. In Chapter
5, the introductory material is summarised and an overview of the thesis studies is
presented, together with discussion of a number of methodological issues which
3
were considered during the planning of the experimental program. The four studies
which comprise that program are reported in Chapters 6, 7, Band 9.
General results and conclusions pertaining to the impact of the psychologist's
expert testimony and the expert's role are discussed in Chapter 10, and results and
conclusions concerning areas other than expert testimony are presented in Chapter
11. Discussion on the implications of the some of the major thesis findings is
presented in Chapter 12.
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Chapter 2
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with particular reference to
psychological expert testimony
in child sexual abuse cases :
A cross-national perspective
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Chapter 2 : Evidentiary analyses of the scope
and admissibility of psychological expert
testimony In child sexual abuse cases
A cross-national perspective
Given that the findings of the experimental studies in this psychological thesis
may have implications for legal practice in varying parts of the world, it is
important to look cross-nationally at the scope and admissibility of expert evidence
generally.
2.1 In the United States of America
The predominant criteria for admissibility of expert testimony in criminal cases
in the United States are provided specifically by Federal Rules of Evidence, 702 to
705 inclusive, adopted in 1975, and to a lesser extent by Rules 401 to 403. By
1993, thirty three states of America had adopted Federal Evidence Rules 702 and
704 either as is or with minor alterations, and a further three States regarded these
rules as authoritative, but not binding. The main objective of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is to maximise the amount of relevant and useful evidence which comes
before the trier of fact, and Rules 702-705 were specifically designed to achieve
greater admissibility of expert testimony (Berger, 1989).
Rule 702, entitled "Testimony by experts", provides that expert testimony may
be admitted when "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue", and the
testimony may be given as "an opinion or otherwise" by "a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." This rule has
largely supplanted previous common law prohibitions which rend~red inadmissible
any expert testimony which was considered to be dealing with matters within the
jury's "common knowledge". The impact of Federal Rule 702 is that experts may
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now testify on issues which were purportedly "lay" issues, but about which
research has indicated potential triers of fact display considerable lack of knowledge
or understanding, such as battered women's reactions (Dodge & Greene, 1991;
Greene, Raitz, & Lindblad, 1989) or the unreliability of eyewitness identification
(Kassin & Barndollar, 1993; Loftus, 1993), or aspects of child sexual abuse such
as the frequency of delayed disclosure and recantation (Morison & Greene, 1992).
Based on psychological studies investigating the fundamental attribution error
(Miller, Ashton, & Mishal, 1990; Ross, 1977), obedience to authority (Blass,
1991; Milgram, 1974), 'group polarization (Isenberg, 1986), cognitive dissonance
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), and bystander apathy
(Latane & Darley, 1970; Latane & Naida, 1981), the results of which have revealed
aspects of human behaviour which are clearly counter-intuitive, it has been
demonstrated (Colman and Mackay, 1992; Mackay & Colman, 1991) how the
ordinary person, being unaware of such findings, may fail to understand essential
issues, even though they are deemed by the judiciary to be within the ambit of
"common knowledge and experience". Tanford (1990) maintains that the United
States Supreme Court continues "to approve legal rules based upon intuitive
assumptions about human behaviour that research by psychologists has shown to be
erroneous"(p.158).
The provision of Rule 702 that the testimony "will assist" jurors is more
expansive than the Frye test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. That
test, the outcome of a 1923 (Frve vs United States) decision prohibiting polygraph
evidence, required that general acceptance in the relevant scientific community be
the hallmark for admissibility, even though it was unclear how courts were to
(
determine what constituted general scientific acceptance (Myers et aI., 1989).
With some notable exceptions (Askowitz, 1992), the new rules of evidence have
largely displaced the Frye test in many jurisdictions but it is uncertain whether that
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was the intention of the Federal Rules Advisory committee, as they neither mentioned
nor repudiated the Frye test (Mosteller, 1989; Saltzburg & Redden, 1986). The
United States Supreme Court recently supplanted the E.rv..!t test with the more
encompassing relevance analysis rule (Daubert y, Merrell DQW pharmaceyticals,
Inc., 1993), involvinq a thorouqh analysis of the reliability of the scientific
principles supporting the expert testimony (Black, Francisco, & Saffran-Brinks,
1994) .
U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to gQ beyond the common law
re~trictiQn which required opinions to be based sQlely on facts personally known to
the expert Qr evidential facts disclosed during the trial process. Under Rule 703. an
expert may nQW rely Qn data from reports which are not themselves admitted into
evidence.
U.S. Federal Rule 704a provides a departure from the common law tradition,
which prevented witnesses giving an oplnlon on what were regarded as "ultimate
issue" questions, Such opinions were considered to be tantamount to a usurpation of
the jury's role, and an encroachment on that area of law which was exclusively
within the ambit of the trier of fact. Rule 704a states explicitly that "testimony in
the form of an opinion or inference, otherwise admissible, is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact", a change
which research indicated was deemed desirable by judges, lawyers and juries
(Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Sloboqin, 1987; Melton, WeithQrn, & Sloboqin,
1985; Poythress, 1982) tor a number of reasons, including:
1) that scientific or clinical terms with specific meanings are also found in legal
tests and to avoid using such terms experts may have to resort to paraphrases
confusinq tQ jurors (Sloboqin, 1989), or to use alternative termlnoloqy to avoid the
appearance ot reaching a legal conclusion (Mosteller, 1989)
2) that it is etten difficult to ascertain which facts are "ultimate" or
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"penultimate" or neither (Jackson, 1984; Siobogin, 1989).
3} that when an expert stops short of expressing a conclusion in order to avoid
speaking to the "ultimate issue", the trier of fact may conclude that there is
something to hide and therefore may depreciate the testimony given (Slobogin,
1989)
4} that "usurping the fact-finding function of the jury" is a "mere bit of empty
rhetoric" (Wigmore,1979) and a "logical absurdity" (Olicker, 1988), since,
unless jurors are specifically directed by the judge to accept the expert's evidence,
which would be tantamount to a directed verdict (Serrato, 1988), they are
unfettered in their ability to draw their own conclusions (Jackson, 1984) and to
disregard expert evidence (State (Oregon) V. Middleton, 1983). Myers et al.
(1989) argue that even an expert's opinion that a child has been sexually abused is
an opinion of ultimate fact, not an opinion concerning the ultimate legal issue. It is
not an opinion as to whether the defendant should be found guilty (Myers, 1993), as
jurors must assess the weight to be given to the expert's opinion and make their own
decisions on the ultimate legal issues.
Rule of Evidence 705 states that an expert can "testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts
or data". Under common law, an expert could render an opinion only after the
supporting facts and reasoning had been disclosed.
Notwithstanding the effects of U.S. Evidence Rules 702-705, an expert's
testimony may yet be prohibited by invoking the more general Evidence Rule 403,
"Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of
time", which states; "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence".
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McCord (1987) suggests that RUles 702 and 403 are interlocked in that "if the
countervailing dangers outweigh the probative value, the evidence will not be of
assistance to the trier of fact" (p. 91, footnote 342). Berger (1989) suggests that
in some jurisdictions the judgement of unfair prejudice has been predicated on the
belief that certain forms of testimony, such as expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, have an aura of reliability, which may unduly impress jurors.
McCord (1987) maintains that, generally, psychological evidence, being
probabilistic in nature, is not likely to "overwhelm juries with its apparent
infallibility", and Vidmar and Schuller (1989), after reviewing actual cases and
empirical studies of the impact of social framework testimony conclude that "jurors
do not suspend their own judgement in deference to the expert" (p, 173)
The current orientation in most U.S. states is toward admitting expert evidence,
unless there are fairly strong countervailing arguments or factors (Weinstein &
Berger, 1992). This liberalisation has been met with concern by those who cite
instances of experts testifying beyond their experience and competence, or
misstating and exaggerating their qualifications (Moenssens, 1993), making claims
on the basis of ill-founded or speculative theories (Gianelli, 1993), and betraying
accepted standards of practice in assessment (Campbell, 1992). The backlash is
apparent also in some jurisdictions where the~ test has been re-introduced as
.
the criterion for admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases (Gianelli, 1993).
The U.S. Civil Rules Committee (1991) proposed that Rule 702 be amended to allow
information which is "reasonably reliable" and which will "substantially assist"
the trier of fact.
Much has been written concerning the scope of psychological expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases and the implications of the U.S. Rules of Evidence and the
Eru test for the admissibility of such evidence in child sexual abuse cases
(Askowitz, 1992; Cacciola, 1986; Carter, 1989; Donner-Froelich, 1985; Gothard,
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1987; Hall, 1989; Levy, 1989; Lorenzen, 1988; McCord, 1986, 1987; Myers et
al., 1989; Perry & Wrightsman, 1991; Roe, 1985; Sagatun, 1991; Selkin &
Schouten, 1987; Serrato, 1988). These authors vary in the nature and number of
expert testimony types which they describe, but in general terms, it appears that
expert evidence about the child in the case, or about children in general, may be
classified as addressing either:
1) typical symptoms or behaviours observed in sexually abused children, with
or without reference to the particular child in the case, or
2) elements of the "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" (Summit,
1983) to explain "unusual" behaviour such as delays in disclosure, with or
without reference to the particular child, or
3) opinion as to a child's credibility or the credibility of children generally, or
4) general testimony about children's cognitive abilities (McCord,1986; Myers
et al.,1989; Perry & Wrightsman,1991).
McCord (1986), supported by Schultz (1980) and Hall (1989), contends that
there are no common characteristics or typical symptoms displayed by child victims
of sexual abuse, but Myers et al. (1989) suggest that there is broad agreement
amongst mental health experts on the indicia of abuse. Nevertheless, the degree of
variability, even asymptomatology, is such as to allow contradictory testimony
across cases. In her analysis of 122 appellate court decisions in which expert
testimony on the characteristics of sexually abused children was challenged, Mason
(1991) found, amongst other contradictions, that fourteen experts proffered
inappropriate knowledge of sex and sexual pre-occupation as indicia, whereas six
others cited naivete and aversion to sexual matters as marks of abuse. In
summarising the judicial response from the appellate courts to expert testimony,
Mason noted that:
1) there was an overall trend in favour of admission,
2) there were rarely questions about the testimony's acceptance by the
1 1
appropriate scientific community,
3) testimony offered on rebuttal as rehabilitation testimony was more likely to
be admitted than affirmative (substantive) evidence,
4) most judicial reference was made to those Federal Rules of Evidence concerned
with assistance to the trier of fact or undue prejudice,
2.2 In the United Kingdom
The use of expert witnesses in English criminal cases is severely constrained by
the "ultimate issue" and "common knowledge" rules. In England (Cross, 1985),
and in Scotland (Wilkinson, 1986), the ultimate issue rule prohibits any expert
evidence which directly addresses those matters which it is for the court to
determine. For civil cases in England, the rule was abolished by the Civil Evidence
Act (1968, s.3) but remains in force for criminal cases. Spencer and Flin (1990)
maintain that, in Britain, "courts tend to distrust expert evidence in general and the
evidence of psychologists and psychiatrists in particular" (p. 212). They suggest
this distrust is related to the "deeply corrupting effect" of the adversarial system
which ensures "that much of the expert evidence the court receives is unreliable
through bias" (p. 213). Gee (1987) points out that, in England, other than by
prohibiting admission, "the court has no say in deciding what expert evidence it will
hear. This choice rests wholly in the hands of the opposing counsel" (p. 312). As a
contrast, Gee cites the situation in Norway which has an adversarial legal system but
in which any expert-witness is independent and responsible only to the court.
The "common knowledge" principle can be dated to the case of Folkes v. Chadd
(1782), during which Lord Mansfield opined that expert evidence could be admitted
only when it provided information beyond the common knowledge and experience of
the jury. Almost two hundred years later, Lord Justice Lawton clearly indicated that
little had changed in the British legal system with regard to the acceptance of expert
evidence; "If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions
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without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary... Jurors do not need a
psychiatrist to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental
illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life" (8, V, Tyrner, OB 834,
p. 841), and he reiterated the widespread judicial concern that expert testimony
may unduly impress jurors.
This semi-sacrosanct view of jurors' "common knowledge" may be related to a
particular conceptual model of the role and function of the jury. In England, and in
other countries with the British common law tradition, the significance of the jury
is frequently viewed by the judiciary as a kind of "mini-parliament" (Neal,
1980), the embodiment of popular democratic participation in the criminal justice
system, and as a force which acts to demystify the law by intruding into the
formalised interactional patterns adopted by the legal protagonists, the "closed
shop" of legal experts (Bankowski, 1988). In this model, the traditional reluctance
of judges to "overpower" lay viewpoints with even more expertise, albeit of a non-
legal kind, is, perhaps, more readily understood.
2.3 In Europe
In France, Germany and Sweden, the potential for bias in the presentation of
expert evidence is minimised as the expert gives his/her evidence as a "neutral
servant of the court" (Spencer & Flin, 1990, p. 200) within the framework of an
inquisitorial system of law.
2.3.1 France
Bardet-Giraudon (1990) has given an account of the expert's place in the French
legal system. In criminal cases, if required, experts are called by a judicial officer,
the juge d'instruction, who is responsible for the preliminary enquiry and
subsequent written report which goes to the court. Experts who are listed for court
service perform their duties for relatively meagre remuneration, as assignment to
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the list carries its own professional prestige. Moreover, an expert's failure to
perform to the best of his/her abilities is considered a criminal offence (Clapham,
1981). If the expert's report is not acceptable to all parties involved in the case
one or more other experts may be called in to produce a collaborative report. In
cases where a child witness under 16 is involved, such as sexual abuse cases, the
child gives unsworn evidence to the juge d'instruction and is usually not required to
appear in court.
2.3.2 Germany
Experts appointed by the court are used extensively in the German legal system.
Undeutsch (1982) cites the Code of Criminal Procedure, which imposes on the
courts a duty to seek the truth, and which obligates the court to call for expert
testimony "when the court does not possess the necessary knowledge and experience
required for evaluating certain evidence" (p. 33). In contrast to the exclusionary
implications of the British "common knowledge" rule, the German Supreme Court
has ruled that "failure to call an expert witness is justifiable only if ... it can be
taken for granted that the triers of fact actually do possess the knowledge needed to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue"
(Undeutsch, 1982, p. 33).
In contrast, also, to the "ultimate issue" prohibitions in the British legal
system, the German Supreme Court since 1954 has held that "an expert
psychiatrist or psychologist must be called upon to testify on the subject of the
truthfulness of the witness's account, particularly in sex cases, if the conviction
hinges primarily or exclusively on the testimony of a witness under the age of
majority or if the witness's testimony is not substantially corroborated by other
testimony" (Undeutsch, 1982, p. 37). In Germany any child under 16 gives
unsworn evidence in court as all evidence must come before the court first-hand
(Frehsee, 1990), but invariably, a psychologist is appointed to interview the child
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and assess the credibility of the child's statement. based on
1) analysis of the individual characteristics of the child witness
2) analysis of the possible motives for the witness to make a false accusation
3) analysis of the content of the statement itself
(Kohnken, 1990; Steller & Kohnken, 1989).
Statement analysis has been based on the use of "reality criteria" which
purportedly "reflect specific features that differentiate truthful from invented
testimonies" (Steller & Kohnken, 1989, p. 218). Court appointed experts whose
task is to assess the credibility of a witness's statement are also used extensively in
Sweden (Trankell, 1972, 1982).
2.4 In Australasia
Only those qualifying as experts can render opinion evidence in Australian State
jurisdictions and the prerequisites for acceptance as an expert are that:
1) the subject matter of the witness's evidence is a proper area for expert
evidence, and
2) the witness is skilled in that area (Waight & Williams, 1985, p. 581).
An expert may base an opinion upon other authors' published works which
contain facts or data to support his/her opinion (B.-\!...,Abadom, 1983), and may also
render evidence to educate the court in matters which are deemed to be beyond the
court's expertise (Cross. 1986).
Although abolition of the common knowledge rule has been recommended
(Australian Law Reform Commission. 1987) the current restrictions on expert
evidence in Australia remain similar to those existing under British common law.
Criticising the rationale of the common knowledge test, the Australian Law Reform
Commission (1987) document stated; "It is within areas classified by the court as
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'common knowledge' that many experts are employed in undertaking research that
could be very helpful to the courts. Notable among these are the work done by
psychologists in conducting research in perception, memory, narration and in
demonstrating the fallibilities of eyewitness identification and the giving of
confessions. A refusal by the courts to utilise the fruits of such research means that
they base their decisions on knowledge that is incomplete and out of date"
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 1987, para. 354). In Australia, a
psychologist's expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness unreliability has
been ruled inadmissible (8, y, Smith, 1987), and Warner (1987) has noted the
limited extent to which an expert can assist the court in sexual assault cases, even to
the rejection of "general information about research and learning on matters such as
the reliability of children as witnesses or the behaviour of sexually abused children
after abuse" (p. 50). Oakes (1994) has proposed that if Australian courts adopt
similar criteria to those enunciated in the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Daybert y, Merrell pow Pharmaceyticals, Inc, (1993) the admissibility of certain
forms of psychological expert testimony in Australian courts may be further
restricted.
In New Zealand, legislation (Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Bill, 1989)
now provides for an expert witness to give evidence on the intellectual attainment,
mental capability and emotional maturity of a complainant under the age of 14 years;
the general developmental level of children the same age as the complainant; and
whether evidence given of the complainant's behaviour is consistent or inconsistent
with the behaviour of sexually abused children of the same age group as the
complainant (Warner, 1990).
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3.1 Psycho-legal treatment of the Impact of
psychological expert testimony
The psycho-legal literature on psychological expert witnesses has largely
focused on expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification
(Berliner, 1988; Blonstein & Geiselman, 1990; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989;
Deffenbacher, 1984, 1988; Egeth, 1993; Ellioll. 1993; Fox & Walters,1986;
Goodman & Loftus, 1988; Hatvany & Strack, 1980; Hosch, Beck, & Mcintyre,
1980; Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989; Konecni &
Ebbesen, 1986; Lempert, 1986; Loftus, 1980, 1986, 1993; Loftus & Monahan,
1980; Maass. Brigham, & West, 1985; Pachella, 1988; Wells, 1986; Wells,
Lindsay, & Tousignant, 1980; Wells & Turtle, 1987; Woocher, 1977, 1986;
Yarmey, 1986; Yuille, 1980), and many of the general issues concerned with the
justification, admissibility and impact of any form of psychological expert testimony
have been discussed in the context of testimony concerning eyewitness reliability.
These issues include proposals that there is no need for such testimony as the
jurors already have that knowledge (Egeth & McCloskey, 1984; McCloskey & Egeth,
1983), but cannot articulate it (Pachella, 1986, 1988), that there is not a
sufficiently reliable body of psychological knowledge (Egeth & McCloskey, 1984;
Elliollt, 1993), that psychology is not an exact science (Pachella, 1986), that
psychologist experts are prone to premature assumptions aboout the external
validity of research (yuille, 1989)" that expert testimony sometimes misleads the
court, resulting in incorrect decisions (Smith. 1989) that the status and influence
of the expert may cause jurors to give his/her testimony undue weight (Smith,
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1989), that psychologists are prone to unavoidable partisanship (Elliott, 1993;
Grisso, 1992; Willging, 1986), that the adversarial system favours the choice of
experts with extreme views, rather than views that are representative of the
scientific community (Saks & Van Duizend, 1983), that experts are well paid
putting the party with greater resources at an advantage (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966;
Saks & Wissler, 1984; Smith, 1989), that the expert may be pressured to
overstate conclusions, bend or distort facts, or give an incomplete story (Wasyliw,
Cavanaugh, & Rogers, 1985), that a "Pandora's box" of time-eonsuming battles of
experts will bring courts to a standstill (Woocher, 1986), that psychologist
experts will be unable to present testimony straightforwardly because of the hostile
nature of cross examination (Gibbs, Sigal, Adams, & Grossman, 1989) and that the
scientific method and adversarial legal system are incompatibly different conceptual
systems (Goodwin Jones, 1986; Newman, 1991). The contrast between law and
psychology has been encapsulated in Repucci and Crosby's (1993) description of the
purposes of psychological research as "descriptive, proactive and academic", and
the purposes of law as "prescriptive, reactive, and pragmatic" (p. 7).
Additionally, when psychological expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases is
discussed the corpus of specific issues includes concerns that the mental health
professional is prone to focussing on the child's feelings rather than objective
reality (Faust & Ziskin, 1988), that the mental health professional's tendency to
empathize with the child may diminish objectivity (Faust & Ziskin, 1988; people v,
Beckley, 1990), and that a large proportion of those called to give expert testimony
are also involved in therapy with the child (Mason, 1991).
Given that this list of concerns in no way exhausts the issues raised, it is
understandable that many who have established a reputation in their field of
psychology are nonetheless reluctant to serve as expert witnesses (Botter, 1982 ;
Saks & Van Duizend, 1983), especially when they are aware that one or two
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presumptuous questions in cross examination may, by innuendo alone, seriously
diminish the impact of any expert's testimony (Kassin, Williams, & Saunders,
1990).
Nevertheless, the use of psychological expert testimony has increased
considerably in areas such as child sexual abuse cases, but empirical studies of the
juridical effects of such testimony have not kept pace. This gap between law and
psychology is of some concern, given that decisions regarding admissibility often
rest on the presumed helpfulness and possible prejudicial impact of expert
testimony, which are essentially empirical questions.
The impact of psychological expert testimony in rape cases (Brekke & Borgida,
1988), and in sexual abuse cases with complainants aged 13 and 17 (Gabora,
Spanos, & Joab, 1993) has been studied empirically, but to date there has only been
one published empirical investigation (Crowley, O'Caliaghan, & Ball, 1994) of the
juridical impact of psychological expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases with
the most common age group of victim/witnesses, complainants aged 12 or under.
Many legal scholars have examined the legal and scientific status of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases. Serrato (1988) identified seven different
types of actual or potential expert testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions, and
graded each type of testimony along a spectrum (Figure 3.1) according to its impact
on the ultimate issue. However, the basis for Serrato's gradings was 'a compilation
and review of numerous court opinions" (p. 164). In other words, hers was an
informed, but nonetheless, a priori, notion of differential impact and it lacked an
empirical basis. For testimony such as the inadmissible 'expert testimony on the
abuser's identity" which Serrato deems to have the highest impact on the ultimate
issue, she has no evidence even from juridical experience on which to base a claim
about its potential impact.
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Figure 3.1. Serrato's spectrum of expert testimony
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----------------------------------------------------------
A notable omission from Serrato's spectrum is expert testimony which informs
the court about the general developmental characteristics of children. Such
testimony is discussed by Myers et al. (1989) in their comprehensive review and
analysis of expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation. Having noted the
research findings that many adults tend to regard children as less credible witnesses
than adults (Goodman, Bottoms, Herscovici, & Shaver, 1989; Leippe & Romanczyk,
1987), Myers et al. suggest that if the defence counsel seeks to capitalise on these
common beliefs, it is appropriate to present expert rebuttal testimony appraising
the court of the counter-research. Jurors who regard children in general as less
credible may discount or devalue the testimony of a child witness. This process may
occur whether the defence counsel seeks to capitalise on such beliefs or not.
3.2 Rationale for generalised expert testimony
on children's cognitive abilities
Peters (1991) maintains that jurors tend to disregard the child's word, if the
case rests largely on the conflicting accounts of the child and another adult. Sex
crimes against children, he notes, have been seen by many prosecutors as the most
difficult cases in which to secure convictions. The lower conviction rates in these
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cases (Cashmore, 1994) may be not only because such crimes are generally
unwitnessed and thus rely on the child's uncorroborated evidence (Thomson, 1991),
but also because that evidence may be depreciated by the trier of fact. Jurors may
hear a child whose communicative competence is compromised by counsel's use of
age-inappropriate, syntactically complex or ambiguous language, especially during
cross-examination (Brennan & Brennan, 1988; Cashmore, in press; Walker,
1993).
If adults generally regard children as less credible witnesses than adults
(Yarmey & Jones, 1983), then triers of fact may hold a priori misconceptions
which may be detrimental to their assessment of the complainant's credibility and
thereby prejudicial to case outcomes. Tetreault (1989) and Frazier and Borgida
(1988, 1992) have argued for generalised educational expert testimony in rape
cases, testimony that would contain information that might counteract common
misconceptions about rape. Similarly, some have argued for the provision of
educational expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases (Myers et aI., 1989; Perry
& Wrightsman, 1991), testimony that might counteract common misconceptions
about children's competence and cognitive abilities.
After reviewing 122 appellate court decisions in which expert testimony
concerning child sexual abuse characteristics was challenged, Mason (1991)
suggested an alternative expert testimony which focussed on the research concerning
children's abilities as witnesses. Such use of expert testimony accords with
Monahan and Walker's (1988) conception of social frameworks for evaluating the
-tacts of a particular case, that is, research findings which are not in themselves
either legislative or adjudicative facts, but which may be used by the trier of fact as
a frame of reference for decisions on factual issues germane to case outcomes. Such
expert testimony would appear to come within the ambit of U.S. Federal Rules of
Evidence 702, 703, 704, 705 which allow that such testimony may be led, provided
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it is considered such as to assist the trier of fact, as specified under Rule 702, and is
also admissible under U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403 which indicate
that any relevant evidence which will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue may be admitted as long as its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial impact. Some U.S. courts, however, have excluded social
framework evidence ( e.g. rape trauma syndrome) as not relevant precisely because
it derives from general studies of groups and does not concern the particular
individual in the case (Mosteller, 1989).
McCord (1987), noting that prosecutors have made "very little use of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases to explain the capabilities of child witnesses"
(p. 64), then applies his four-factor balancing test (McCord, 1986) and gives such
testimony high ratings on necessity, understandability and importance, with less
surety on reliability because of what he terms the "embryonic nature" of the
research. McCord, a professor of law, does not clarify the sense in which he uses the
word "reliability", and it is possible that he may be referring to either:
1) the reliability which findings attain with increasing numbers of
experimental studies, by virtue of their robustness across varying
conditions and stimulus settings (Loftus & Ceci, 1991), or
2) ecological validity, that is, the extent to which research findings can be
generalised from a research context to real life situations (Yuille & Wells,
1991).
As both senses are pertinent, it is important (Yuille & Wells, 1991) that the
psychologist should point out to the court not just the research findings but also any
problems, limitations or methodological issues which limit the generalizability of
findings. In preparing the expert testimony for this series of experiments,
limitations on generalizability were noted.
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In the U.K., Justice Clapham (1981) suggests that the results of psychological
research have been little used largely because the legal profession is not aware of the
extent to which such advice is available or useful to them.
3.3 Empirical studies of the Impact of
generalised psychological expert testimony
The impact of four forms of generalised psychological expert testimony has been
investigated; unreliability of eyewitness identification, (Wells, Lindsay, &
Tousignant, 1980), the battered woman syndrome (Schuller, 1992), rape myths
(Brekke & Borgida, 1988), and common symptoms and reactions to sexual abuse
(Gabora et al., 1993).
Wells et al. (1980) found that those student-jurors who saw generalised
testimony on unreliability factors in eyewitness identification were less likely to
display overbelief in eyewitnesses and less likely to rely on eyewitness's confidence.
The rationale given by Wells et al. for using a generalised testimony was their hope
of developing a 'standard form of expert advice that could be routinely delivered to
triers of fact" (p. 284), a prospect unlikely in child sexual abuse cases given the
rapidly expanding research on children's abilities and consequent changes in the
nature of the expert advice a psychologist could give.··
Schuller (1992) used student jurors reading a fifty page homicide trial
transcript to study the impact of general and specific expert evidence on the battered
woman syndrome. The general testimony dealt with social science research on
battered women, to which in the specific testimony was added the psychologist's
opinion that the woman displayed the emotional and behavioural characteristics of
one suffering from that syndrome. While jurors exposed to the specific testimony as
against the general testimony were more likely to believe that the killing was
unintentional, the defendant was telling the truth and her life was in danger, there
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was evidence that the general testimony was effective in addressing certain
misconceptions. Relative to the no-expert condition, subjects who heard the general
testimony were more likely to believe that the woman was trapped in the
relationship, and unable to leave. In a second study, using audiotaped versions of the
same stimulus trial, Schuller analysed the content of jurors' deliberations and found
evidence that jurors deliberating in groups appeared to utilize the general testimony
to a greater extent than individual jurors had done. In both the general and specific
expert evidence conditions, jury members spent more time raising interpretations
that supported the defendant's version of what occurred, relative to jurors who
heard no expert evidence.
Using an audiotaped re-enactment of a rape trial and student jurors, Brekke and
Borgida (1988) compared generalised expert testimony to dispel misconceptions
about rape with expert testimony which gave the same information plus an explicit
attempt to link it with the particular case by way of a series of hypothetical
questions. Relative to those who heard the generalised testimony, subjects who heard
the specific testimony were significantly more likely to vote for conviction. Similar
results were found by Gabora et al. (1993) using students as mock jurors viewing a
videotaped simulation of a sexual abuse case with victim ages 13 and 17. However,
the specific testimony used by Gabora et.al, was much more comprehensive than the
generalised testimony, including, as it did, all the research findings mentioned in the
general testimony plus test results and interview testimony and, more importantly,
the psychologist's explicit opinion that the defendant had abused his daughter. In the
Gabora et al. study, the finding of interest was that the specific and the general
expert testimony were equally effective in overcoming misconceptions.
3.4 Role of the psychologist expert In a child sexual abuse case
Some maintain that, in common law countries, the kernel of the problem with
regard to child witnesses is the nature of the adversarial system itself, described by
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Haward (1982), as "primitive in conception" (p. 59), and by Yuille (1989) as
"inappropriate for dealing with intrafamilial child sexual abuse" (p. 191)
Nevertheless, in countries with an adversarial legal system, there has been an
outpouring of reforms and recommendations for change on matters such as
competency and corroboration requirements for children, or admission of hearsay
testimony, or the use of videotaped depositions or closed circuit television for the
reception of children's evidence, in the U.S. (Bulkley, 1989; Perry & McAuliff,
1993; Whitcomb, 1990, 1992), in the U.K (Spencer 1990, 1992; Spencer & Flin,
1993), in Canada (Wilson, 1990) and in Australasia (Warner, 1990), even though
in some of these countries more change has been desired by advocates of reform than
achieved (Spencer, 1992). Recent studies have focussed on the extent to which
implemented reforms have achieved their objectives (e.g.,. Cashmore, 1992;
Cashmore & Cahill, 1990; Davies & Noon, 1992).
While a number of Evidence Acts passing through the legislatures in various
countries have facilitated the admission of expert evidence in child sexual abuse
cases, a fundamental conflict arises, in practice, between a psychologist's desire to
maintain the ethically appropriate position of "impartial educator" (Camper &
Loftus, 1985; Loftus, 1986b) and the exigencies of the adversarial system (Hall,
1989). Yuille and Wells' (1991) admirable exhortation to psychologists to refuse
to offer testimonial services if lawyers cannot accept them in the impartial educator
role is pre-empted by the nature of the opposing counsels' briefs, which are to
present only information which supports their case, a position encapsulated by
defence lawyer, Percy Foreman's view that "my clients want freedom, not justice"
(Smith, 1966).
There is also the concern voiced by some (Faust & Ziskin, 1988) about the
ability of psychologists to keep the rights and welfare of a child in balance with the
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rights of the accused to due process, and there is empirical evidence (Otto, 1989) to
support the view that some psychologists may experience role conflicts and become
biased adversaries when called to give expert testimony in court, with conscious or
unconscious bias (Haward, 1981). levy (1989) has also described some child
sexual abuse experts as "fiercely committed to the role of children's advocate,
devoted to preferring child protection to any other value" (p. 396). Any indications
of partisan stances tend to impair the perception of objectivity and professional
credibility expected from a psychological expert witness, even when the psychologist
feels hindered by the adversarial nature of courtroom proceedings (Spencer, 1987).
The psychologist. delivering expert testimony in such a system, may strive to retain
objectivity but may yet appear to be taking a partisan stance (Borgida, Gresham,
Swim, Bull, & Gray, 1989).
In concluding their comprehensive evidentiary analysis of expert evidence in
child sexual abuse cases, Myers et al. (1989) recommended a "new concept", which
might tend to circumvent the pressures to partisanship. The authors suggested that
the court should appoint experts on child development to assist the court in
understanding the developmental and psychological needs of particular child
witnesses.
The role of court-appointed experts has been discussed in positive terms by a
large number of authors prominent in the psycho-legal field in the U.S. (Bulkley,
1989; Burk, 1993; Deffenbacher, 1984; Egeth & McClosky, 1984; Fienberg,
1989; Fox & Walters, 1986; Freckleton, 1987; Hall, 1989; Loftus. 1986b;
McCord, 1986; Mason, 1991; Myers et al., 1989; Perry & Wrightsman, 1991;
Smith, 1989; Wells, 1986) in the U.K. (Clapham, 1981; Gee, 1987; Sheldon &
Macleod, 1991; Spencer, 1987; Spencer & Flin, 1990) and in Australasia (Oakes,
1994; Robertson, 1989; Warner, 1987; Williams, 1994). and increasingly there
have been calls for courts within the Anglo-American legal system to use court-
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appointed experts, who are not restricted in their capacity to report
comprehensively and accurately. As early as 1934, Wigmore, the doyen of scholars
on evidence, maintained that all experts should be court-appointed (Wigmore,
1934). In the U.S., Federal Rule of Evidence 706 empowers a judge to appoint an
expert witness, and there are indications that the court-appointed expert role is
viewed positively by judges (Saks & Van Duizend, 1983) and by legal practitioners,
both prosecution and defence, and the general public (Lindsay, McDonald, &
McGarry, 1990). In the U.K., Spencer (1987) writes that this 'is not such a
revolutionary change as it sounds, because the judge in a criminal case already has a
power, rarely exercised these days, to call a witness who has not been called by
either of the parties, but it would require a significant change in the law if the
parties were to be forbidden to call their own experts when an expert witness was
appointed by the court" (p. 250). Goodwin Jones (1986) has noted that court-
appointed experts or "assessors" were once regUlarly used in the U.K. legal system,
but after increasing concern that appeals seemed to be going "not from judge to judge
but from assessor to assessor" (p. 14), new rules of evidence were introduced to
limit expert influence and relegate scientists to the role of "gamekeepers", rather
than "poachers" of the law, ensuring that the primary role of the lawyer was
maintained and that the expert remained "on tap, but not on top". The U.K. Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure (1993) addressed the issue of court appointed
experts but eventually rejected them in favour of widening the admissibility of
expert evidence towards a less adversarial orientation, which would allow the expert
the opportunity to elaborate upon issues raised in examination and cross-
examination.
Other concerns expressed about a court-appointed expert have been the potential
over-reliance jurors are likely to place on a court-appointed expert's testimony,
reducing trial by jury to an "empty illusion" (Levy, 1961), or the diminished
vigour with which court-appointed experts, receiving relatively meagre
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In cases involving child witnesses, Haugaard (1988) has argued for a screening
process in which a court-appointed examiner would interview a potential child
witness before the trial. Citing the research studies which show that jurors are
often sceptical of children's testimony and give it less weight than that of adults
(Goodman, Golding, & Haith, 1984), Haugaard suggests that a court-appointed
examiner might supply information to the jury in testifying about the assessment
procedure, the competency of the child as a witness, and relevant psychological
research indicating the cognitive abilities of children in general. He suggests that
such testimony may increase the value of the child's testimony. The difficulty with
Haugaard's suggestion, as he himself notes, is that courts have been reluctant to
allow testimony by an expert that directly relates to the determination of
credibility, a function assigned to the jury. However, the courts have had fewer
objections if the expert testifies in general terms about the abilities of specific
groups, rather than of the individual child in the case.
In the only published empirical study of court-appointed experts in a trial
involving a charge of a sexual nature (Brekke, Enko, Clavet, & Seelau, 1991), a
videotaped re-enactment of an acquaintance rape case was used with expert evidence
concerning rape trauma syndrome. Brekke et al. compared the impact of adversarial
and nonadversarial (court-appointed) expert testimony and concluded that while
jurors seemed to be less responsive to the content of the court-appointed expert's
testimony, there were indications it was weighed more heavily than the adversarial
expert testimony on pre-deliberation verdicts and on ratings of the likelihood that
rape had occurred.
3.5 Summary
While numerous concerns have been expressed about the use of psychological
expert testimony in criminal trials including child sexual abuse cases, the use of
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such testimony has expanded and appears unlikely to diminish. By contrast, there is
a dearth of empirical studies investigating the impact of psychological expert
testimony. and legal commentators addressing the issue of impact are largely reliant
on a priori opinions. Authors prominent in the legal and psychological fields have
recommended the use of a generalised educational expert testimony, focussing on
children's cognitive abilities, in child sexual abuse cases. Empirical studies of the
impact of generalised expert testimony indicate that such testimony can be as
effective as more specific forms in overcoming misconceptions.
Psycho-legal scholars have also suggested that. as the adversarial system does
not facilitate the adoption or maintenance of an impartial educator position, courts
should consider appointing their own expert witnesses. The only published study on
the impact of testimony given by a court-appointed expert in a case involving a
sexual crime found that such testimony appeared to weigh more heavily than
adversarially-presented testimony on jurors' decisions regarding the ultimate
issue.
The next chapter reviews the findings on studies which have investigated jurors'
responses to child witnesses, and thenrlooks at predictions from theoretical models
concerning jurors' perceptions of and responses to child witnesses and expert
witnesses, and the likely interplay of child and expert evidence in the same trial.
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4.1 Empirical studies of Jurors' reactions to child witnesses
Some research indicates that many adults have an a priori conception of children
as less credible witnesses than adults, in that children are believed to have less
reliable memories (Cole & Loftus, 1987; King & Yuille, 1987), to be more
susceptible to suggestion (Goodman & Reed, 1988), to be less internally consistent
(Myers & Perry, 1987), and to be less able to distinguish fact from fantasy
(Goodman, Golding, & Haith, 1984). The findings suggest that adults may have
different processing and evaluation procedures for statements made by children and
adults.
Brigham and Spier (1992) point out that perceptions of the child witness in the
criminal justice system may be just as important at the investigative stage, in
determining whether charges are filed and the case prosecuted, as they are at trial.
It has been noted that, traditionally, ?hildren's evidence has been viewed with
,
suspicion by leading protagonists in the legal system (Davies, 1993). The British
judiciary's customary attitude to children's evidence is a matter of concern for
Hanson (1993) who, after citing a passage from Lord Cross's judgement in D,p.P. v,
Boardman (1975), draws the implication that "even the corroborative evidence of
two young boys will be suspect, let alone the evidence of a single young boy" (p. 57).
However, those most sceptical of the truthfulness and reliability of child witnesses
appear to be defence lawyers (Brigham & Spier, 1992; Brigham & Wolfskiel,
1983; Leippe, Brigham, Cousins, & Romanczyk, 1989). Such scepticism may be
entirely consonant and even an advantage (Leippe et al.,1989) for a role in which
there are treatises giving instructions on how best to capitalise on any indications of
misinformation, frailty or suggestibility in a child (Bailey & Rothblatt, 1980).
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Cashmore (1992) found that, in contrast to other professionals in the legal arena,
defence lawyers rated the more anxious children as the more effective witnesses,
even though research indicates that high levels of anxiety impair the effectiveness of
children's testimony (Flin, Bull, Boon, & Knox, 1992; Goodman et al., 1992).
At trial, the critical factor is not so much whether children are able to give
accurate and reliable testimony, but whether they are perceived by the trier of fact
to be doing so. Two studies (Goodman, Bottoms, Herscovici, & Shaver, 1989; Wells,
Turtle, & Luus, 1989) have indicated that there may be a distinct lack of
calibration. Ideally, the child's testimony should be accurate, and should be
perceived as accurate. In both studies, jurors tended to believe witnesses perceived
as confident, and confident witnesses were given higher accuracy ratings.
Generally, studies using mock jurors have found that young children were rated
as less credible witnesses than adults. Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith, and
Michelli (1987) conducted a series of experiments using different modalities
(videotape & written transcripts), juror groups (student & community), and cases
(murder & vehicular fatality). 6-year-olds were consistently rated as less credible
than ten- or thirty-year-old witnesses. Similar results were reported in two
experiments by Leippe 'and Romanczyk (1987), who also found that testimonial
inconsistency adversely affected perceptions of the 6-year-old witness but not the
credibility of a 10- or 30-year-old witness. This apparently greater salience of
contextual factors in jurors' perceptions of children was supported by Nigro,
Buckley, Hill, and Nelson (1989), who varied powerfulness of speech style for an
8-year-old and 25-year-old eyewitness to a vehicular fatality. Jurors rated the
8-year-old with the powerful speech style as the more credible witness.
A witness's perceived degree of potential complicity in the crime may also affect
jurors' judgements of credibility. Ross, Miller, and Moran (1987) found that an
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8-year-old witness in a drug trafficking case was rated as more accurate,
competent, consistent and truthful than a 21-year-old witness, who, the authors
speculated, may have been believed to be somehow involved in the drug deal.
Similarly, in a case involving an allegation of forced oral sex, Goodman et al.
(1989) found that a 6-year-old was judged to be a more credible victim/witness
than a 22-year-old. The authors suggested that the young child's presumed honesty
and lack of the requisite cognitive abilities to fabricate a sexual allegation may have
enhanced her credibility. An equally plausible interpretation, though not advanced
by Goodman et al., is that the 22-year-old female was perceived as having a greater
degree of blame or complicity. Data from the Goodman et al. study indicate that the
prime reason for the age effect on verdicts was the very low proportion of male
jurors (18%) who voted the defendant guilty with the 22-year-old victim. A large
number of studies from the literature on rape suggest that, compared with women,
men identify more with defendants (Borgida & Brekke, 1985), have less empathy
for rape victims (Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, & Bentley, 1982), attribute greater
responsibility to the victim (Calhoun, Selby, & Warring, 1976; Luginbuhl &
Mullin, 1981) and are significantly less likely to find a defendant guilty (Deitz &
Byrnes, 1981; Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch, 1990; Lyons & Regina, 1986; McNamara,
Vattano, & Viney, 1993; Spanos, Dubreuil, & Gwynn, 1992; Weir & Wrightsman,
1990).
There is some evidence that an attribution of, at least, partial responsibility and
blame may extend beyond adults down to 13-year-old sexual assault victims
(Duggan et aI., 1989; Nightingale, 1993) who are legally defined as minors and for
whom responsibility and consent are not salient legal issues.
In studies which have used mock jurors, a consistent finding is that the
perception of the child's credibility varies not only with the age of the child witness
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but also as a function of type of case. Goodman et al. (1987), Goodman and Michelli
(1981), and Leippe and Romanczyk (1987) all found that 6-year-olds were rated
as significantly less credible witnesses than adults, whereas Nigro, Buckley, Hill
and Nelson (1989) found that mock jurors rated a 6-year-old eyewitness as more
accurate, intelligent, forceful, competent, consistent and truthful than a 21-year-
old. In a simulated sex abuse case, Goodman et al. (1989) found a 6-year-old was
judged as significantly more credible than a 22-year-old, although these authors did
caution that concerns about children's suggestibility may be given more weight in
actual cases than in laboratory studies. Anecdotal reports from jurors in the
McMartin case and a Maryland child sexual abuse case (Perry & Wrightsman,
1991) suggest that caution in generalizing from laboratory simulations may be
justified.
4.2 Theoretical models
4.2.1 Hypotheses and models formulated specIfIcally to explaIn
aspects of Jurors' perceptIons of child witnesses.
The Importance displacement hypothesis
A number of authors have postulated hypotheses about jurors' responses to child
witnesses. In a series of experiments Goodman and others (Goodman, Golding, &
Haith, 1984; Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith & Michelli, 1987; Goodman &
Michelli, 1981) consistently found that mock jurors rated 6-year-olds as less
credible witnesses than adults and formulated the "importance displacement
hypothesis", expressing jurors' tendency to give more weight to the testimony of
other witnesses when the key witness is a child.
Ross et al. (1989) have suggested that there are two conditions under which the
testimony of a child is evaluated more positively than that of an adult: "(1) when the
child's testimony violates, in a positive manner, the juror's expectation about
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children's eyewitness abilities, and (2), when witness credibility depends more on
honesty than cognitive ability" (p. 42). In child sexual assault cases, the second
condition may apply generally to child witnesses, and the first condition may apply if
idiosyncratic aspects of the particular child victim/witness such as confidence,
demeanour, and consistency are appraised positively. Thus the "importance
displacement hypothesis" may not be relevant to child sexual assault cases. If it
were relevant, a somewhat paradoxical outcome might result. For example, if more
weight were given to the testimony of other witnesses in such cases, then a
prosecution expert's testimony which is supportive of the child's case might be
given more weight and presumably more scrutiny. However, as discussed below, an
expert is most likely to disconfirm any expectations of bias when he/she leads
evidence which is not supportive of the child, and which may be elaborated by the
juror. Under these circumstances, the quid pro quo for enhancing expert credibility
is to lead evidence which may detract from the credibility of the child.
Lelppe and Romanczyk's communication/persuasion model
Leippe and Romanczyk's (1987) communication/persuasion model of jurors'
reactions to child witnesses incorporates jurors' stereotyping about children's
trustworthiness and memory 'expertise' as an essential element in the processing
that leads to judgments of the child's credibility. On the basis of their research,
Leippe and Romanczyk (1987, 1989) propose that jurors' stereotypical attitudes
toward children comprise a 'perceptual filter' mechanism mediating the processing
of idiosyncratic aspects associated with the 'quality of testimony', and the
interpretation of critical details. Their model highlights the centrality of jurors'
implicit theories about children's general levels of cognitive competence, and the
implications of discrepancies between jurors' pre-trial beliefs and research
findings about children's cognitive abilities.
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4.2.2 Pertinent models and theories from social psychological literature
to elucIdate the likely Interplay of child and expert evIdence
Petty and Cacioppo's (1986a) elaboration likelihood model posits that the
amount and nature of issue relevant elaboration in which people are willing or able
to engage to evaluate a message vary with individual and situational factors. For
example, with high motivation and ability they are more likely to draw inferences
about the merits of arguments for a particular recommendation. When a juror
engages in issue relevant elaboration, it is hypothesised that it will typically result
in any new message being integrated into the underlying belief structure (schema)
for the attitude object (child witness). As Petty and Cacioppo (1986b) indicate,
theories of attitude change can be placed on a continuum according to their
assumptions about the degree of elaboration in which people typically engage.
Some theories such as Information Integration theory (Anderson, 1981) and the
theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) assume that people usually
engage in careful and systematic processing of a message, whereas other theories
associate attitude change more closely with positive or negative affective cues, and
others emphasise the use of persuasion rules or inferences. An example of the last is
the heuristic model of persuasion (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1984),
which proposes that under certain circumstances, such as those in which there is no
reason to doubt the communicator's expertise or trustworthiness, people evaluate
messages by employing relatively simple decision rules, such as "statements by
experts can be trusted". However, beliefs concerning source characteristics may be
more salient when the individual believes that the expert may be advocating a
particular position, requiring selective presentation of information. In these
circumstances, attribution analysis (Wood & Eagly, 1981) may be used to predict
the process of opinion change.
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According to attribution analysis, a juror, exposed to the testimony of an expert
witness in an adversarial role, may use information about the expert and his/her
role to form a pre-message expectancy concerning the position the expert will
advocate. Therefore, if jurors believe that, in an adversarial legal system, opposing
counsels seek only to lead evidence which is favourable to their case, they may have
certain pre-message expectancies about the testimony presented by an adversarial
expert. Some jurors may believe that expert witnesses have certain attributes
which facilitate their expression of differing testimony depending upon which side
has hired them, and others may believe that expert witnesses are, in general, well-
intentioned but, nonetheless, respond to the demand characteristics of the
adversarial system by presenting biased testimony.
Attribution theory proposes that jurors' conclusions about whether their
expectancies have been confirmed or disconfirmed are critical. If the expert
disconfirms the expectancy of bias, the message is more likely to be attributed to
factual evidence and the likelihood of attitude change is increased. If the juror has an
expectancy of bias which is confirmed in the presentation of testimony, the outcome
is more likely to be the perception that the communicator is not to be trusted and the
message is less persuasive.
Predictions from attribution analysis are parallel to Kelley's (1972)
discounting and augmentation principles, that is, that messages confirming negative
expectancies tend to be discounted and those which disconfirm such expectancies tend
to have increased persuasiveness. An adversarial expert may intentionally employ
techniques designed to disconfirm possible expectancies of bias, and this is inherent
in Brodsky's (1977) advice to mental health professionals called as expert
witnesses; "Always be honest.. honesty, including evidence against the position of
your side, is an impressive part of credibility" (p. 272).
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Inferences from the foregoing theoretical considerations lead to a diversity of
predicted outcomes, dependent upon each juror's pre-message expectations about
children and experts. If, for example, a juror holds certain negative stereotypes
about children and also believes that adversarial experts are not likely to be
impartial, then anyone of the four outcomes in Figure 4.1 is possible.
(Juror has pre-trial negative stereotype about children)
1
Idiosyncratic aspects Idiosyncratic aspects
of child's testimony of child's testimony
confirm the negative confirm the negative
stereotype stereotype
I I
I I
I I
Idiosyncratic aspects
of child's testimony
do not conform to
negative stereotype
I
I
I
Idiosyncratic aspects
of child's testimony
do not conform to
negative stereotype
I
I
I
v
Contrast effect
...child is seen as
more credible
I
I
I
experts
v
Contrast effect
...child is seen
more credible
I
I
I
expectation that adversarial
biased testimony)
I
I
v
Assimilation effect
...juror tends to
discount child's
testimony
I
I
pre-trial
give
I
I
v
Assimilation effect
...juror tends to
discount child's
testimony
I
I
(Juror has
v
Adversarial expert
is seen as biased
...expert confirms
expectations of bias
I
I
I
v
Child's testimony
discounted even
more
v
Adversarial expert
is seen as not biased
...expert disconfirms
expectations of bias
I
I
I
v
Child's testimony
is enhanced
v
Adversarial expert
is seen as biased
...expert confirms
expectations of bias
I
I
I
v
Child's testimony is
not further enhanced
& possibly discounted
v
Adversarial expert
is seen as not biased
...expert disconfirms
expectations of bias
I
I
I
v
Child's testimony
is further enhanced
Figure 4.1 Four possible interactional outcomes of child and expert evidence on
jurors with pre-trial negative cognitions concerning children and experts.
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An important consideration is that jurors' assessments of the credibility of child
witnesses and expert witnesses are likely to be predicated on different components.
Ross, Miller, and Moran (1987) found that subjects' general ratings of the
credibility of an 8-year-old and a 74-year-Old eyewitness did not differ, but the
factors predictive of credibility did. Wigmore (cited in Saks & Hastie, 1978, pp.
165-166) proposed five components of witness credibility; witness accuracy,
objectivity, character and demeanour, consistency of testimony, and corroboration.
In judging the credibility of child witnesses, accuracy may be a particularly salient
factor (Ross et aI., 1987), whereas objectivity is more likely to be pertinent to
subjects' perceptions of an expert's credibility.
4.2.3 Legal admonitions vs. legal reality :
the Juror as fact-finder or fact Interpreter
It has been suggested (Lempert, 1993; Sealy, 1989) that juries engage more in
fact interpreting than fact finding. Sealy cites the London School of Economics (LSE)
jury studies to show that the facts of the case were fairly well established but they
did not "speak for themselves" as far as indicating a verdict. Legal rules of
procedure attempt to lock jurors into a legal "consensual universe" (Farr &
Moscovici, 1981) with its own language, rituals and rules, and judges who deliver
admonitions to jurors to act merely as fact-finders, but such instructions may be
less than successful if jurors insist on fact interpretation, the mode of elaboration to
which they are accustomed in their own consensual universe.
Sealy (1989) reviewed a number of major jury studies to reach the conclusion
that interpretation dominates over fact establishment, and noted that jurors indulge
in a high degree of elaboration' beyond the facts to rationalize particular
interpretations. For example in the LSE studies, Sealy observes that much of the
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deliberation was spent discussing minor inconsistencies and other themes in the rape
victim's evidence which might tend to justify acquitting the defendant. The
elaboration by some jurors of relatively minor inconsistencies suggests that there
may also be a process of selective perception and/or biased assimilation (Lord, Ross,
& Lepper, 1979) of certain parts of particular witnesses' testimony.
Pennington and Hastie (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993) and Lempert (1993)
maintain that jurors construct a narrative organization or "story", after the facts,
which constitutes an interpretation of what the evidence is about. After reviewing
traditional models of juror decision making, including the Information Integration
model (Kaplan & Schersching, 1981), Bayesian models (Marshall & Wise, 1975;
Schum, 1977; Schum & Martin, 1993), Poisson process stochastic models (Kerr,
1978, 1993; Thomas & Hogue, 1976), and sequential weighting models (Walker,
Thibault, & Andreoli, 1972), Pennington and Hastie (1981) note that these models
all assume that the juror engages in some form of linear, sequential processing.
From their own research, Pennington and Hastie conclude that juror decisions do not
show a continuous updating pattern and that there is a multiplicity of non-linear
interdependencies among evidence items. They also maintain that the process of
interpreting event sequences continues past the point at which all the evidence has
been heard. If the juror's interpretation or "story" is crucial in decision making
then important elements of that story construction process may be the juror's
interpretations of how the witnesses themselves interpret events, especially in
cases where there is relatively little disputation about the "facts".
In the sexual assault case used in this thesis, there is considerable agreement
between plaintiff and defendant about basic facts leading up to the incident, but there
is also considerable scope for jurors to construct different interpretations of the
evidence depending upon the degree to which they believe the child may have
misinterpreted the father's actions, or the extent to which they believe post-event
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suggestions may have led the child to retrospectively misinterpret the incident. The
juror's on-going process of interpretation throughout the trial may be accompanied
by a tendency to selectively attend to both the child's and the expert's evidence.
In the scenario used in this thesis, particular aspects of the psychological expert
testimony may be salient for particular interpretations of the evidence. If the juror
engages in constructing an interpretation based on the belief that the child has
I
exaggerated inadvertent touching of the genitals (which the father admits he may
have done while rubbing the child's legs) into genital manipulation and/or
penetration, then the psychologist's evidence on children's reality monitoring may
be considered especially pertinent and may be closely scrutinized by the juror for
evidence which supports his/her interpretation. Alternatively, a juror who is
inclined towards believing that the child's mother may have imparted post-event
suggestions involving fabrication or exaggeration of the incident may selectively
attend to the expert's evidence on children's susceptibility to suggestion.
4.2.4 Predictions from social psychology concerning the
relative Impact of adversarlal and nonadversarlal expert testimony.
Petty and Oacloppo's (1986b) persuasion theory proposes that trustworthiness
and expertise are the major components of perceived credibility. While there is no
apparent reason why adversarial and nonadversarial experts should differ on
perceived expertise, the adversarial expert, appearing as an advocate for one side in
the case, may be perceived by jurors as less trustworthy than an expert in a
nonadversarial role. If a nonadversarial expert is seen as more trustworthy and
impartial then there may be greater message acceptance. However, Chaiken's
(1987) heuristic model of persuasion predicts that jurors may be more likely to
adopt a heuristic or "rule of thumb" mode of processing with an expert whom they
consider less likely to be biased, and their motivation to carefully process
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nonadversarial expert testimony may be lower. Therefore, nonadversarial expert
testimony may be more readily accepted but less carefully scrutinized.
Petty and Cacioppo's (1986a) elaboration likelihood model predicts diminished
motivation to process systematically when perceived communicator expertise is
high, but if perceived expertise is unrelated to expert role, there may be no
differences, on this model, between processing modes for adversarial and
nonadversarial testimony. Petty and Cacioppo's model, however, also suggests that
other characteristics of the communicator may pre-dispose jurors to hold positive
or negative expectations about a message. If a juror's schema for "adversarial
expert" is associated with derogatory cognitions about "hired guns" or
"saxophones", then the juror may be more inclined towards finding faults or
deficiencies in that expert's evidence than would be the case with a nonadversarial
expert. Inferences from persuasion theories lead towards the hypothesis that
communications from a nonadversarial source may be more readily accepted and
have a more significant impact, but may also be accepted with less scrutiny.
4.3 Summary
Convergence from the theories of communication and persuasion discussed in this
chapter leads to the following hypotheses relevant to the first three experiments of
this thesis :
1. Expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities from a nonadversarial
source is likely to be accepted as coming from an impartial educator and have
significant impact on jurors' evaluations of a child witness.
2. The same expert testimony from an adversarial source may be less well
accepted and be less influential in jurors' evaluations of a child and in subsequent
decision making.
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3. Jurors are prone to fact interpretation rather than fact finding. Therefore,
their interpretations of the degree to which the child may have misinterpreted the
alleged sexually abusive incident will be a particularly salient factor in their
decision making.
4. Jurors' interpretations of evidence tend to be non-linear and on-going, even
after all the evidence is heard. Therefore, the impact of variations in the temporal
order in which evidence is presented will not be significant.
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5.1 Summary of Chapters 2-4
1. Evidentiary analyses of psychological expert testimony suggest that currently
in common law countries, such testimony is more likely to be admitted if it is
considered to be
1) of assistance to the trier of fact
2) relevant
3) not unduly prejudicial
4) of such a nature as to address malters which are beyond the common
knowledge of jurors
5) of such a nature as to avoid the expression of a direct opinion on any
ultimate legal issues in the case.
2. Reviews of court decisions indicate that expert testimony which deals in
,
generalizations about characteristic attributes, behaviours or abilities of a
particular group of which the plaintiff (or defendant) is or may be a member may
be more acceptable to the courts than specific testimony.
3. There is some evidence from studies of jurors' perceptions of child witnesses
that jurors may hold certain misconceptions about children's cognitive/testimonial
abilities. A number of authors prominent in the psycho-legal field have argued for
a type of expert testimony which may address this problem without being unduly
prejudicial to the defendant in a child sexual abuse case. Such testimony would
detail research findings on the general capabilities of child witnesses, not the
credibility or characteristics of a particular child.
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4. There is a dearth of empirical studies on the impact of psychological expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases, and published statements about the impact of
such testimony are invariably speculative.
5. Predictions from social psychological theories indicate that psychological
expert testimony may be influential in jurors' pre-deliberation decision-making
and that nonadversarial expert testimony may be more readily accepted than the
same body of testimony presented in adversarial mode.
6. In this thesis, four studies are reported which were designed to investigate
the juridical impact, in child sexual abuse cases, of psychological expert testimony
concerning children's general cognitive abilities. In all the studies use is made,
either alone or as a role variation, of the court-appointed (nonadversarial) expert
mode of presentation, recommended by prominent authors in the psycho-lsqal area.
5.2 Overview of experimental studies in this thesis
In Experiment 1, presence or ab~,ence of expert testimony, age of the child
victim/witness (6, 9 or 12 years), and gender of the child were manipulated in a
2x3x2 factorial design. In order to minimise possible confounding role effects, the
expert testimony was presented by a court-appointed witness so that the focus of the
investigation might remain on the impact of the content of the testimony. It was
hypothesised that subjects exposed to the expert testimony would assess the child
more favourably on those child-based credibility variables that were addressed by
the expert, with a possible age gradient, that is, a greater effect with the 6 year old
children and less with the 12 year old children. It was further hypothesised that
more favourable judqernents of the child's credibility would be a mediating factor in
outcome decisions, specifically higher ratings of defendant guilt.
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Without an expert in the adversarial role, no conclusions could be drawn about
the relative impact of the jurors' perceptions of impartiality and assistance.
Therefore, in Experiment 2, the same stimulus materials and body of expert
testimony were used in an expert role manipulation. The design was essentially a 2
(expert role: court appointed vs witness for the prosecution) x 2 (age of child: 6
vs 9 years) x 2 (gender of child). Further, to allow scope for a full investigation of
gender effects and interactions, both male and female psychological experts were
used. It was hypothesised that jurors who saw the court-appointed experts may
perceive them more as impartial educators and their testimony might be more
likely to enhance perceptions of the child's cognitive abilities than the testimony of
the prosecution expert who was more likely to be seen as a biased advocate.
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether the relative temporal order of
the presentation of the child's and expert's testimony led to differential outcomes.
The design was a 2 (order of expert testimony presentation: before vs after child's
testimony) x 2 (Age of female victim/witness: 6 vs 9 years). A control group in a
no-expert condition was also used. II was hypothesised that the expert testimony
presented prior to the child's might be better utilized in that it might serve to
modify stereotypical attitudes or misconceptions jurors may have about child
witnesses before jurors saw the child. However, predictions from Pennington and
Hastie's (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993) story model suggest that temporal
order variations may not be significantly different. .
In Experiment 4, the impact of the generalised expert testimony used in the first
three experiments relative to two other types of expert testimony was investigated,
with varying quality of child's evidence. The design was a 3 (type of expert
testimony: cognitive abilities, psychological consequences, statement analysis) x 2
quality of the child's statement (moderate vs enhanced) x 2 (expert role: court-
48
appointed vs prosecution). It was hypothesised that those exposed to the generalised
expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities would rate the child higher on
those variables, but as the other types of testimony were likely to enhance the
child's testimony in other ways, it was hypothesised that there would be no
differences in verdict outcomes across type of testimony. It was further
hypothesised that jurors who saw the child's enhanced quality statement would give
higher ratings of the child's credibility and defendant guilt than those who saw the
moderate statement. The final hypothesis was that, across all three types of expert
testimony, jurors would show greater acceptance of the court appointed expert's
evidence than the same testimony presented by the prosecution's expert.
5.3 Methodological issues and rationales
Before preparing the materials required for the experiments of this thesis a
number of methodological issues needed to be addressed. The following section
details the rationales for decisions pertaining to the format of the trial
presentations, the use of 6-person rather than 12-person juries, the need for
gender-balanced juries, the use of an ambiguous trial as a stimulus, and the matter
of stimulus sampling.
5.3.1 The use of videotaped trial- presentations rather than
written transcripts or real life
Some large scale studies, such as the Oxford studies (McCabe & Purves, 1974)
and later Chicago jury studies (Zeisel & Diamond, 1978) have used "shadow" juries
which sat in court and observed criminal cases in their entirety. The use of real
trials or re-enactments as stimulus trials provides manifestly high external
validity, while evidence presented on videotape has less external validity and has
also been argued to be less impactful because of its impersonal quality (Sharp,
1989). Nevertheless, when systematic variations necessitate multiple versions of
the same basic trial and small group deliberations are to be videotaped, real life
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presentations are not feasible. A particular problem with the use of videotaped
simulations is their relative brevity and inability to capture the complexities and
nuances of actual trials (Weiten & Diamond, 1979), but many studies using written
formats also use remarkably abbreviated transcripts.
It has been suggested that there are two fundamental differences between the use
of written and videotaped formats for trial presentation. Firstly, some authors have
proposed (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Ross et al., 1989) that written formats may
tap into jurors' stereotypes of protagonists, so that for jurors presented with child'
sexual abuse cases in transcript format, stereotypes of children of a certain age and
stereotypes of alleged molesters may be particularly salient mediators of jurors'
decision making. Ross et al. (1989) maintain that when mock jurors actually see a
witness, as they would be able to do in a real trial, confirmation or violation of the
juror's stereotypical expectations by the witness's behaviour strongly influences
perceived credibility.
Secondly, the modes of processing are hypothesised to vary according to the
communication modality, so that written format presentations are thought more
likely to involve systematic processing with a more careful appraisal of the material
communicated (Leippe & Romanczyk,1987), whereas videotaped presentations are
thought more likely to be heyristically processed, that is, with particular emphasis
on source characteristics (Chaiken & Eagley, 1980). A number of studies have
shown that contextual factors and communicator characteristics which are apparent
only to those who view the child, such as perceived speech style (Nigro et al.,
1989), demeanour and confidence (Hendry, Shaffer, & Peacock, 1989) are
powerful determinants of credibility.
In the experiments reported in this thesis the expert testimony is generalised
and no opinions are given about a particular child's abilities. It is up to the jurors
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to make their own inferences from the expert testimony to the particular child in
the case, and for this reason it was felt important to present subjects with the visual
image of a child of a certain age, while attempting also to ensure that contextual
differences across children of different ages and gender were minimised. Thus, no
interview was used wherein a child appeared anxious, distressed, or appeared to be
lacking in confidence. Alternatively, given that witness confidence is perceived as a
reliable indicator of accuracy (Loftus, 1979; Noon & Hollin, 1987) no interview or
segment was used wherein a child appeared to be manifestly over-eonfident, or
indulged in inappropriate behaviour such as smiling when giving answers which
would constitute part of the account of the sexually abusive incident. As far as
possible, differences in speech style and demeanour were closely monitored during
the interviews
5.3.2 Rationale for the use of 6-person Juries
It was decided to use 6-person juries throughout this research for two practical
reasons;
1) videotaping of deliberations, transcribing deliberations and content analysis
are all facilitated by the use of six-person rather than larger jury panels.
2) for convenience in assembling jury panels, it is easier to organise six people
to attend in the same place and at the same time than twelve, and
Since the Williams vs Florida (1970) case, 6-person juries have been used
with increasing frequency in U.S. criminal cases (Hans & Vidmar, 1986), but
indictable offences to which a not guilty plea is entered are tried before 12-person
juries in Australia and in England (Spencer & Flin, 1990). In Scotland, solemn
procedure cases are tried by a jUry of 15, albeit with a simple majority decision
rule (Spencer & Flin, 1990).
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While methodological concerns have been expressed about studies on jury size
(Lempert, 1975; Saks, 1977; Zeisel & Diamond, 1974), McCabe (1988) has noted
that participation in discussion and satisfaction with process is greater in smaller
groups, although Saks (1977) found no differences in satisfaction with the
deliberation process between 6-person and 12-person juries. Hastie, Penrod, and
Pennington (1983) concluded that neither trial outcomes nor the quality of
deliberations were significantly affected by using 6-person juries, although they
noted the likelihood of a more restricted diversity of viewpoints and a tendency to
reach unanimity more quickly than 12-person juries.
5.3.3 The need for a gender balance In research
Involving sexual assault cases
Hastie et al. (1983), after reviewing the literature on gender effects in jury
research, concluded that only two reliable generalizations could be made:
1) that males participated in deliberation to a greater degree, and
2) that, in rape cases, females more frequently rendered guilty verdicts.
Since then, other studies involving rape trials (Brekke & Borgida, 1988;
Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch, 1990; Spanos, Dubreuil & Gwynn, 1992) and child
sexual assault cases (Gabora et al., 1993; Ross et aI., 1994) have supported the
latter generalization, although significant gender effects on verdict were not found
by Duggan et al. (1988) using a child sexual assault scenario. Given the apparent
robustness of gender effects in sexual assault cases, potential confounding effects
were minimised in this thesis by ensuring gender-balanced juries throughout all
experiments. Weeks in advance, jurors were randomly allocated a time to attend.
Each trial viewing and deliberation session was organised with three males and three
females, who were all contacted the day before they were due to attend. If any juror
then failed to appear, viewing of the trial did not proceed and the session was
aborted, with thanks and apologies to those who had attended.
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5.3.4 The use of an ambiguous trial as stimulus
The trial scenario written for use in these experiments was adapted as far as
possible from actual trial transcripts, but to minimize the likelihood of early
unanimity during the deliberation process, an ambiguous scenario was developed that
involved conflicting accounts of the child and his/her father, and that would allow
jurors to surmise possible motivation for fabrication from either of the plaintiff's
parents, if they so desired. Dawes (1993) has proposed that any jury research
should use a multiplicity of cases and these should not be ambiguous cases. Aside
from the methodological difficulties involved in using multiple cases, there is
inherent ambiguity in !!.ill'. trial scenario as there is no way of establishing a
criterion of truth or correctness (Kadane, 1993), as one can never know that a
particular jury, either in real life or under experimental conditions, has come to
the "right" verdict.
5.3.5 The matter of stimulus sampflng
Some have proposed that research on juror decision making should incorporate
stimulus sampling (Dawes, 1993; Yuille & Wells, 1991). Wells, Turtle, and Luus
(1989) used fourteen eyewitnesses at ~ach of three age groups (8, 12, adult) and
found no significant inter-age differences in perceived credibility but considerable
intra-age group variability in jurors' perceptions of accuracy and credibility.
However, in the Wells et al. study, each eyewitness was asked to watch a videotaped
staged abduction and return the next day to answer seventeen questions concerning
the incident. As desirable as stimulus sampling may be, it was not feasible in the
experiments in this thesis. Ethical considerations precluded any involvement of
children in answering questions about sexual abuse, and for this reason a parallel
script was created in which the questions put and the child's answers were quite
innocuous. Even so, the process of recruiting suitable children of each gender at ages
6, 9, and 12 presented several difficulties to be overcome. The decision was made
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not to use professional actors in any of the roles, as the desired effect was to be one
of ordinary people involved in a criminal case. 'Therefore, approaches had to be made
to any friend or acquaintance who was known to have a child of the particular age and
gender.
Even though assured that there was no hint or mention of sexual abuse in the
child's actual interview (Appendix 4), a number of parents declined to allow their
children to participate. Further, some children who did have parental permission to
participate were interviewed and found to be unsuitable, even after rehearsal, either
because they appeared unduly anxious on videotape or because it was obvious that
they were reading the script which was written on large cue sheets and held behind
the interviewer. For these reasons it took some time to complete the interviews for
just one representative at each of the six age by gender conditions. Following the
videotaping of the interviews, weeks were then spent editing each of the original
interviews into the form required to show a child's account of a sexually abusive
incident. Given ,all the difficulties described, the possibility of using multiple
stimulus children in each age by gender condition was not practicable.
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Experiment one
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expert testimony concerning
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Chapter 6
Experiment 1: The Juridical Impact of psychological expert
testimony concerning children's cognitive abilities.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Experiment 1, the focus was on investigating the impact of the content of the
expert testimony and the psychologist was presented as a court-appointed expert so
that there was no inherent basis for jurors' perceptions of bias due to partisan role
demands. Perry and Wrightsman (1991), after analysing the problems associated
with child witnesses, recommended that nonspecific testimony on children's abilities
should be presented in a nonadversarial, nonpartisan manner to courts in order to
inform the triers of fact. In this experiment, ages and gender of the child
victim/witness were varied and the trial was presented in videotape format.
The expert testimony was generalized in that it did not address the specific
behaviours or abilities of the child complainant, nor did the expert attempt to point
out the connections between the general information and the situation of the child
witness. The psychologist sought merely to present a cognitive developmental
framework. His testimony summarized findings from relevant research across
differing age levels, on these four points:
1) the likelihood of a delay in disclosure
2) children's memory expertise, that is, their abilities to give complete and
accurate accounts of events,
3) children's reality monitoring abilities, that is, their abilities to distinguish
fact from fantasy,
4) children's susceptibilities to post-event misleading information.
addressed by this expert, and that these more favourable judgments of the child's
credibility would mediate higher ratings of defendant guilt.
6.2 METHOD
6.2.1 SUbjects
One hundred and forty-four subjects participated in the study, in 24 groups each
of six mock jurors. There were 72 undergraduate subjects drawn from an
introductory psychology course and 72 subjects were jury-eligible citizens from
the community, the equal numbers facilitating ANOVA analyses of student/community
differences. Students and community members sat on separate juries, so that a
student jury and a community jury were exposed to each of the twelve experimental
conditions. Community subjects were solicited by requesting undergraduate
psychology students to take a copy of a prepared letter and pass it to any jury-
eligible citizen known to them. The letter informed the recipient of the general
nature of the research without specifying the particular variables under
investigation, and invited replies on the form enclosed from anyone willing to
participate as a mock juror. It was explained in each letter that jurors would
deliberate in groups of six after watching a simulated reconstruction of a sexual
assault trial, and that the deliberations would be videotaped for later content
analysis. Each videotaped trial was viewed by two mock jury panels, one each from
the student and community samples.
The mean ages of the student participants (24.4 years) and the community
participants (36.5 years) were significantly different, 1(142) = 8.33, Q.<.001. As
expected, there were significant differences between the mean number of children of
the student participants (0.44) and the community participants (1.86), 1(142) =
6.51, 11.<.001), and also between the mean years of parenting experience for
students (1.84) and the community group (11.25), 1(142) = 7.57, 11.<.001. Mean
years of education (students, 12.7 years; community, 13.6 years) were not
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significantly different. There were no significant differences between the mean
ratings of the student and community groups on any of the dependent variable
measures or verdicts, so data from the two groups were combined for analysis.
6.2.2 Experimental Design
Age of the child victim/witness (6, 9, or 12 years), gender of child
victim/witness and presence or absence of expert testimony were varied in a 3x2x2
factorial design. Jurors were randomly assigned to the twelve cells, but a gender
balance of three male and three female members was retained in the composition of
every jury, permitting ANOVA analyses of juror gender effects.
6.2.3 Material
Videotapes
Twelve trial tapes were prepared following the 3x2x2 design. In preparing the
scenario, a number of actual trial transcripts were examined but it was decided to
develop a scenario which would be plausible across the three ages of victim/witness
under investigation. In the development of the scenario, dialogue from actual
transcripts was incorporated where possible. Two lecturers from the Law faculty at
the University of Tasmania assisted in developing the trial scripts. Both were very
,
familiar with child sexual abuse cases and had served on the Tasmanian Law Reform
Commission Committee in the preparation of that Commission's report on child
witnesses (Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania, 1989).
A male staff member from the Law Faculty played the role of judge and two female
final year law students played the roles of prosecuting and defence counsels. All
adults involved as actors in the simulation were given extensive information and
instructions, and were required to sign statements of informed consent (Appendix
2). Similar consent forms were signed by the parents of children involved in the
simulation (Appendix 2). All participants were given assurances of confidentiality.
The trial was videotaped in a courtroom, except for the children's testimonies, which
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were presented as videodepositions within the videotaped trial. The reception of
children's evidence by videodeposition was recommended by the Pigot Committee
(U.K.) and videodeposition admissibility in principle has been endorsed in the 1990
Criminal Justice Bill (U.K.) (Davies, 1991). Legislation allowing the admissibility
of videodepositions for child witnesses in the state of Tasmania in Australia has been
introduced following the recommendations of the Law Reform Commissioner (1989).
Following the format recommended by Pigot, each child was interviewed by a child
psychologist, this interview constituting the examination-in-chief, and then
interviewed by counsel for the defence, which interview constituted the cross-
examination. To protect the children who played the part of victim/witnesses
against possible adverse effects, a parallel script was created in which the questions
put and the child's answers were quite innocuous, a procedure developed by Thornton
(1989). All interviews were recorded using a video 8 recorder. The videotapes
were then edited into the final versions, by substituting different questions from the
interviewer onto the audio component of the videotape, using a Sony EVO-720P video
8 editor. The edited videotapes of each witness were then assembled into the sequence
required for each of the twelve trial presentations on VHS format. Changes in the
final wording of the transcripts for male and female child victims were minor.
Except for the child witness and the expert testimony, each jury panel heard the
same script lines and saw the same people playing the roles of the family doctor, the
child's mother and the defendant, and the interactions of those three with the judge
and prosecuting and defencecounsels werethe same.
In the development of the sexual abuse scenario, cognisance was taken of those
factors which are generally characteristic of intrafamilial sexually abusive acts
(Berliner & Conte, 1990; Christiansen & Blake, 1990; De Young, 1982; Russell,
1986). The characteristic factors incorporated into the present scenario were:
1) such acts do not usually involve violence or severe force,
2) coitus is more likely with pre-pubescent girls as fathers are more hesitant
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to engage in coitus after puberty.
3) most incestuous acts occur at home, usually in a bedroom or living room,
4) the usual time is the late evening, and
5) the child is often offered a bribe or inducement to perpetuate secrecy.
Although incest frequently involves an elaborate psycho-social "grooming"
process (Christiansen & Blake, 1990) leading to a progression of sexual acts over a
period, Berliner and Conte (1990) report that about 30 per cent of victims have a
single abuse experience, as was presented in this simulation.
A scenario was developed which involved conflicting accounts of the child and
his/her father, and which allowed jurors to surmise possible motivation for
fabrication from either of the complainant's parents, if they so desired. The child's
parents had separated months before the alleged incident. The child normally resided
with the mother, but spent some weekends with the father. On the last such weekend
stay, the child stated that slhe had developed leg cramps during the night and had left
the bedroom to seek help from his/her father in the living room. The father had
responded by removing the pyjama pants and then rubbing the affected areas of the
legs vigorously with oil. The father then alleged that the child had fallen asleep after
some minutes of rubbing and had been taken back to bed. The child alleged that the
rubbing developed further and was extended to the genital area, following which the
father had then introduced something into the anus/vagina which was extremely
painful. The child alleged having screamed out and requested the father to stop, but
that the father continued and moved up and down above the child. The child alleged
that he/she had kept his/her eyes closed throughout, but found the experience
extremely painful. The father was alleged to have subsequently bribed the child with
chocolate to avoid disclosure, which came one month later when the child declined to
go to the father's house and then revealed to the mother what had allegedly occurred.
The case for the defence rested largely on the absence of mens rea. The defence
admitted that the father did rub the child's legs with oil to ease the child's pain, and
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may even have made unintentional contact with the child's genital area, but there
was no conscious intention to commit a sexual act, and no subsequent allemptto buy
the child's secrecy.
Preparation of psychological expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities
The preparation of the expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities and
their capacities to give accurate and reliable accounts of events involved a review of
the prodigious empirical output since the early 1980's. Even the list of books and
papers which have reviewed, synthesised or compiled research into children's
memory, suggestibility or reality monitoring abilities is a considerable one (e.g.
Baxter, 1990; Benedek & Schetky, 1986; Berliner & Barbieri, 1984; Brooks &
Siegal, 1991; Bull, 1988; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1987;
Davies, 1989, 1993; Dent & Flin, 1992; Doris, 1991; Dunning, 1989; Eth, 1988;
Flin, 1988; Goldman, 1992; Goodman & Helgeson, 1985; Melton, 1981; Naylor,
1989; Nurcombe, 1986; Oates, 1990; Penrod, Bull, & Lengnick, 1989; Perry &
Wrightsman, 1991; Quinn, 1988; Rabinowitz, 1985; Rozell, 1985; Schwartz-
Kenney, Wilson, & Goodman, 1990; Spencer & Flin, 1990; Thomson, 1991; Yates,
1987).
The body of expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities was based on
studies published as of August, 1990, when the scripts were prepared for the
videotaping of the various trial segments. A large number of empirical studies have
been published since that time and some would certainly have warranted inclusion in
the expert's testimony had they been available. For example, results of the series of
experiments conducted by Clarke-Stewart, Thompson, and Lepore (Goodman &
Clarke-Stewart, 1991) showed that 5-year-old and 6-year-old children's
responses to interpretive questions, which were inconsistent with what they had
observed, were strongly influenced by the post-event suggestions imparted in the
experimental context. Nevertheless, the expert testimony, as prepared for this
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experiment made it clear, on the basis of then published research, that young
children were vulnerable to the influence of misleading information, especially
when it is supplied by an adult (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987) and that children in the
6-year-old to 9-year-old age group were susceptible to demand characteristics,
such as their perceptions of adults' expectations (King & Yuille, 1987).
The script was a brief summary of the major findings from research into
children's memory competence, susceptibility to suggestion, and reality monitoring,
and was based mainly on reviews of the pertinent literature available at that time
(Bull, 1988; Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1987; Dunning, 1989; Fundudis, 1989; Penrod,
Bull, & Lengnick, 1989). The expert also included testimony to explain why delayed
disclosures are common in child sexual assault cases. In brief, the content of the
psychological expert testimony, over the course of examination-in-chief and
subsequent cross-examination, provided the following information:
. Delayed disclosure Delayed disclosure was a typical reaction in cases of
sexual abuse (Summit, 1983). Possible reasons for delayed disclosure include
fear of retaliation, threats or inducements to keep a secret, a feeling of guilt or
self-blame in the child, fear of hurting a loved one.
Memory: Much research on children's memory has involved slides or
filmed stimuli and the results may not be good indicators of children's capacities
to report sexual assaults. Research indicates that young children may provide
less complete accounts of events than older children, but the accuracy of the
accounts may not vary much with age. When tested four or five days after a
playful interaction with an unfamiliar adult male, three year-olds had poorer
recall than six year-olds, but the six year-old children and adults performed
equivalently in answering objective questions and in identifying the man
(Goodman & Reed, 1986).
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Suggestlblflty: Both children and adults can be susceptible to the
influence of suggested material. Whether children are more suggestible depends
on other factors as well as age, including the degree of suggestion, the strength of
the memory, whether the information to be recalled was central or otherwise,
the status of the person asking the question, and the level of intimidation and
stress experienced by the child. Young children are more likely to be vulnerable
to the influence of misleading information when it is supplied by an adult rather
than a seven year-old child (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). In another study,
children in the six to nine year age group reported that they had "gone along"
with misleading suggestions because of what they perceived to be the adult
-
questionner's expectations and or wishes (King & Yuille, 1987). Some research
has shown no evidence of increased suggestibility in young children (Duncan,
Whitney, & Kunen, 1982; Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac, 1979). Other
research indicates that children less than about seven years of age may be
particularly vulnerable to misinformation which is concerned with peripheral
details. On central, salient details young children may be no more susceptible to
suggestive influence than adults (Johnson & Foley, 1984; King & Yuille, 1987).
Reality monitoring (ability to distinguish fact and fantasy): Piaget's
conclusions, based on his research, that children can consistently distinguish
between the real and the imaginary from about seven or eight years of age were
cited (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1969). Children as young as six can be as
accurate as adults when asked to distinguish between memories of what they said
and what another said to them (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). Some children
as old as nine may have difficulty distinguishing between what they did and what
they imagined they had done (Foley & Johnson, 1985). Children under about age
seven who lack full capacity for abstract thought are likely to base their
imaginative fantasies on actual experiences (DeYoung, 1987).
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The same expert testimony was used throughout and was delivered by a male
senior lecturer in psychology. The psychological expert was questioned by the judge
who also made it clear to the court at the outset that the witness was court-appointed
and not present to support either the prosecution or defence case. The psychologist
was cross-examined by defence counsel. For the jurors exposed to expert testimony,
the judge's final instructions included this paragraph :
You have heard the testimony of a psychologist. His testimony has
provided the court with results from psychological studies which have
investigated the behaviours displayed by children of various ages. Bear
in mind that his testimony is merely to provide information which you
are free to use or reject in your decision making. You are the trier of
fact and are solely responsible for any decisions you make.
The duration of the videotaped trial without expert testimony was approximately 33
minutes, and with expert testimony, 44 minutes.
Juror Pre-deliberation Questionnaire (Appendix 3)
Before deliberating, subjects assessed the child witness using a 9-point scale on
the following variables; confidence, consistency of testimony, reliability of memory,
resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring ability, attractiveness, and the
likelihood that the child did not misinterpret the defendant's actions. Subjects also
gave their assessment of the degree to which the abuse was harmful to the child,
assuming it occurred. Similarly, on 9-point scales, subjects also assessed the
degree to which the mother's and doctor's testimony enhanced the child's testimony,
and then rated the overall credibility of the child, the mother, and the defendant.
Those exposed to expert psychological testimony were asked to rate the helpfulness of
that testimony and the degree of impartiality of the psychologist expert. Jurors not
exposed to expert testimony were asked a similar question but worded
hypothetically, that is, they were asked to assess how helpful it would have been to
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have had 'expert psychological testimony concerning children's memory,
susceptibility/resistance to suggestion, ability to distinguish fact from fantasy and
the likelihood of a delay in disclosing sexual abuse. All jurors were asked to write
what features of the child's testimony were convincing and what features were
unconvincing. The questionnaire also requested juror age, sex, education, number of
children, and number of parenting years. Finally, subjects were asked to vote
guilty or not guilty and, on a 5-point scale, indicate the degree of certainty each felt
about their vote.
Post-deliberation
At the end of the 25 minute deliberation period, subjects were asked to rate the
child's confidence, consistency, reliability of memory, resistance to suggestion,
reality monitoring ability, and overall credibility, and then to vote guilty or not
guilty and give an indication of their subjective certainty.
6.2.4 Procedure
On arrival, jurors were given instructions (AppendiX 2.5) which stated that, as
a panel, they would view a videotaped simulation of a trial involving a child
complainant bringing an allegation of sexual assault against his/her father. It was
specified that each juror was to complete a brief questionnaire on aspects of the trial
before and after a deliberation process of 25 minutes duration, and the deliberations
were to be videotaped for later content analysis. Jurors' confidentiality was
guaranteed. Each subject was required to sign a statement of informed consent
(Appendix 2.6) before participating as a mock juror. This statement also explained
to the mock jurors that guarantees of confidentiality had been given to the actors in
the simulation.
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6.3 RESULTS
Expert testimony effects
As the expert testimony addressed the issues of children's memory, resistance to
suggestion and reality monitoring, these were the dependent variables of particular
interest in so far as it was hypothesised that jurors who heard the expert testimony
would assess the child more favorably on those variables. A multivariate E test
(3x2x2x2 MANOVA) using child age, expert testimony, gender of child and gender of
juror as the independent variables was calculated on the jurors' ratings of the
child's memory, resistance to suggestion and reality monitoring. The analysis
indicated significant main effects for the presence of expert testimony, (Wilks'
Lambda: [(3, 118) = .906, 12.<.05) and for juror gender, with female jurors'
ratings significantly higher (Wilks' Lambda : [(3, 118) = .930, 12.<.05). The
interaction of expert testimony x age of child x gender of juror was significant
(Wilks' Lambda : [(6, 236) = .894, 12.<.05). Further univariate analyses indicated
that while expert testimony x child age x gender of juror interactions were not
significant on ratings of the child's memory and reality monitoring, there was a
significant interaction on ratings of the child's resistance to suggestion. [(2,120) =
3.858, 12.<.05), with the mean for female jurors' ratings of the 9-year-old children
with expert present (M = 5.37) being lower than the mean for male jurors in the
same condition (M = 6.25). ANOVA tests indicated no significant impact of expert
testimony on ratings of the child's confidence, £(1,120) = 0.56, 12.>.05, or
consistency, £(1,120) = 2.65, 1l.>.05, or attractiveness, £(1,120) = 1.20,12.>.05,
or harmfulness of the alleged act, assuming it occurred, [(1,120) = 0.13, 12.>.05,
or the likelihood that the child had misinterpreted the defendant's actions, [( 1,120)
= 0.92, 12.>.05
Analysis of verdicts
Table 6.1 shows the frequency of guilty and not guilty pre-deliberation verdicts
and post-deliberation verdicts. in terms of each independent variable studied. The
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relationships between the independent variables and jurors' pre-deliberation
verdicts were analysed using a log-linear analysis.
--------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 6.1. Pre- & post-deliberation verdict frequencies by independ. variables.
PRE-DELIBERATION POST-DELIBERATION
Guilty Not guilty Guilty Not guilty
EXPERT TESTIMONY OONDITION
Expert present 48 24 43 29
No expert 38 34 32 40
GENDER OF ~ILD OONDITION
Male 46 26 38 34
Female 40 32 37 35
AGE OF~ILD OONDITION
Six years 29 19 24 24
Nine years 26 22 22 26
Twelve years 31 17 29 19
GENDER OFJUROR OONDITION
Male 33 39 31 41
Female 53 19 44 28
Column totals (for each Ind.Var) 86 58 75 69
----------------------------------------------------------
There were no significant differences in the number of guilty votes with respect
to the gender or age of the child or the presence of expert testimony, nor were there
any significant interactions. The log-linear analysis showed a significant main
effect for juror gender, X 2 (1, !i=144) = 11.12, \2.<.01), with female jurors
significantly more likely to vote for conviction. Before deliberation, 73.6% of the
female jurors voted for conviction, compared to 45.8% of the male voters. After
deliberation, both juror gender groups showed some movement toward acquittal,
12% change in the female jurors, and 4% change in the male juror group. After
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nominating their verdicts, jurors were also asked to rate their degree of certainty I
uncertainty on a five-point scale. These ratings were used to scale verdicts along a
continuum from 1 (very certain defendant is not guilty) through varying degrees of
uncertainty up to 10 (very certain defendant is guilty). These scaled verdicts are
referred to in this experiment and subsequent experiments as verdict ratings. On
these verdict ratings, there was a significant difference, 1(142) = 2.63, 12.<.01,
between those exposed to expert testimony (M = 6.9, SD = 2.7) and those without
expert testimony (M = 5.6, SD = 2.9). There was also a significant difference
between pre- and post-deliberation verdict ratings for the female jurors, 1(71) =
2.45, 1l<.05, but not significant difference for the male jurors.
Balance of verdicts within Juries.
Table 6.2 shows the balance of verdicts within juries before and after the
deliberation process. Only one jury panel prior to and after deliberation was
unanimous in voting guilty.
Table 6.2 Number of jury panels with a particular balance of verdicts
before and after deliberation.
Unanimous Majorityfor Balanced
Not guilty Not guilty (3 - 3)
Pre-deliberation
Majority for Unanimous
Guilty Guilty
Expert present
Expert absent .
Post-deliberation
Expert present
Expert absent
o
o
o
o
2
3
2
5
3
5
4
5
6
4
5
2
o
o
--------------------------------------------------------------------
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EvaluatIons of the expert testImony
Those jurors who heard the expert testimony were asked to assess the
impartiality of the psychologist and the helpfulness of his testimony. On
assessments of impartiality there was no significant difference between the mean
rating (M =7.11, SD = 1.69) for those voting for conviction (n =48) and the mean
(M = 6.62, §Q =2.14) for those who voted for acquittal <rL= 24). Those who voted
for conviction ui =' 48) rated the expert testimony as being significantly more
helpful (M = 7.76, ~ = 1.42) than did the jurors (n =24) who voted for acquittal
(M =5.79,~ = 2.18), 1(70) = 4.61,12.<.01.
Jurors who did not receive the expert testimony were asked to give a hypothetical
rating, on a 9-point scale, of how helpful they would have found expert psychological
testimony on the areas which were addressed. The mean for jurors who voted guilty
was 7.42 (~ = 1.78), and for those who voted not guilty, 7.64 (~ = 1.25), a
nonsignificant difference. Regardless of whether they voted for conviction or .
acquittal, the high ratings appear to indicate that jurors anticipated that they might
have found the psychological expert testimony helpful, had they been exposed to it.
Gender of chUd effec~
Relative to the male child witnesses, the female child witnesses were rated as
significantly more resistant to suggestion, E(1, 120) = 6.1, 12-<.05, and
significantly more attractive, £(1,120) = 16.6, 11.<.01. There was a significant
gender of child x gender of juror interaction on ratings of the child's consistency.
Relative to the female jurors, male jurors gave the male child significantly lower
ratings on consistency, £(1,120) = 5.44, 11.<.05, but there was no corresponding
juror gender difference on this variable with the female child.
A significant interaction involving gender of child x gender of juror x child age
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was noted on ratings of the child's reality monitoring ability, E(l, 120) = 3.26,
Q.<.05. Male jurors gave the 6-year-old girl (M = 6.04) higher ratings .on reality
monitoring than the 6-year-old boy (M = 5.08), and the female jurors gave the
12-year-old girl (M = 7.16) higher ratings on reality monitoring than the 12-
year-old boy (M = 5.91).
Age of child effects
There were no significant differences on any dependent variable with respect to
the age of the child.
Gender of juror effects
The retention of gender-balanced juries throughout facilitated analysis of gender
of juror effects on the child-based dependent variables. Female jurors gave
significantly higher ratings to the child victim on memory, E(l, 120) = 3.97, Q.<
.05, resistance to suggestion, E(l, 120) = 4.48, ~ .05, reality monitoring,
E(l,120) = 7.33, Q.<.05, and overall credibility, E(l,120) = 8.72, /2.<.01, and
They also gave significantly higher pre-deliberation verdict ratings, that is,
certainty of guilt ratings, E(l,120) = 7.78, Q.<.01. There was also a significant
interaction associated with the attractiveness variable, E(l,120) = 4.80, Q.<.05. In
the absence of expert testimony, male jurors, relative to female jurors, rated the
children significantly lower on attractiveness, but there was no significant juror
gender difference when the expert was present.
Table 6.3 shows the mean ratings for the child-based dependent variables and for
pre-deliberation verdict ratings with respect to all the independent variables.
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Table 6.3 Mean ratings for child-based dependent variables and mean verdict
ratings. by independent variables
Confid Consist Memory Resist to Reality Hannful Attract Non-mis Verdict Credibility
suggest monitor -interp rating of child
Expert Testimony
Presence 5.9 7.1 6.7 5.8 6.7 6.9 5.4 7.0 6.9 6.7
Absence 5.7 6.7 6.0 5.0 5.9 7.0 5.2 6.7 5.7 6.2
Gender of child
Male 5.6 6.8 6.3 5.0 6.3 7.1 4.9 6.9 6.5 6.5
Female 6.0 7.0 6.4 5.7 6.3 6.9 5.6 6.7 6.1 6.5
Age of child
6 years 5.7 7.0 6.3 5.3 6.1 7.1 5.3 7.0 6.4 6.9
9 years 5.9 6.9 6.4 5.6 6.6 7.0 5.1 6.8 5.8 6.3
12 years 5.7 6.9 6.4 5.2 6.2 6.9 5.5 6.7 6.6 6.2
Gender ofJuror
Male 5.8 6.7 6.1 5.1 5.9 6.8 5.1 6.2 5.6 6.1
Female 5.8 7.1 6.6 5.7 6.7 7.2 5.4 7.4 6.9 6.9
AnalysIs of IndIvIdual votes
Prior to the deliberation process. jurors who voted the defendant guilty (0. = 86)
also rated the child higher on consistency of testimony, (1 = 4.01. 12<.01). memory.
(1 = 4.53, \2.<.01), resistance to suggestion, (1 = 3.67, \2.<.01), ability to
distinguish between fact and fantasy. (1 = 4.55, 12< .01), on the extent to which the
abuse would have harmed the child. assuming it occurred. (1 = 2.75. 12<.01), and on
overall credibility.I] = 7.44 • 1L<.01). They also rated the mother's credibility
significantly higher. (1 = 5.04. 11.<.01) and the defendant's credibility significantly
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lower, (1 = 3.57, Q.<.Ol), and were less likely to attribute misinterpretation of the
incident to the child, (1 = 6.95, Q.<.Ol.)
Correlation and regressIon analyses
Intercorrelations of the child-based dependent variables, confidence,
consistency, memory ability, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring,
harmfulness of the alleged act, the child's attractiveness, the likelihood that the child
did not misinterpret the defendant's actions, pre-deliberation verdict ratings, and
jurors' assessments of the child's overall credibility are shown in Table 6.4.
Differential reliability of the individual child-based ratings may have accounted for
some differences in the magnitude of the correlations.
-------------------------------------------------------
Table 6.4 Inter-correlations between verdicts and child-based dependent variables
Confid Consist Memory Resist to Reality Harmful Attract Non-mis Verdict
suggest monitor -interp rating
Consistency
.49 •
Memory
.40 • .63 •
Resistance to
.27 • .37 .39 •
suggestion
Reality
.23 • .49 • .43 • .48 •
monitoring
Harmfulness .08 .14 .06.
.22 • .08
Attractiveness .16 .16. .17
.24 • .27 • .01
Non - mis
.23 • .47 • .46 • .30 • .55 • .25 • .13
-interpretation
Verdictrating
.25 •
.42 • .44 • .37 • .40 • .20 • .17 .54 •
Overall child
.34 • .52 • .48 • .40 • .50 • .21 • .14 .60 • .61 •
Credibility
* p-c.n t
To examine which of the child-based ratings made by jurors were most highly
predictive of the jurors' ratings of the child's credibility, a stepwise regression
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analysis was used. The quantitative rating made by jurors as to the likelihood that
the child had not misinterpreted the defendant's actions accounted for the most
substantial proportion of the variance (R2 = .365) and the next highest R2 values
were for the variables of consistency and resistance to suggestion. These three
variables accounted for 46% of the total variance in child credibility ratings. The
same predictor variables were entered into a stepwise regression analysis with the
jurors' quantitative verdict ratings as the target variable. Again, likelihood of the
child's non-misinterpretation accounted for the highest proportion of variance (R2
= .294), with resistance to suggestion and memory having the next highest R2
values. These three variables accounted for 36% of the variance in verdict ratings.
To investigate the hypothesis that rationales for verdicts differ with the age of
the child victim (Goodman et aI., 1989), a stepwise multiple regression analysis
using the same child-based ratings was conducted for each age of child victim. For
those jurors who saw the 6-year-old children, the likelihood of the child's not
misinterpreting the event, followed by resistance to suggestion were the best
predictors of pre-deliberation verdicts for the child's credibility (total 8.2 = .472)
and for verdict ratings (total B.2 = .499). For jurors who viewed the 9-year-old
complainants, reality monitoring ability, followed by the likelihood of the child's not
misinterpreting the event were the most salient predictors of the child's credibility
ratings (total R2 = .53), and reality monitoring ability was the best predictor of
verdict ratings (R2 = .439), with no further significant contribution to variance
from any other variable. Reality monitoring ability, followed by memory ability
and consistency were the chief predictors of the child's credibility for jurors who
saw the twelve years-old witnesses (total R2 = .68), and the likelihood of the child
not having misinterpreted the event, followed by memory ability were most salient
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as predictors of verdict ratings for jurors who saw the 12-year-old children (total
8.2 = .30).
6.4 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIONS
The deliberations of every jury group were videotaped and the contents
transcribed. The contents of deliberations were analysed to determine how content
varied as a function of the independent variables. The codebook used for the content
analysis (see Appendix 11) was adapted from the codebook originally devised by
Murray Levine and colleagues for use in the Duggan et al. study (1989). Two coders
each had a preliminary six hours training in the use of the codebook. Following
Duggan et al. (1989), the conversational "turn" was used as the unit of analysis,
and each coder decided whether more than one content theme was contained within
each utterance unit.
In assigning juror statements to the codebook categories, agreement between the
coders from one deliberation to another ranged from 63% to 82%. Disagreements
regarding classification were resolved by the two coders conferring with each other
and a third person, who was also trained in the use of the codebook classifications,
!
and who acted as the final arbiter, a technique used by Duggan et al. (1989). The
most frequent sources of disagreement were between the categories 99 (Uncodable
Statements), 97 (Personal anecdotes), 92 (Task focus), and 91 (Rule and role
focus). With regard to jurors' perceptions of the child witness, the most frequent
disagreements between coders were between the categories 10V (General belief), 12
(No cognitive distortion) and 17V (Sufficient explanation).
Prior to the statistical analyses, frequency data from some categories were
combined. Categories 14V, 15V and 16V all dealt with jurors' perceptions of
whether the child acted appropriately, and were therefore combined, as were the
data from categories 24V to 26V inclusive, which concerned perceptions of whether
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th-e child had acted inappropriately. Similarly. data were combined for categories
150 and 160, involving jurors' perceptions of whether the defendant had acted
appropriately, and for categories 250 and 260, which dealt with jurors'
perceptions of whether the defendant had acted inappropriately. Where two
categories reflected the opposite poles of a dichotomy, the frequency data for each
juror were combined using the formula, a-b/a-b, to give a score which took account
of the general orientation of the jurors' comments (favourable or unfavourable to
the child) as a proportion of the total number of comments the juror made about
belief or disbelief in the child. Frequency data from the following categories were
combined into single dichotomouscategories :
Dichotomous categories relatIng to perceptions of the child
10V (Expressions of general belief in the child) - 20V (expressions of general
disbelief in the child)
11V (child's demeanour appropriate) - 21V (child's demeanour inappropriate)
12V (child does not display cognitive distortion) - 22V (child does display
cognitive distortion)
13V (no apparent reason for child to lie) - 23V (child has motivation to lie)
14V to16V inclusive (child behaved appropriately) - 24V to 26V inclusive
"(child behaved inappropriately)
17V (content of child's testimony sufficiently explains events) - 27V (content of
child's testimony is insufficient explanation)
l8V (Naivete) - 28V (Child has the intellectual capacity to lie)
Dichotomous categories relating to the lntervlew with the child
19Ps (psychologist conducted interview appropriately) - 29 Ps (interview was
not conducted appropriately)
19X ( cross-examination of child was appropriate) - 29X (cross. examination of
child was inappropriate)
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Dichotomous categories relating to perceptions of the defendant
10D (Expressions of general belief in the defendant) - 200 (expressions of
general disbelief in the defendant)
110 (defendant's demeanour appropriate) - 210 (defendant's demeanour
inappropriate)
130 (no apparent reason for defendant to lie) - 230 (defendant has motivation
to lie)
150 and 160 combined (defendant behaved appropriately) - 25D and 26D
combined (defendant behaved inappropriately)
17D (content of defendant's testimony sufficiently explains events) • 27D
(content of defendant's testimony is insufficient explanation)
Dichotomous categories relating to discussion of evidence
51M (Mother's testimony enhances the child's case) - 52M (Mother's testimony
does not enhance the child's case)
51Dr (Doctor's testimony enhances the child's case) • 52Dr (Mother's
testimony does not enhance the child's case)
51Ps (Psychologist's testimony enhances the child's case) - 52Ps
(Psychologist's testimony does not enhance the child's case.
,
For all other categories, frequency data were analysed without modification.
There were, ultimately, 46 categories as listed below:
7 dichotomous categories relating to jurors' perceptions of the child witness,
5 dichotomous categories relating to perceptions of the defendant,
2 dichotomous categories dealing with the appropriateness of the
,
examination-in-chief and cross examination,
10 categories on jurors' discussion of evidence, plus 3 dichotomous categories
9 categories on juror conclusions and concerns,
7 categories on process issues, &
3 miscellaneous categories.
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In the following analyses, alpha was set at .01, because of the large number of
content categories.
Presence/absence of expert testimony:
Those jurors who saw the expert testimony engaged in significantly more
discussion of the child's testimony, £(1,143) = 6.71, ~= .01, and were more likely
to mention inconsistencies between the child's testimony and the father's testimony,
F(1,143) = 7.61, /2.<.01.
Those who did not see the expert testimony were more likely to make statements
concerning insufficiency of evidence, £(1,143) = 12.14, ~<.001, and were more
likely to express concern for the consequences of the verdict for the child, £( 1,143)
= 9.4, l2.<.01, and for the defendant, E(1,143) = 12.2, l2.<.001. They were also
more likely to advance the hypothesis that the child's mother had acted as a
fabricating or embellishing agent.
Gender of child:
There was significantly more discussion of the child's evidence with female
victim witnesses, E(l, 143) = 6.71, l2..<.01, and the mother's testimony was
perceived as more likely to enhance the child's case with a female child, F (1,143) =
7.5, l2..<.01. There were more expressions of concern about consequences of the trial
for the defendant when the complainant child was male, £(1,143) = 9.61, l2..<.01.
Age of child:
There was significantly more advancing of alternative hypotheses as
interpretations of the alleged incident by jurors who saw the 12-year-old victim!
witnesses relative to those who saw the nine year old children (Fisher's PLSD = .55,
Q.<.01).
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Gender of juror:
Female jurors were less inclined to think that the medical doctor's testimony had
enhanced the case, E(l,143) = 8.32, 1l<.01. The mean number of utterance units
per deliberation was substantially, but not significantly (1l=.12) higher for females
(M = 35.2) than for male jurors (M = 30.5).
Student SUbjects vs Community SUbjects :
Relative to community subjects, students were more likely to make inaccurate
statements (see Appendix 11, Content Analysis Codebook, category 60), E(l,143) =
6.61, 1l=01, and inappropriate statements (see Appendix 11, Content Analysis
Codebook, categories 81-83), [(1,143) = 15.98, 1l<.001. Some examples of
inappropriate statements from the student deliberation transcripts were :
"Yes, I think where there is doubt you should go with the child" (from case with
9-year-old girl victim).
"If it was your daughter, if that was your daughter, would you on the evidence,
would you say the mongrel should be in jail?" (from case with 12-year-old
girl victim).
"He should be punished for what he's done to her, but we can't prove it" (from
case with 12-year-old girl victim)
"I only put guilty because we had to put one or the other"(from case with 6-
year-old boy victim).
"It's such a sick and horrid crime you instantly jump to the defence of the child"
(from case with 6-year-old boy victim).
"I would like to think he's guilty but I couldn't put someone away when there is a
possibility he is innocent because the stigma attached to that is ... soul-
destroying" (from case with 6-year-old boy victim).
"It's also because you know how many people do get away with it, and you sort of
want this guy to pay for everyone else" (from case with 6-year-old boy
victim).
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"The 9-year-old male isn't really a male in the full sense of the word, because
he hasn't gone through puberty and got the, but he still is a sex role, and he
is still a child" (from case with 9-year-old boy victim).
"Even if it did happen I don't think the damage done in a crime like this is all that
bad" (from case with 12-year-old boy victim).
There was a tendency for male students to make more inaccurate statements than
female students, but this did not reach significance (g,=.07). The tendency for
students to want more information about the defendant's sexual or criminal history
than the community subjects approached significance (p-=.02). Relative to the
community subjects, students were also more likely to express concern about the
consequences of the trial and/or verdict for the child, E(l,143) = 19.95, 1l..S..001,
and for the defendant, E(l,143) = 13.65, g,<.001. Finally the number of statements
considered uncodable, because the meaning was unclear or they were expressions not
classifiable under any category, was significantly higher for student jurors,
E(l,143) = 12.28, p-<.001.
RelatIonshIp of deliberation contents to verdIcts
A stepwise multiple regression analysis was used to determine the relationship
between content analysis categories and the jurors' quantitative ratings of post-
deliberation verdicts. The most salient predictor of verdicts was the proportion of
favourable or unfavourable comments made by a juror concerning the child victim's
cognitive abilities (8.2 =.208). The next contributing variable, bringing R2 to
.289 was the proportion of statements indicating that the juror considered the child
would not have been capable of fabricating or maintaining a fabrication relative to
statements that the child did have the intellectual capacity to lie. Further
contributions to variance were made by the degree to which jurors regarded the
mother's testimony as enhancing the child's case, the number of jurors' statements
about the appropriateness of the child's behaviour during and after the alleged sexual
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assault, and the proportion of favourable or unfavourable comments made about the
child's demeanour and manifest affect. These five variables together accounted for
41% of the variance in post-deliberation verdicts.
6.5 DISCUSSION
The aim in the present study was to investigate the impact of general
psychological testimony on mock jurors in a simulated sexual abuse trial. The
expert testimony did not bear on the substance of the allegation of sexual abuse nor
did it advert to, any specific characteristics or behaviours of the child complainant,
rather it informed the court of what His Honour Justice Pigot (1989) termed the
'fruits of modern research into child psychology' (p. 210). While the expert
testimony had significant impact on the child-based variables, the impact on
verdicts was less clear. The jurors who heard the general testimon,Y on children's
memory expertise, reality monitoring and resistance to suggestion rated the child
complainant significantly higher on these variables. Those who heard the expert
testimony gave significantly higher ratings of the defendant's guilt on a 10-point
scale, but the effect of the presence or absence of expert testimony on dichotomous
guilty/innocent verdicts failed to reach significance. The findings lend support to
\
Haugaard's (1988) claim that a court-appointed psychologist's testimony regarding
the cognitive abilities of children in general may increase the jurors' perceptions of
the child's credibility or, as Haugaard (1988) terms it, the 'value' of the child's
testimony in a sexual abuse case. It is not clear, however, whether that increased
'value' of the child's testimony mediates increased numbers of guilty verdicts. In
this study, the presence of the psychologist's expert testimony was related to
increased guilty verdicts, but the trend failed to reach significance. However, on the
scale incorporating degree of certainty in one's verdict decision, the effect of the
presence of expert testimony was highly significant. Previous studies (Goodman et
aI., 1987; Ross et aI., 1989) have found no straightforward link between the weight
attached to a child's key witness testimony and case decision. A possible
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interpretation of the present findings is that while the effect of exposure to the
expert testimony had no significant effect on pre-deliberation verdicts, it may have
been particularly salient in increasing the degree of certainty in those jurors who
voted for the defendant's guilt.
It is of particular interest that the most salient predictor of both the child's
perceived credibility and the verdict ratings was not one of the child-based variables
addressed in the expert testimony but rather the jurors' ratings of the likelihood
that the child may have misinterpreted the defendant's actions. In the case presented
to the jurors the major protagonists in the trial differed little on facts, except for
the differing accounts of the details of the alleged incident given by the child and by
the defendant. The child's story was that there was full and painful penetration. The
defendant claimed that if he made any contact at all with the genitals while he rubbed
the child's legs it was inadvertent and nothing more. Thus, the jurors' beliefs
concerning the likelihood that the child may have misinterpreted the defendant's
action were salient, suggesting, as Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1988, 1992,
1993) have proposed, that jurors tend to construct a story, or causal explanation of
the evidence, based on their interpretations of key evidentiary information.
The pattern of juror gender differences on pre-deliberation verdicts was similar
to that found by Gabora et al. (1993) with female complainant witnesses aged 13 and
17, in a simulated child sexual abuse case. The juror gender differences found in
this experiment and in the other studies of this thesis are discussed further in
Chapter 11.
The finding in this experiment of no significant main effects for credibility
according to the age of the child victim differs from the findings of Duggan et al.
(1989). It was hypothesised that the expert's testimony on children's cognitive
abilities may have greater impact on those who saw the 6-year-old children.
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Indeed, the expert had much to say about children in the 6-year-old to 9-year-old
range and very little to say about 12-year-olds. It may be that the testimony, being
generalised, had a pervasively enhancing effect on jurors' perceptions of children,
which might be the case if jurors were inclined to adopt a heuristic mode of
processing with the court-appointed expert, and did not attend carefully to details
concerning the ages specified by the expert. Another interpretation is that jurors
exposed to the 12-year-old children, hearing the favourable research findings with
regard to much younger children's cognitive abilities, may have responded by
attributing higher levels of testimonial capacity to the older children than jurors
who had not heard the evidence concerning younger children. The implications of the
non-significant victim age results for understanding jurors' perceptions of child
witnesses at various ages are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.
It was noted by Duggan et al. (1989) and also in this study, that considerable
emphasis was placed, during deliberations, on the meaning of proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt". A number of jurors stated that, although they believed the child's
version of what had occurred, they still maintained sufficient doubt to constitute a
'reasonable doubt". More puzzling was the position of those jurors who stated that
they believed the sexual assault had occurred, as the child stated, but they were
nevertheless reluctant to vote guilty because of their concern about the consequences
for the defendant of a guilty verdict.
6.6 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM EXPERIMENT 1
Following the analysis of results from Experiment 1 and prior to the conduct of
further experimentation, three methodological areas were reviewed: the duration of
the trial stimulus, the impartiality of the psychological expert's testimony, and the
use of undergraduates as mock jurors. The following discussion touches briefly 'on
reasons why the first two of these areas were considered to be satisfactory, but the
use of students as subjects was not continued in later experiments.
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6.6.1 The brief duration of the simulation
relative to 8 protracted trial In real life.
With regard to the findings of this study it should be emphasised that this was a
simulation and although efforts were made to enhance ecological validity by
presenting videotaped trials of a plausible and emotionally engaging scenario and by
allowing a period of juror deliberation, there were problems associated with
compressing what might take three or more days in criminal court proceedings into
a videotape of less than 45 minutes. Excluded is a wealth of evidential and extra-
evidentiary detail and complexity, as well as the nuances and tactics which comprise
some of the texture of courtroom proceedings such as the use of presumptuous
questions shown to be effective in diminishing an expert's credibility (Kassin,
Williams, & Saunders, 1990). For these reasons, jurors in this study may have
tended to place a greater relative weight on the expert's testimony than might have
been the case in full trial proceedings. Nevertheless, the number and kind of
witnesses presented in this simulation are similar to those mentioned as positively
or negatively salient by jurors in the actual sexual abuse case studied by Shigaki and
Wolf (1990), in which the jurors interviewed after the trial maintained that the
five-year-old child's testimony was the most salient factor influencing their
verdicts, and the testimonies of the child's mother, medical doctor and expert
witness on sexual abuse were all considered to be positive and of equal salience.
6.6.2 Impartiality of the expert
A comparison of jurors' evaluations of the court-appointed expert relative to
experts giving the same testimony in partisan roles was not undertaken, as it was, in
Brekke et al.'s study (1991), but jurors who heard the expert testimony in this
study, whether they voted guilty or not guilty, gave high ratings of the expert's
impartiality. Borgida et al. (1989) have pointed out that in an adversarial legal
system, a psychologist expert may strive to be objective, yet appear to be partisan.
It is, of course, possible, that in some cases the converse may apply, that is, jurors
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may attribute to a court-appointed expert the positive source characteristics (Petty
& Caccioppo, 198Gb) of nonadversarial status and objectivity, when, in fact, the
expert's testimony is considerably less than impartial.
Expert testimony of the type presented in this study could not encompass, even
over a much longer period in court, the full details and diversity of findings from
research into children's cognitive abilities, and any attempt to summarise the
literature succinctly is likely to be considered differently, as more or less
impartial, by other experts in the field. Judgments of an expert's impartiality are,
ultimately, subjective, whether it be jurors or other experts making those
judgments. In the present study, the attempt was made to summarise the relevant
literature and to incorporate differences of opinion and divergent findings, some of
which emerged when the judge questioned the expert and some when the defence
counsel was invited to examine the expert. In this fashion, it was hoped to
incorporate within the simulation some of the checks and balances which are routine
procedure in the Anglo-American legal system. In accord with the conclusions
reached by the authors of numerous reviews of children's abilities (e.g., Ceci &
Bruck, 1993; Davies, 1989; Dent & Flin, 1992; Perry & Wrightsman, 1991;
Spencer & Flin, 1990), the expert was', generally supportive of children's cognitive
abilites and testimonial capacities.
6.6.3 The ecologIcal validIty of usIng undergraduate student
subtect» vs Jury-eligIble citizens.
A number of results from the content analysis of deliberations suggest that there
may have been substantial differences in process, even though there were no
significant differences in outcome, between student jurors and jury-eligible
subjects from the community. Compared to, jurors from the community, student
jurors were more likely to make inaccurate and inappropriate statements and to
engage in speculation which was not germane to their roles as triers of fact, such as
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discussion concerning the consequences of the trial for the child and for the
defendant. It is also interesting to note that there was considerably more volatility
in the student juror group, who moved from 44 pre-deliberation guilty verdicts to
32 post-deliberation guilty verdicts. Among the community jury groups only one
subject changed; from a pre-deliberation not guilty verdict to guilty, following
deliberation.
A number of interpretations of these studenVcommunity differences are
possible. It may be that student jurors approach deliberation with a greater
propensity to listen to others' viewpoints and be persuaded by reasoned debate.
Alternatively, it may be that students' verdicts are more likely to initially reflect a
degree of campus "political correctness" (i.e., a propensity to empathise with the
victim), which tends to dissipate to some extent as the facts of the case are aired.
Given that inaccurate and inappropriate statements are more common in the student
groups' deliberations, it suggests a tendency towards less rigorous thinking in those
groups, and/or less willing acceptance of the constraints within which jurors are
required to operate.
In terms of leniency of verdict, students have been found to be more lenient than
subjects from the community (Hinkle, Smeitzer, Allen, & King, 1983; Kaplan &
Krupa, 1986) or less lenient (Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977), depending on
the nature of the case. In the present experiment, although there were no significant
differences between the student and community subjects on any dependent variable
measures or verdicts, the difference on post-deliberation verdicts did approach
significance, (ll.=.07), with students giving fewer votes for conviction.
AUbrey and Ewing (1989) found that, when presented with a scenario involving
elements of the battered woman syndrome (Walker,1984), psychology students
were less inclined than registered voter subjects to endorse stereotypical statements
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about battered women and more inclined to understanding the situation of the victim.
AUbrey and Ewing suggest their results may indicate the development of increased
social consciousness among the students in the campus milieu, an environment which
they propose fosters "the development of values in which the perception of others is
less likely to be stereotypical or judgmental" (1989, p. 295). In the present
.study, no survey of pre-trial attitudes to victims of sexual assault was undertaken,
but it may be that student jurors were initially more uncritically positive towards
the child victim/witness than jurors from the community, and then found it difficult
to sustain that position as counter arguments based on the legal facts were advanced
during deliberation.
The differences in deliberation content between students and community groups
and the volatility of student verdicts from pre- to post-deliberation support the
contention that students may not be an accurate analog for studying the cognitions,
atttitudes or decision-making processes of real jurors (Aubrey & Ewing,1989;
Weiten & Diamond, 1979). As Wells (1986) has noted, "in examining the validity
of verdicts, we must be concerned with the process by which those verdicts are
reached. Verdicts reached by bizarre or faulty processes are unacceptable
regardless of whether or not the verdict was correct" (p, 91). For these reasons
the decision was made to use only jury-eligible citizens from the community in the
remaining experiments of this thesis.
6.7 SUMMARY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
In the past decade, a large number of jurisdictions within the Anglo-American
adversarial system have recommended or implemented reforms to legal procedures
for dealing with child victim/witnesses of sexual assault. Currently, the growing
use of psychological expert witnesses by both the prosecution and defence in child
abuse litigation has been termed a 'disturbing trend' and a 'lucrative industry'
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(Whitcomb, 1990) spawning battles of experts. Some authors from both legal and
psychological perspectives have endorsed the available but rarely used procedure
which allows the court to appoint its own expert witness. In this study a court-
appointed expert was used to present generalised testimony based on the substantial
body of literature concerning children's memory abilities, resistance to' suggestion
and reality monitoring. On these variables the jurors who heard the expert
testimony rated the child victims significantly higher than did those jurors who did
not have the benefit of such testimony.
McGough (1991) has re-iterated that witness credibility is a question of fact to
be determined by the jury in our legal system. It is important to note that the
expert in this study made no attempt to usurp the jury's function in this respect. No
direct mention was made of any characteristics of the child complainant nor was
there any statement made by the expert which referred to the child's credibility.
The expert merely provided a cognitive developmental framework which was as
accurate as the current state of psychological research allowed. It was then up to the
jurors themselves to use that framework or not. The question of whether the same
testimony delivered by a psychologist expert witness for the prosecution would have
similar impact on jurors was the subject of investigation in the second experiment.
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Experiment two: The impact of
adversarial versus nonadversarial expert testimony
in a simulated child sexual abuse case
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Chapter 7
Experiment 2: The Impact of
adversarlal versus nonadversarlal expert testimony
In a simulated child sexual abuse case
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In Experiment 1, it was found that, in a simulated child sexual abuse trial,
jurors exposed to expert psychological testimony concerning research on the
cognitive abilities of children rated the child witnesses significantly higher on those
variables which the expert addressed than did those jurors not exposed to the expert
testimony. In that experiment, the psychologist expert was presented as a court-
appointed witness so that an evaluation of the impact of the expert testimony could be
made with minimal likelihood of confounding role effects.
As a court-appointed expert, it was expected that the psychologist would be seen,
not as an advocate for either side, but rather as a neutral, impartial educator whose
function was to provide a cognitive developmental framework which the jurors
might or might not use in their decision making, and particularly in their
assessments of the child witness' credibility. In that experiment jurors rated the
impartiality and helpfulness of the psychologist expert highly, but without an expert
in an adversarial role, no conclusions could be drawn about relative levels of
impartiality and assistance.
In the present study, the same stimulus materials were used as in the previous
study, but the psychologist expert was presented in two modes; a non-adversarial
(court-appointed) expert, and an adversarial (appearing for the prosecution)
witness. The experimentwas similar to that conducted by Brekke et al. (1991),
who used a videotaped re-enactment of an acquaintance rape case as the trial
stimulus.
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Results from Experiment 1 showed a number of outcomes which differed
according to juror gender. Female jurors gave significantly higher ratings to the
child victim's memory, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring and overall
credibility, and were significantly higher in quantitative ratings of their degree of
certainty of the defendant's guilt.
It was considered that, in an emotionally engaging scenario such as a sexual
assault case, especially one involving a child victim, strong affective responses
involving empathy or identification may be characteristically gender-differentiated
(Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, & Bentley, 1982) and that the possibility of gender as a
factor in such a trial should be explored fully. Therefore, male and female child
victim/witnesses were used as in Experiment 1, but additionally, in this study, both
male and female psychological experts were presented.
7.2 METHOD
7.2.1 Subjects
One hundred and ninety two subjects participated in the study, in 32 groups each
\
of six mock jurors. All SUbjects were jury eligible citizens from the community
who had been solicited by requesting undergraduate psychology students at the
University of Tasmania to take a copy of a prepared letter and pass it to any jury-
eligible citizen known to them. The leiter explained the general nature of the
research without specifying the relevant variables under investigation. The leiter
further explained that jurors would deliberate in groups of six after watching a
simulated reconstruction of a sexual assault trial and that deliberations would be
videotaped for later content analysis. The subjects were randomly assigned to the
experimental conditions. There was a gender balance of three males and three female
jurors in each mock jury.
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7.2.2 Experimental design
The design was a 2 (expert role: court appointed vs. witness for the prosecution)
x 2 (age of child : 6 vs 9 yrs) x 2 (gender of child) x 2 (gender of psychological
expert) x 2 (gender of juror) factorial design. As child age did not significantly
affect subjects' child-based ratings or verdicts in Experiment 1, it was decided to
use just two child ages in this experiment.
7.2.3 Material
The same basic trial scenario as in experiment one was used in this experiment.
In the court-appointed role, each psychological expert was questioned by the judge
who also made it clear to the court at the outset that the witness was court-appointed
and was not present to support either the prosecution or defence case. When the
psychologist was presented as a witness for the prosecution, examination-in-chief
was conducted by prosecuting counsel (full transcript of adversarial expert
testimony, Appendix 6). In each role, the psychologist was cross-examined by
defence counsel.
Juror Questionnaire
Before deliberating, subjects assessed the child witness using a 9-point scale on
the same variables as in Experiment 1, and subjects were again asked to vote guilty
or not guilty and, on a 5-point scale, indicate the degree of certainty each felt about
their vote.
Post-deliberation
At the end of the 25 minute deliberation period! subjects were asked to rate the
child's confidence, consistency, reliability of memory, resistance to suggestion,
reality monitoring ability, and overall credibility, and then to vote guilty or not
guilty and give an indication of their subjective certainty.
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7.2.4 Procedure
On arrival, each juror was given instructions which stated that, as a panel, they
would view a videotaped simulation of a trial involving a child complainant bringing
an allegation of sexual assault against his/her father. It was specified that each
juror was to complete a brief questionnaire on aspects of the trial before and after a
deliberation process of 25 minutes duration, and the deliberations were to be
videotaped for content analysis. Each juror's confidentiality was guaranteed. After
viewing the trial, jurors were given a sheet which listed the witnesses, and specified
the legal definition of the charge of sexual intercourse with a young person
(Tasmanian Criminal Code, s.124). As in Experiment 1, all deliberations were
transcribed and the contents were analysed using the same raters, codebook and
procedures which had been used in the first experiment.
7.3 RESULTS
Independent variable effects on Jurors' perceptions
of the child victim/witness
A multivariate F test (2x2x2x2x2) MANOVA, using expert role, child age, and
the genders of expert, child and juror as independent variables with the three child-
based dependent variables, memory, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring, .
showed significant main effects for expert role (Wilks' Lambda: E (3, 158) = .943,
R<.05). There was also a significant interaction between the gender and role of the
expert (Wilks' Lambda: E(3,158) = .931, 1l.<.Ol), and between age of child, gender
of child and gender of juror, [(3,158 = .933, 1l.<.05).
Univariate analyses indicated that jurors who heard the court-appointed expert
rated the likely harmfulness of the sexual abuse significantly higher (M. = 6.98)
than those who heard the prosecution expert (M = 6.32), E(l,160) = 4.46, R<·05.
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Gender of expert x expert role Interactive effects
The interactive effect of gender and role of expert was significant on credibility
ratings, E(l,160) = 15.72, 12.<.01. While there were no significant differences
between mean child credibility ratings when the female expert was acting in either
the non-adversarial (M = 6.34) or adversarial (M = 6.84) role, the mean for the
jurors' ratings of the child's credibility when the male psychologist was court'
appointed (M = 7.07, lliL = 1.74) was significantly higher than when he was
presented as a witness for the prosecution (M = 5.53, SO = 1.95). Further Anova
analyses of the child-based ratings made by jurors showed that a number of the
child-based variables exhibited the same pattern as the child's credibility ratings,
that is, there were significant interactions between role and gender of expert on
ratings of the child's confidence, E(l,160) = 6.67, /2.<.05, consistency, E(l, 160)
= 7.57, /2.<.01, reality monitoring, E(l,160) = 6.00, 1L<.05,· memory ability,
E(1,160) = 10.99, /2.<.01, and the likelihood that the child did not misinterpret the
defendant's action, E(l,160) = 10.48, 12.<.01. For each of these variables, as with
the child's credibility ratings, the interactive effect was attributable to jurors'
significantly lower ratings of the child when the male expert appeared in the
adversarial (prosecution) role, as shown in Figures 7.1 to 7.6.
7.2
7
Mean 6.8
Child 6.6
credibility 6.4
ratings
6.2
6
5.8
5.6
5.4
o Female expert
• Male expert
Prosecution Court-appointed
Expert Role Condition
Figure 7.1 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's overall credibility at
each expert gender x role condition.
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Figure 7.2 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's confidence at
each expert gender x role condition.
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Figure 7.3 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's consistency at
each expert gender x role condition
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Figure 7.4 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's reality monitoring at
each expert gender x role condition.
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Figure 7.5 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's memory ability at
each expert gender x role condition.
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Figure 7.6 Mean pre-deliberation ratings of the child's likelihood of not
misinterpreting the defendant's actions at each expert gender x role condition.
Interactions Involving age and gender of child.
Significant interactions between the gender and age of the child were found on the
child-based variables of confidence, ~(1,160) = 9.14, 12.<.01 and consistency,
£(1,160) = 6.64, 12.<.05. On these variables" the interactive effects were
allributable to the lower mean ratings which jurors gave to the 6-year-old boy's
confidence (M = 5.39) relative to the 6-year-old girl's <M = 6.16), and to the 9-
year-old girl's confidence (M = 5.32) and consistency (M = 6.38) relative to the
9-year-old boy's confidence (M = 6.14) and consistency <M = 7.12).
Following the significant MANOVA effect for the interaction of age and gender of
child with gender of juror, univariate Anova analyses indicated that the interaction
of these three variables was significant on ratings of the child's reality monitoring
ability. The mean ratings for reality monitoring in each of the child age x gender of
child x gender of juror conditions are shown in Table 7.1. The results indicate that
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when the child was six years old, jurors of the same sex gave the child higher
ratings than the 9-year-old child, but with the 9-year-old child, jurors of the
opposite sex gave the child higher ratings than the 6-year-old child.
Table 7.1 Mean ratings (with SO's in parentheses) of the child's reality
monitoring ability by child age, gender of child and gender of juror
Childage
Six
Nine
Six
Nine
Six
Nine
Six
Nine
Gender of child
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Gender of juror
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Mean ratings of child's
Reality monitoring ability
5.91 (1.65)
5.37 (1.81)
6.52 (1.89)
7.14 (1.62)
6.48 (1.33)
7.08 (1.21)
6.96 (1.60)
6.52 (1.65)
Gender of Juror effects
Relative to male jurors, female jurors gave the child witnesses significantly
higher ratings on overall credibility, E(l, 160) = 11.01, 1L<.Ol, confidence,
F(1,160) = 4.25, Q.<.05, consistency, E(l,160) = 5.56, Q.<.05, reality monitoring
ability, E(l,160) = 6.46, 1L<.05, and the likelihood that the child did not
misinterpret the defendant's actions, E(l, 160) = 19.20, Q.<.01.
Three-way gender Interactions :
Gender of expert x gender of child x gender of Juror
Anova analyses of the child-based ratings also indicated a significant three-way
gender interaction on ratings of the child's confidence, E(1,160) = 7.75, 12.<.01,
consistency, E(1,160) = 4.77, Q.<.05, memory, E(l,160) = 5.33, 1L<.05, with a
tendency towards significance on ratings of the child's overall credibility, E(l, 160)
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~ 3.46, g~.06) and on pre-deliberation verdict ratings, F (1, 160) ~ 3.38, 1i~.07.
For each of these variables the interactive effect was attributable to male jurors'
significantly lower ratings of the male child when the male expert gave testimony.
Table 7.2 shows the mean ratings for each of the three-way gender conditions on
each of these variables.
------------------------------------------------------- - - -
Table 7.2 Three-way gender means for ratings of the child's memory, confidence,
consistency, credibility and pre-deliberation verdict ratings.
MemQry Confidence Consjstency Credibility verdict rate
Gender of
E.xJml Q1JjlsJ JJll:Q[
Male Male Male 5.43 4.62 5.89 5.06 4.87
Male Male Female 6.81 6.75 7.87 7.12 6.87
Male Female Male 6.20 5.75 6.50 6.29 5.68
Male Female Female 5.81 5.27 6.47 6.72 6.31
Female Male Male 6.08 5.79 7.00 6.16 5.79
Female Male Female 6.18 5.89 7.10 6.47 6.85
Female Female Male 6.60 5.77 7.10 6.56 6.72
Female Female Female 7.04 6.16 7.29 7.16 7.29
AnalysIs of verdIcts
The relationship between the independent variables and jurors' pre-deliberation
verdicts was analysed using a log linear analysis, which showed there were no
significant differences in the number of guilty votes with respect to expert role or
expert gender, but the interaction of these variables approached significance
(g~.055). Further chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the effect of
expert role on verdict within each expert gender condition. There was a
significantly higher proportion of guilty votes when the male expert was in the
court-appointed role, relative to the adversarial role, x2 (1, N~96) ~ 6.06,
g<.05. With the female expert, there was no significant effect of role on verdict.
Chi-square analyses of the effect of expert gender on verdict within each role
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condition showed that when the expert appeared for the prosecution, there were
significantly more guilty votes with the female expert than the male expert, X 2 (1 ,
N=96) = 7.15, 12<.01. The log linear analysis also indicated a significant main effect
for juror gender, X2 (1, N=192) = 7.76, 12.<.01, with female jurors significantly
more likely to render a guilty verdict. Prior to deliberation, 69 % of the female
jurors and 49 % of the male jurors voted for conviction. After deliberation, there
was a 4.5 % change to acquittal in the female juror group, and no change in the male
juror group. Table 7.3 shows the frequency of guilty and not guilty pre-
deliberation verdicts and post-deliberation verdicts by each independent variable.
TABLE 7.3. Pre- & post-deliberation verdict frequencies by independ. variables.
PRE-DELIBERATION
Guilty Not guilty
POST-DELIBERATION
Guilty Not guilty
EXPERT ROlE CONDITION
Court-appointed
Witness for prosecution
AGEOFCHILD OONDITION
Six years
Nine years
GENDER OFQ-lILD OONDITION
Male
,
Female
GENDER OFEXPERT OONDITION
Male
Female
59
54
59
54
51
62
53
60
37
42
37
42
45
34
43
36
60
49
54
55
49
60
48
61
36
47
42
41
47
36
48
35
GENDER OFJUROR OONDrrlON
Male 47 49 47 49
Female 66 30 62 34
Column totals (for each Ind.Var) 113 79 109 83
----------------------------------------------------------
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After nominating their verdicts, jurors were asked to rate the degree of
certainty/uncertainty they felt about their verdicts on a five-point scale, which
allowed the dichotomous verdicts to be scaled quantitatively from 1 (very certain
defendant is not guilty) up to 10 ( very certain defendant is guilty). Anova analyses
of the independent variables with these verdict ratings showed significantly higher
ratings for those exposed to the non-adversarial expert relative to the adversarial
expert, £(1,160) = 4.29, 12.<.05, and also higher verdict ratings for the female
jurors relative to the males, E (1,160) = 6.97, 12.<.01.
The interaction between gender of expert and role of expert was highly
significant with regard to verdict ratings, £(1, 160) = 14.69, 12<.001, as was found
with jurors' ratings of a number of the child-based variables. Verdict ratings did
not vary significantly with role when the expert was female, but were significantly
higher (M =7.12, S D = 2.92) when the male expert was in the non-adversarial
role. relative to the adversarial role (M = 4.75, !iD. = 2.86). As can be seen from
Figure 7.7, the pattern is consistent across juror gender.
Female
Adversarial
Fe~e ~e
Oourt-appointed Adversarial
Male
Oourt-appointed
Expert Gender x Role ConditIon
Figure 7.7 Pre-deliberation verdict ratings for male and female jurors at
each expert gender x role condition.
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Balance of verdicts within Juries.
Table 7.4 shows the balance of verdicts within juries before and after the
deliberation process. Only two jury panels prior to deliberation and three panels
after deliberation were unanimous in voting guilty.
Table 7.4 Number of jury panels with a particular balance of verdicts
before and after deliberation.
Unanimous
Not guilty
Majorityfor Balanced
Not guilty (3 - 3)
Majority for Unanimous
Guilty Guilty
Pre-deliberation
Court-appointed expert 0
Prosecution expert 0
Post-deliberation
Court-appointed expert 0
Prosecution expert 0
4
3
3
7
4
5
3
3
8
6
8
5
2
Evaluation of the expert testimony : Impartiality and helpfulness.
Anova tests of the relationship between the independent variables and the
perceived impartiality and helpfulness of the psychologist's testimony indicated that
,
,
those who saw the expert in the court-appointed role rated the expert's testimony as
significantly more impartial, E(l,160) = 4.69, 1!.<.05, and more helpful,
E(l,160) = 8.69, 12.<.01. Relative to male jurors, female jurors also rated the
expert's testimony as more impartial, E(l,16?) = 11.6, 1l.<.01, and more helpful, E
(1,160) = 4.45, 11.<.05. ,The interaction of expert gender and expert role was
significant for ratings of expert assistance, E(l,160) = 5.38, 12.<.05, and for
ratings of the expert's impartiality, E(l,160) = 3.84, 12.=.05. The male expert
witness was rated as significantly more helpful, 1(94) = 3.97, 11.<.01, and
impartial, 1(94) = 2.7, 11.<.01, in the court-appointed role than when presented in
the role of a prosecution expert witness. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show the interaction of
expert role and gender on ratings of impartiality and helpfulness.
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Figure 7.8. Ratings of the expert's impartiality for male and female jurors
at each expert gender x role condition.
7.5
7.25
Mean 7 -.- Femalejurors
ratings
of expert's 6.75 -e- Male jurors
helpfulness 6.5
6.25
6
5.75
5.5
5.25
Female Female
Adversarial Court-appointed
Male Male
Adversarial Court-appointed
Expert Gender x Role Condition
Figure 7.9. Ratings of the helpfulness of the expert's testimony for male and
female jurors at each expert gender x role condition.
----------------------------------------------------------
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CorrelatIon and regressIon analyses
Intercorrelations of the child-based dependent variables, confidence,
consistency, memory ability, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring, the
child's attractiveness, the likelihood that the child did not misinterpret the
defendant's actions, pre-deliberation verdict ratings, and jurors' assessments of the
child's overall credibility are shown in Table 7.5. Differential reliability of the
individual child-based ratings may have accounted for some differences in the
magnitude of the correlations.
To examine which of the child-based ratings made by jurors were most highly
predictive of the jurors' pre-deliberation verdicts at each victim age, stepwise
regression analyses were conducted using the variables, confidence, consistency,
memory ability, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring, harmfulness of the
alleged act, the child's attractiveness, and the likelihood that the child did not
misinterpret the defendant's actions. Results showed that, for both the 6-year-old
and 9-year-old victims, jurors' ratings on the likelihood that the child had not
misinterpreted the defendant's actions accounted for the most substantial proportion
of variance, followed by jurors' ratings of the child's resistance to suggestion. These
variables accounted for 48% of the variability in pre-deliberation verdicts with the
6-year-old victim, and 40% of the verdict variability with 9-year-old victims.
A similar regression analysis with the child's credibility as the target variable
showed that, for the 6-year-old, perceived resistance to suggestion, followed by the
likelihood of not misinterpreting the defendant's actions, together accounted for 56%
of the variance. With the 9-year-old victim, ratings of the child's consistency were
the most salient predictor, followed by the likelihood of non-misinterpretation of
the defendant's actions, these two variables accounting for 57% of the variance in
pre-deliberation verdicts.
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Table 7.5 Inter-correlations between verdicts and child-based variables
Confid Consist Memory Resist to Reality Attract. Non-ntis Verdict
suggest monitor -interpret rating
Consistency .47 '
Memory
.46 ' .52 '
Resistance to .44 ' .31' 047 '
suggestion
Reality .35 ' .44 ' .57 ' .55 '
monitoring
Attractiveness .13 .00 .12 .07 .15
Non - misinter .38 ' .34 ' AI' .32 ' 047 ' .16
-pretation
Verdict rating .39 ' .30 ' .44 ' .49 ' .50 ' .09 .58 '
Overall child .54 ' .54 ' .61 ' .58 ' .62 ' .19 .61 ' .69 '
credibility
* p<.Ol
7.4 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIONS
The content of deliberations was analysed to determine how content varied as a
function of the independent variables. Alpha was set at .01, because of the large
number of content categories.
Role of expert: Those jurors exposed to the non-adversarial expert were
significantly more likely than those who saw the adversarial expert to make
comments which indicated acceptance of the child's testimony as sufficient
explanation for events 1(190) = 2.9, );1.<.01, and were significantly more likely to
see the family doctor's testimony as enhancing the child victim's case, 1(190) = 2.6,
);1.<.01 ).
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Gender of expert: Those who viewed the female expert witness made more
favourable comments about the manner in which the psychologist's interview with
the child was conducted, 1(190) = 2.75, p.<.01. It should be noted that the female
psychologist whose interview with the child was shown in all trial conditions, was
not the female psychologist who presented expert testimony. Those who viewed the
female expert witness also were significantly more likely to view the mother's
testimony as strengthening the alleged victim's claim than were those who saw the
male expert witness, 1 (190) = 3.14, p'<.01.
Gender of juror: The only significant differences in the content of the male and
female jurors' deliberations were that females engaged in significantly more
discussion of the child's testimony, 1(190) = 3.5, 12.<.001, and the defendant's
testimony, 1(190) = 3.08, 12.<.01. In these content analysis categories, the term
"discussion' included any clear reference to the witness' testimony or any questions
intended to clarify the content of that testimony, for example, 'Did she say she fell
,
asleep when her father was massaging her legs ?"
Female jurors also recorded a significantly higher number of utterance units per
deliberation (M. = 29.87) than did the male jurors (M = 24.68). While the mean
number of words spoken during deliberation was substantially higher for female
jurors (M = 606.3) than for male jurors (M = 536.1), this difference was not
significant.
Age of child victim: Significantly more discussion of the child's testimony
occurred with the 9-year-old victim, than with the 6-year old victim, 1(190) =
3.34, p'=.001. There was significantly more discussion of reasonable doubt and its
relation to verdicts in the deliberations of jurors who saw the 6-year-old victims,
relative to those who saw the 9-year-old victims, 1(190) = 2.76,12.<.01
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Gender of child victim: Significantly more discussion of the doctor's testimony
and questions seeking to clarify the content of the doctor's testimony occurred with
the male victims, 1(190) = 3.08, 1l.<.01. Comments indicating acceptance that the
child had acted appropriately during and after the alleged sexually abusive incident
were at a significantly higher level in the deliberations of those who saw the female
child than with those who saw the male child, 1(190) = 2.5, 12.=.01.
Relationship of deliberation contents to verdicts
Stepwise and multiple regression analyses were used to determine the
relationship between content analysis categories and the jurors' quantitative ratings
of post-deliberation verdicts. The most salient predictor of verdicts was the
proportion of favourable or unfavourable comments made by a juror concerning the
child victim's cognitive abilities (B.2 = .171). The next variable contributing to
variance of post-deliberation verdicts was the degree to which jurors regarded the
psychologist's testimony as enhancing the child's case. A significant contribution to
variance was also made by jurors' ratings of the appropriateness of the child's
behaviour during and after the alleged sexual assault, including the delay in
disclosure. These three variables tog~ther accounted for 35% of the variance in
post-deliberation verdicts.
7.5 DISCUSSION
The Impact of expert gender and expert role
In the present study, with the male adversarial expert there were significantly
fewer guilty verdicts than when he appeared as a court-appointed witness. There
were also significantly fewer guilty votes with the male expert than the female
expert when each appeared as an adversarial expert. While there were no
significant differences between the mean ratings of the child's credibility and other
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child-based variables, and also the defendant's guilt, when the female expert was
acting in either the adversarial or non-adversarial role, the ratings on these
variables were significantly higher when the male psychologist was court-appointed
than when the male expert was a witness for the prosecution.
On ratings of the impartiality and helpfulness of the psychologist expert the same
pattern emerged. These lower ratings of the child, the expert and defendant guilt by
jurors exposed to the male adversarial expert witness were consistent across juror
gender. Theoretical models and analyses of the communication and persuasion
process (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1984; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b;
Wood & Eagly, 1981) suggest ways in which nonadversarial presentations of expert
testimony may lead to jurors giving greater weight to the content of such testimony
but why this process appeared to occur only with the male expert and not with the
female expert is not readily explicable, As in Brekke et al.'s (1991) study of the
relative impact of non-adversarial and adversarial expert testimony, the present
experiment was not designed to distinguish between the 'relative merits of theoretical
models of persuasion but these models may alford some plausible interpretations of
the underlying processes. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986b), the two
primary components of a communicator's credibility are perceived trustworthiness
and expertise both of which jurors might attribute to a court-apppointed expert.
However, an adversarial witness may be seen as expert but untrustworthy having
assumed what Brodsky (1977) terms, an 'unequivocal advocacy role' or in more
common parlance, the role of a 'hired gun' (Rappeport, 1993; Schultz-Ross,
1993). If jurors have conceptions of the adversarial legal system as one which
encourages partiality (Fox & Walters, 1986; Smith, 1989), and which is also
traditionally dominated by male protagonists in the roles of judges, lawyers and
experts, they may be less inclined to associate a female expert with the 'hired gun'
role, and thus more inclined to perceive a female expert as impartial and
trustworthy, and more inclined to see her testimony as helpful. Scutt (1994)
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suggests that the legal system in Australia is still perceived as highly male-
dominated, and that this perception is fueHed by expressions of lingering judicial
sympathy for men who kill their departing wives, and reluctance to relinquish
cautions to juries on the purported female propensity to prevarication in rape cases.
While there are no published studies on the impact of the expert's gender in the
presentation of expert testimony, Leippe, Brigham, Cousins and Romanczyk (1987)
found that female criminal attorneys were significantly more likely to understand
the reasons why children retract aHegations of sexual abuse. They suggested that
this result was consistent with Eagly's (1987) findings that women generaHy
displayed warmer, more empathic styles of social and professional interaction. It
may be that, in the present study, the female in the adversarial expert role was
perceived by jurors as displaying a warmer, more empathic presentational style,
and these contextual factors may have led to her testimony receiving a greater degree
of acceptance than the male expert's, whose presentational style may have been such
as to have little impact on jurors' expectancy of partiality.
While jurors made no assessments of the experts' presentational styles, it is
nevertheless of some interest that the cbntent analysis of deliberations revealed that
those who saw the female expert made more favourable comments about two other
female protagonists in the trial - the psychologist who interviewed the child, and the
child's mother.
Because only one male and one female served as experts in this trial, it may have
been that the effects of expert gender and the significant interactions with expert
role were in some manner confounded with idiosyncratic characteristics of the
individuals who served as experts. To investigate whether other factors such as
jurors' perceptions of confidence or demeanour may have been mediating differential
responses to the male expert in the varying roles, a further 40 jury-eligible
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citizens, who had not previously been used as subjects in either experiment one or
two, were shown just the videotaped sequence involving the presentation of the male
expert's testimony. Twenty subjects (10 male, 10 female) viewed the expert
delivering his testimony as a court-appointed witness and another gender-balanced
sample of twenty subjects viewed the expert giving evidence as a prosecution.
witness. These subjects were told only that they were to view a psychologist's
testimony concerning children's abilities, and were given no information as to the
expert's role. After viewing, each subject was asked to rate the expert on 9-point
scales, on the variables of confidence, honesty, competence, credibility,
trustworthiness and clarity of presentation. Results, shown in Table 7.6, indicated
no significant differences between the means for any variable.
Table 7.6. Post-experimental assessment of certain expert attributes.
(Figures shown are means with standard deviations in parentheses)
Expert attrIbute Expert Role
Court-appointed (n=20) Prosecution (n=20)
Confidence 7.20 (1.24) 6.85 (1.04)
Honesty 7.30 (1.03) 7.40 (1.56)
Competence 7.00 (1.33) 6.90 (1.41)
Credibility 6.95 (1. 57) 6.80 (1.50)
Trustworthiness 7.15 (1. 13) 6.90 (1.16)
Clarity 7.40 (0.94) 7.35 (1.04)
Content analysIs and children's cognitive abilitIes
From the content analysis of deliberations, it was found in this experiment, as in
Experiment 1, that the jurors' perceptions of the child's cognitive abilities were the
most salient predictors of verdicts. The primacy of jurors' beliefs about children's
cognitive abilities, which is a central feature of Leippe and Romanczyk's
communication/persuasion model (1987), is further supported by the finding that
the degree to which the psychologist's testimony on children's abilities enhanced the
child's case was the next highest content category predictive of verdicts.
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However, given that the psychologist's testimony is salient with regard to verdict
outcomes, the question remains as to whether the order in which the psychologist
gives testimony vis-a-vis the child is important. Is there evidence for a process
whereby the expert's testimony, when presented early in the trial, sensitises
jurors to view the child more favourably than jurors who hear the expert's
testimony after the child has testified, thereby producing differential outcomes?
This question was evaluated in the third experiment which was designed to
investigate the impact of variations in the temporal sequence in which the child's and
the psychologist expert's testimony are presented.
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Experiment three
Investigation of variations in the temporal order of
presentation of the child's and expert's testimony
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Chapter 8
Experiment 3
Investigation of variations In the temporal order
of presentation of the child's and expert's testimony
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The central question to be investigated in this experiment was: "Is the order in
which the child witness and psychologist expert give their testimonies important ?"
If the expert comes before the child, does it tend to sensitise the jurors to give more
attention to the child's testimony or particular aspects of the child's testimony, and
thereby enhance the jurors' perceptions of the child's credibility ?
Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant (1980) investigated the relative impact of
generalised expert testimony presented early, which they termed "expert advice",
with the more usual placing of expert testimony after the eyewitness' testimony.
They hypothesised that when presented before the eyewitness' testimony, the
benefits of psychological expert testimony would be able to be better utilized.
Kassin, Reddy, and Tulloch (1990) found that the relative influence of presentation
order varied with cognitive variables; subjects high in the need for cognition were
more influenced by arguments preceding evidence and those low in need for cognition
were more influenced by arguments that followed the evidence.
Brekke and Borgida (1988), arguing from findings on belief perseverance,
hypothesised that once jurors have come to a particular interpretation of case facts,
any subsequent expert evidence would have relatively little impact, and that a
generalised expert testimony presented early in the trial would be better utilized by
jurors. However, Pennington and Hastie (1988, 1992, 1993) suggest that the
juror's process of interpretation is non-linear and continues well after all the
112
evidence has been presented. The results from the Brekke and Borgida study showed
no main effects for timing of presentation of the expert testimony on any of the
jurors' ratings, although there were some differences in deliberation content. The
design of the present experiment allows testing of the following alternative
hypotheses in a simulated child sexual abuse case:
1) that expert testimony presented early is differentially utilized in that
jurors are sensitized to view the child more favourably than those who hear
the expert's testimony after the child, or
2) that the timing of expert testimony is unimportant.
8.2 METHOD
8.2.1 SUbjects
One hundred and twenty adult subjects participated in the study (60 males, 60
females). All subjects were jury-eligible citizens who were recruited by
requesting undergraduate psychology students to take a copy of a prepared letter and
pass it to a jury-eligible citizen known to them. The letter informed the recipient of
the general nature of the research without specifying the particular variables under
investigation, and invited replies from anyone willing to act as a mock juror. It was
explained that jurors would deliberate in groups of six after watching a simulated
reconstruction of a sexual assault trial, and that the total time involved for each
participant was approximately two hours. No payment was offered or made. Mean
age of the participants was 36.5 years §Q = 10.4) and the mean period of education
was 12.6 years (~= 2.4).
8.2.2 Experlmentsl Design
Two ages of female victim/witness were used (6 & 9 years). For each victim age
condition there were two orders of presentation (expert testimony before or after
the child's testimony). There were 24 subjects at each child age x order of
presentation condition. A further 24 subjects were allocated at random to a no-
113
expert control condition, in which half the subjects saw the G-year-old and the
other half saw the s-year-old child.
8.2.3 Stimulus materIals
The same trial scenario and pre-deliberation rating scales as in Experiments 1
and 2 were used. The psychologist appeared in the trial as a male court-appointed
witness in every manipulation.
8.2.4 Procedure
As in the previous experiments, each juror was asked to read the instructions
and sign the statement of informed consent. After viewing the trial, jurors were
required to complete the same ratings as used in the previous experiments, as well
as to render a verdict prior to deliberation and to indicate their degree of certainty.
Jurors were then given 25 minutes to deliberate, after which each was asked to vote
guilty or not guilty, with an indication of subjective certainty.
8.3 RESULTS
Expert testimony position effects on the child based variables,
A multivariate F test (3x2x2 MANOVA) using expert testimony position, child
age and juror gender as the independent variables and the jurors' ratings of the
child's memory, resistance to suggestion and reality monitoring ability as the
dependent variables was conducted. The analysis indicated that ratings in each of the
expert present conditions were significantly higher than ratings in the no-expert
control condition (Wilks' Lambda: E(G, 212) = .838, 11.<.01). Further univariate
analyses showed that there were no significant differences on any dependent
variables between those who saw the expert testimony prior to the child and those
who saw the expert testimony after the child. Table 8.1 shows the means on each of
the child-based dependent variables for the expert before, expert after and nil
expert variations.
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Table 8.1. Means on child-based and pre-deliberation verdict ratings
by expert position.
Dep. variable Expert position
Before child After child Nil expert
Child's confidence 6.19 6.31 5.45 n.s.
Child's consistency 7.14 7.25 6.41 n.s.
Child's memory 6.75 6.91 5.70 before v. nil (p<.Ol )
after v. nil (p<.Ol )
Resistance to
suggestibility 5.61 6.02 4.91 after v. nil (p<.05)
Attractiveness 5.80 5.91 5.83 n.s.
Reality monitoring 7.20 7.16 5.72 before v. nil (p<.Ol )
after v. nil (pc.ut)
Likelihood that child
did not misinterpret 7.13 6.85 6.39 n.s.
Verdict ratings 7.04 6.60 5.95 n.s.
---------------------------------------------------------
Verdicts and verdict ratings
Chi-square analysis of verdicts indicated no significant effect for expert
position, although there were substantially more guilty verdicts rendered in each of
the expert present conditions. Pre-deliberation verdicts are shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2. Pre-deliberation verdicts by expert position
(Percentages of total vote in each condition are shown in parentheses)
Verdict
Guilty
Not guilty
Before (n-48)
33 (69%)
15 (31%)
Expert position
After (n-48)
29 (61%)
19 (39%)
Nil (n-24)
12 (50%)
12 (50%)
11 5
Balance of verdicts within juries.
Table 8.3 shows the balance of verdicts within juries before and after the
deliberation process. Three jury panels prior to and after deliberation were
unanimous in voting guilty.
Table 8.3 Number of jury panels with a particular balance of verdicts
before and after deliberation.
Unanimous Majorityfor Balanced Majority for Unanimous
Not guilty Not guilty (3 - 3) GUilty Guilty
Pre-deliberation 0 4 7 6 3
Post-deliberation 0 6 2 9 3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gender of juror effects :
The multivariate F test indicated a significant main effect for juror gender on the
child based variables, memory, resistance to suggestion and reality monitoring
ability (Wilks' Lambda : E(3,1 06) = .916, 1L<.05). Compared to male jurors,
females gave significantly higher ratings for the child's consistency, E(l,108) =
5.98, 1L<.05, the likelihood that the ~hild had not misinterpreted the incident,
E(l,108) = 10.86, 12.<.01, the degree to which the abuse was considered harmful to
the child, assuming it occurred, E(l,108) = 4.30, 12.<.05, and the child's overall
credibility rating, E(l,108) = 8.06, 1L<.05. Analysis of scaled pre-deliberation
verdict ratings showed that female jurors gave significantly higher ratings for
conviction, E(l,108) = 11.14, 1L<.01.
Age of child effects:
The 6-year-old child was rated as more confident, £(1,108) = 5.31, ~<.05, and
more attractive, E(l,108) = 8.49, 1L<.01 than the 9-year-old child.
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Regression analysis :
To examine which of the jurors' child-based ratings were most highly predictive
of their ratings of the child's credibility, a stepwise regression analysis was run
using the variables, confidence, consistency, memory ability, resistance to
suggestion, reality monitoring, harmfulness of the alleged act, the child's
attractiveness, and the likelihood that the child did not misinterpret the defendant's
actions. The most substantial proportion of variance <B.2 = .423) was accounted for
by jurors' perceptions of the likelihood that the child had or had not misinterpreted
the event. Other salient variables in the regression equation were resistance to
suggestion and reality monitoring. These three variables accounted for just under
half (8.2 = .495) of total variance in child credibility ratings.
With verdict ratings as the target variable, the likelihood that the child had not
misinterpreted the event again accounted for the highest proportion of variance (8.2
= .393), followed by reality monitoring ability, consistency and resistance to
suggestion. These four variables accounted for 60% of the variance in verdict
ratings.
8.4 DISCUSSION
It was hypothesised that expert testimony concerning children's general
capabilities which was presented prior to the child's testimony may have greater
impact in so far as the jurors had that knowledge to utilise while viewing the child's
testimony. The hypothesis was not supported by the data. The finding of no
significant differences on any dependent variable regardless of whether expert
testimony was presented before or after the child's testimony suggests that an "on -
line" linear information processing model may not suffice to explain juror
decision-making.
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The results tend to support Pennington and Hastie's (1981, 1986, 1988,
1992) "story model", which posits that jurors do not show a continuous updating
decision strategy, but rather a "memory based" strategy which involves organising,
elaborating and interpreting in memory a number of interdependent elements
dispersed throughout the evidence presentation before coming to a pre-deliberation
verdict decision. The story model which proposes that jurors construct a mental
representation, an interpretation of what the evidence is about, leads to the
supposition that not only is the juror's interpretation or "story" crucial in decision
making but that essential elements in story construction may be the juror's
perceptions of the trial protagonists' interpretations of events. In this experiment,
as in the previous two experiments, the prime predictor variable, accounting for the
greatest variance in both child credibility ratings and verdict ratings was the
jurors' perceptions of the likelihood that the child did or did not misinterpret the
defendant's actions.
In this experiment, as in Experiment 1, there were no significant differences
between the proportions of guilty votes in expert present conditions when compared
with the no expert condition. On verdict ratings, the differences between expert
present and expert absent conditions were not significant, whereas this difference
was significant in Experiment 1. It may be that somewhat less weight was put on
child-based factors in jurors' decision-making in this experiment. However, the
relatively small number of subjects in the no expert condition may have reduced the
likelihood of a significant difference emerging.
Results from the experiments thus far have indicated that psychological expert
testimony regarding children's cognitive abilities may impact on jurors' decision
making in a child sexual abuse case, but the question remains as to whether other
forms of psychological expert testimony impact similarly on jurors. Further, there
is, in actual cases, considerable variability with regard to the quality of the
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testimony provided by a child victim/witness. Does the impact of psychological
expert testimony differ with varying levels of statement quality in the child's
testimony? The following chapter presents the results of an investigation of the
relative impact of the generalised expert testimony as used in the first three
experiments, compared with two other types of psychological expert testimony,
across variations of expert role and the content quality of the child's evidence.
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Chapter 9
Experiment four :
A study of the impact of different types
of expert testimony across
differing levels of\ child statement quality
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Chapter 9
Experiment 4 A study of the Impact
of different types of expert testimony
across differing levels of child statement quality
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In the final experiment of this thesis, the aim was to investigate the relative
impact of generalised expert testimony on children's cognitive abilities with two
other forms of psychological expert testimony, one of which is sometimes admitted
into Anglo-American criminal cases, and another type of expert testimony which has
not been admitted in Anglo-American courts, but is commonplace in the European
inquisitorial system.
The first type of comparison testimony is expert testimony on behaviours and
psychological effects commonly observed in sexually abused children. Mason
(1991) indicates that prosecutors increasingly rely on expert witness testimony in
child sexual abuse cases and the usual form of such testimony is behavioural
syndrome testimony which addresses the general characteristics of a sexually abused
child and in which the expert mayor may not claim that the plaintiff fits the
particular characteristics described.
A difficulty here is the variability in the behavioural and psychological
consequences of abuse. A number of authors have claimed that an expert in the field
of child sexual abuse cannot accurately diagnose a specific child as a victim as there
are no unique behaviours or typical characteristics of sexually abused children, and
many even appear to be asymptomatic after abuse (Hall, 1989; McCord, 1986;
Mrazek, 1981; Schultz, 1980). However, Myers et al. (1989) maintain that while
sexually abused children may display a wide range of reactions to the abuse, experts
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are not without symptomatic and behavioural guidelines. The survey by Conte,
Sorensen, Fogarty, and Dalla Rosa (1991) indicated that professionals in the area
showed a high level of agreement conceming the sequelae indicative of sexual abuse.
Myers (1993), in reviewing the admissibility of expert testimony on commonly
observed behavioural and psychological sequelae in sexually abused children in the
U.S. cites courts which have prohibited such testimony (Commonwealth v. Dunkle,
1992; Nelson v, State (Alaska), 1989; State (South Carolina) v. Hudnall, 1987;
State (Arizona) y. Moran. 1986), and courts where such testimony has been
admitted (Broderick v, King's Way Assembly of God Church, 1991; Brady v,~
(Indiana), 1989; Commonwealth (Massachussettsl v. Dockham, 1989). Myers also
notes a number of cases where the expert, properly qualified, has been permitted the
further step of opining that a particular child has been sexually abused (Broderick
v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 1991; Glendening v. State (Florida), 1988;
People (Michigan Court of Appeall y, James. 1990; Seering y, pepartment of Social
Services (California Court of Appeal), 1987; State (Ohio) v, Bostoo, 1989;~
(Idaho) v. Hester, 1988; Townsend v. State (Nevada), 1987).
For the purposes of this experiment,\the expert provides testimony on commonly
observed behavioural and psychological effects, while acknowledging the diversity of
symptomatology. He then states, on the basis of tests, interviews and assessment
procedures he has conducted with the child, his opinion that the complainant displays
symptoms and behaviours consistent with those which might be displayed in a child
who has been sexually assaulted.
The second form of comparison testimony used in this experiment was a
psychologist expert's assessment of the validity of the child's statement. While a
number of methods for assessing the credibility of a child's sexual abuse allegation
have been proposed (Benedek & Schetky, 1987; DeYoung, 1986, 1988; Faller,
122
1988; Jones & McGraw,198?; Mann, 1985; Wehrspann, Steinhauer, & Klajner-
Diamond, 198?) only one procedure, Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), provides an
objective system for rating, analysing and interpreting data. Recent work (Raskin &
Esplin, 1991) has sought to provide a set of robust criteria which allow
quantification of the sort of clinical jUdgements, used in the European Statement
Reality Analysis procedure (Undeutsch, 1982). To date, studies have investigated
the validity (Steller, Wellerhaus, & Wolf, 1988; Esplin, Boychuk, & Raskin,
1988) and reliability (Anson, Golding, & GUlly, 1993) of the SVA criteria, and the
effect of training in the use of the SVA criteria to assist in detecting adult deception
(Landry & Brigham, 1992).
While much further investigation and development of the SVA criteria would be
required before their use might be considered in judicial contexts, the criteria are,
nevertheless, the most useful basis currently available for the procedures required
for this experiment, one of which was to develop expert testimony which focussed on
an assessment, not of the child, nor of the child's general credibility, but rather of
the child's statement concerning the alleged incident. The criterion based content
analysis (CBCA) procedure of the SVA technique also provides an objectively
definable and measurable basis for manipulating the quality or content of the child's
testimony, and thereby to investigate the effects of a number of variables across
qualitative differences in the child's evidence. Studies of juror decision making have
found that certain factors such as demeanour (Hendry, Shaffer, & Peacock, 1989)
are more salient in a weaker evidence condition. In this experiment, the child's
testimony was presented to half the jurors in a standard form, and to the other half
in an enhanced form, that is, some of the child's answers were expanded so that
exemplars of certain CBCA criteria were added to the standard form of the testimony.
To what degree jurors intuitively used those criteria listed in the CBCA procedure as
indicators of enhanced credibility was also investigated in this experiment.
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9.2 METHOD
9.2.1 Subjects
One hundred and forty-four subjects participated, all jury-eligible citizens
recruited from advertisements in the local newspaper. Potential mock jurors were
informed in the advertisement that they would be required to participate in
University research on juries for one evening only. The time required was
approximately two hours and a paymentof $20 would be made to each participant.
Those replying to the advertisement were sent a sheet with the following points :
The research was concerned with child witnesses in criminal trials, particularly
cases involving allegations of sexual assault.
Mock jurors in groups of six were required to watch a simulated trial on
videotape and then give various ratings on paper.
The deliberation period would be videotaped for possible later content analysis.
Only one attendance for about two hours' duration was required, and a $20
paymentwould be made.
With the information sheet, potential jurors were sent an expression of interest
in participation which was to be signed and returned, together with a pre-trial
questionnaire, a map showing where to attend, and a return envelope. Potential
jurors were informed that they would be contacted some weeks after the return of
their expression of interest and questionnaire, and allocated a time to attend.
9.2.2 Pre-trial questionnaire (Appendix 7.2)
Golding (1992) has indicated the importance of establishing a "normative
understanding of the knowledge schemata of potential jurors" (p. 254) to determine
whether jurors lack critical information or have incorrect beliefs, assumptions or
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expectations. On areas in which courts traditionally have expected the jurors'
common knowledge to suffice, studies have found that jurors have limited knowledge,
as Dodge and Greene (1991) found in their investigation of jurors' understanding of
battered women's reactions, and as others have found regarding aspects of jurors'
conceptions of children's testimonial capacities (Cole & Loftus, 1987; Goodman &
Reed, 1986; King & Yuille, 1987; Myers & Perry, 1987). Gabora et al. (1993)
using a pre-trial child sexual abuse be,lief scale concluded that their subjects held
relatively few misconceptions about child sexual assault. However, the subjects
were all psychology undergraduates, who might be expected to be better informed on
such matters than the general public,
In the present experiment, to ascertain pre-trial attitudes and beliefs,
prospective subjects were asked to complete a pre-trial questionnaire. Although
such a questionnaire may serve to "prime" potential jurors to the issues, such an
effect may have been minimized by the period of four to six weeks between return of
the questionnaire and attendance as a mock juror. The questionnaire (Appendix 7.2)
covered four areas : perceptions of trial procedures and the legal system (items 4,
10, 12, 15, 23 & 24), perceptions of children as witnesses and the behaviour of
sexually abused children (items 2, ',5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19 & 21),
perceptions of perpetrators! alleged perpetrators of sexual abuse (items 1,3, 11 &
25), perceptions and attitudes concerning experts and expert testimony (items 9,
17, 20 & 22). Respondents indicated their degree of agreement I disagreement on a
9-point Likert scale. To minimise response bias, response directions with more
favourable implications for a child witness were varied.
Most of the items used came from the survey used by Borgida et al. (1989),
which was administered to professionals in the area of child sexual abuse to
determine their degree of partisan orientation. Of the 35 questions in the Borgida et
al. survey, 16 were used in the present study. Minor changes in wording were
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considered necessary. For example, of the ten questions in the "Child as witness"
section of the Borgida et al. survey, only one qualifies the word "children" by
specifying an age, yet research results indicate considerable differences in jurors'
stereotypes of child witnesses as a function of age (Nightingale, 1993). Therefore,
the words, "aged 8 or 9" were inserted after "children" as a 9-year-old victim
witness was used in the trial scenario which subjects would view. The items in this
survey drawn from the Borgida et al. instrument are items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10,
11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21.
Two items in this survey (12 & 13) were adapted from questions used by Corder
and Whiteside (1988) in their survey of jurors' perceptions of issues related to
child sexual abuse. The other seven items were devised for this study, five
(numbers 9, 20, 22, 23, 24) concerning attitudes towards expert witnesses and/or
the legal system, one item (7) regarding delays in reporting abuse and the last item
'"(25) concerning attitudes towards treatment or punitive measures for perpetrators.
9.2.3 Experimental design
The design was a 3 (type of expert testimony: cognitive abilities, psychological
consequences, statement analysis) x \2 (child's statement quality : standard vs.
'enhanced) x 2 (expert role: court-appointed vs. witness for the prosecution) x 2
(gender of juror). Only one age and gender of victim/witness was used (9-year-old
female).
Independent Variables
Manipulation 1: Manipulating the quality of the content of the child's testimony.
To vary the quality of the child's testimony, an objectively definable and
measurable basis for manipulations was required. The criteria used in Criteria-
based content analysis (CBCA) (Raskin & Esplin, 1991) were considered the most
appropriate for this purpose (see Appendix 8.4). Empirical evidence for the .
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reliability and validity of these criteria has been sought in a number of centres
(Horowitz, 1991). Their potential for discriminating between fabrications and
accounts of genuine experiences have been investigated by Landry and Brigham
(1991), and inter-rater reliability has been studied by Anson, Golding, and Gully
(1993). However, the utility of the criteria in this experiment was not to
differentiate between fabrications and accounts based on actually experienced events,
but rather to provide an objective basis for manipulating quality of testimony. The
first 18 criteria were used in preparatory work, omitting criterion 19, "details
characteristic of the offence".
Each of six post-graduate students in psychology was given approximately six
hours training in the use of CBCA, in three two-hour sessions. Training consisted of
learning the CBCA criteria and becoming familiar with exemplars of these criteria
in a transcript of a child's actual videotaped testimony (Steller & Boychuk, 1992).
Further training in the application of the CBCA criteria to transcripts of actual
testimony from child sexual abuse cases in the Australian Capital Territory was
followed by extensive group discussion to ensure that raters had adequate practice in
using the CBCA procedure and understood the need for inter-rater consistency.
After the training period, raters were divided into two groups of three. Raters in
the "Standard" testimony group were given a testimony similar to that used as the
child's testimony in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The raters in the "Enhanced"
testimony group were given a testimonial transcript which was based on the
"Standard" testimony but had additions and alterations designed to enhan~e the
statement by the addition of further CBCA exemplars. The differences between the
two testimonies-in-chief are indicated below, with the added CBCA criterion in
italics and parentheses:
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Question 21 : 'What about the night you got cramp at your Dad's... what did you do
then T'
Standard answer: "I got out of bed and went into the next room and Dad was at
his desk and watching T.V. Anyway, I told him my legs were hurting real bad and..
and then he put some big cushions together.. down on the floor ... and said I should
lie down while he got some oil to rub me legs. "
Enhanced answer: "I got out of bed and went into the next room and dad was
watching T.V. No. No ! I remember now, he was sitting at his desk, but the T.V was
on.. pretty quiet (Spontaneous Correction - criterion 14). Anyway, I told him my
legs were hurting real bad and.. and then he put some big cushions together.. down
on the floor ... and said I should lie down while he got some oil to rub me legs. Then
he went out and I think I remember hearing the phone ring just after he went out so
he didn't come back straight away (Unexpected complication - criterion 7) ... but he
wasn't away long and he came back with some oil.
Question 24: "And what did you do ?"
Standard answer: "I screamed out and told him to stop."
Enhancedanswer : "I screamed out and told him to stop. I remember yelling
'Stop, Daddy, stop !' (Reproduction of conversation - criterion 6 ) 'cause I felt
really scared and I remember my voice sounded a bit shaky .. like scared." (Account
of SUbjective mental state - criterion 12)
Question 25: "Did he stop when you yelled ?"
Standard answer: " No, he started putting something bigger into me. I couldn't
see because he was on top of me. It really, really hurt."
Enhancedanswer: " No, he started putting something bigger into me. I couldn't
see because he was on top of me. It really, really hurt.... and I felt frightened. "
(Account of subjective mental state • criterion t2)
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Question 26 : " What happened then ?"
..
Standard answer: " He moved up and down a bit .. when he got up there was sticky
stuff all over my legs. He wiped it off and put my pyjamas back on me."
Enhancedanswer :" He moved up and down a bit .. when he got up there was
sticky stuff all over my legs. He wiped it off and put my pyjamas back on me, and he
said, 'You'll be all right. I'll get you back to bed." (Reproduction of conversation-
criterion 6 )
Question 28 ; " How did you feel after this happened 1"
Standard answer: "Next day, I was still sore. Dad said I should take a hot bath
and he would buy me a chocolate."
Enhanced answer: " I don't really remember how I felt afterwards, except I was
really sore (Admitting lack of memory - criterion 15) and the next day, I was still
sore. Dad said I should take a hot bath and he would buy me a chocolate."
Question 29 : "How do you feel about Dad now 1"
Standard answer: "... not very gOod."
Enhanced answer: "I don't know ... I'm not angry with him, or, you know ... I
don't feel bad about him or like that.'. (Pardoning the perpetrator, that is. not
blaming him when the opportunity arose - criterion 18)
Question 31 : "Did the sticky stiff feel like the oil Dad was using ?"
Standard answer: No.. not really ! It was sort of different."
Enhancedanswer :" No., not really! It was sort of different, not like anything
I'd felt before, but I can', remember very well. All I remember is it felt yucky."
(Admitting lack of memory - criterion 15)
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Question 37 "Kim, do you realise your father could get into big trouble for
this?"
Standard answer: " I know ... but he wanted to hurt me."
Enhancedanswer: " I don't want to get him into trouble or anything like that.
just don't know why he wanted to hurt me." (Pardoning perpetrator - criterion 15)
Raters in each group were asked to carefully analyse the transcript given by
writing beside each CaCA criterion any exemplars they found and then allocating
points for each criterion on the basis of "0" (absent), "1" (present) and "2"
(strongly present). Each of the six criteria added in the enhanced version was
identified as present by at least two of the three raters in the "enhanced" testimony
group. Conversely, in the "standard" testimony raters' group, no two raters
identified any of the six additional criteria as being present in the "standard"
testimony. Mean rating for number of criteria present in the "standard" testimony
was 9 with a mean point score of 13.33. In the "enhanced" testimony raters' group,
the mean for criteria present was 15, with a mean point score of 22.67. As in the
first three experiments, a parallel script was created in which the questions put and
the child's answers were innocuous. The videotape of the interview which was
conducted with a 9-year-old girl by a female child psychologist then was edited into
the two child testimony conditions, the "standard" and "enhanced" testimonies (see
Appendix 9).
Manipulation 2 :
Manipulating the type of psychological expert testimony
An aim of the experiment was to compare the influence of psychological expert
testimonies which were primarily concerned with
1) the capacities of children in general
2) the behaviour of a particular child witness, or
3) the statement of a particular child witness.
130
Therefore there were three variations of psychological expert testimony, which
may be characterised as focussing on
1) the general cognitive capabilities of children (as in Experiments 1, 2, 3 )
2) the psychological symptoms displayed by the child plaintiff,
3) an analysis of the content of the child's statement.
1) expert testimony on the general capabilities of children
The first form of expert testimony, dealing with children's general capabilities,
was the same as used in the first three experiments.
2) expert testimony on the symptoms displayed by the child plaintiff,
The second form of testimony was based on a review of the signs and symptoms
that might typically be manifested by a child who has been sexually abused. To
formulate a psychological expert testimony on the behavioural/psychological
consequences of sexual abuse a number of leading articles were consulted regarding
the short and long term effects (Bresee, Stearns, Bess, & Packer, 1986; Browne &
Finkelhor, 1986; DeYoung, 1986; Finkelhor, 1990; Tong & Oates, 1990a, 1990b).
The psychological testimony was designed to reflect those reactions which are
frequently mentioned in the literature as characteristic sequelae. The psychologist
admits at the outset that children's-reactions to abuse are highly variable and that
there is no symptom or set of symptoms which are reliably and exclusively
diagnostic. The psychologist cites findings from Bresee et al. (1986) that symptoms
may vary between children sexually assaulted on only one occasion and those
subjected to more frequent molestation. The psychologist testifies that he has used
some of the tests and procedures which Bresee et al. have found to be effective in
differentiating victims of sexual abuse, particularly those which measure self
concept, level of depression, relationship to parents, body image and level of
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anxiety, and that he has spoken to staff at the child's school about her past and
present performance. The psychologist's testimony-in-chief concludes thus :
"Kim's results on the Children's Manifest Anxiety scale
indicated moderate to high levels of anxiety. Her self reports
indicated that she had experienced frequent periods of disturbed
sleep since the alleged incident and that she no longer wanted to
stay out overnight at her friends' houses. From discussion with
school personnel, there were indications of decline in Kim's
school performance over recent months. I concluded that the
symptoms and behaviours displayed by Kim, namely, social
withdrawal, sleep disturbance, moderate to high anxiety levels,
and declining school performance were all symptoms and
behaviours which are consistent with those which might be
displayed in a child who had been sexually assaulted."
Under cross examination from defence counsel, the psychologist states that he has
no previous anxiety scale results to serve as a baseline. He admits also that it may
be difficult to differentiate between symptoms and behaviours produced by other
disturbing and stressful events such as the separation of one's parents, but that the
child's reactions were consistent with an experience of greater traumatic impact
,
than anything associated merely with her parents' separation.
3) expert testimony concerning the content of the child's testimony.
The psychologist's testimony-in-chief begins with some brief background on the
use of Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) in Europe since the 1950's and that the
focus is on analysis of the content of the child's statement; it is not a procedure for
assessing the general credibility of a child witness. The psychologist then outlines
the general CBCA categories: general characteristics of the statement, specific
contents, peculiarities of the event, and motivation to make a false allegation,
together with some of the specific criteria within these categories (Horowitz, 1991;
Kohnken, 1990; Kohnken & Steller, 1988; Raskin & Esplin, 1991). The
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psychologist' cites the studies by Steller, Wellershaus, and Wolf (1988) -and Esplin,
Boychuk, and Raskin (1988) to indicate the nature of recent research into the
validity of the CBCA criteria. He mentions that CBCA research is proceeding at three
North American universities; Utah, Arizona and British Columbia, as well as at the
U.S. National Institute of Child Health and Development (Horowitz, 1991).
The psychologist then gives the results of applying criteria-based content
analysis to the child's statement. For the "standard" testimony he concludes that 9
out of the possible 18 criteria were fulfilled, resulting in a score of 13 using the 0
(criterion absent), 1 (criterion present) and 2 (criterion strongly present)
scoring method. For the "enhanced" testimony, he concludes that 15 of the 18
criteria are present, resulting in a score of 23 points.
In concluding, the psychologist uses words which are appropriate to the
probabilistic assessment made. He says that the standard testimony has "some" of
the qualities consistent with an account of an actually experienced event, but in the
enhanced testimony version uses the word "many". For the standard testimony the
psychologist rates the statement as "moderate" in terms of the presence of the
criteria, and in the enhanced version, he uses the word "high".
Under cross examination by defence counsel, the psychologist admits that he has
not administered formal standardised tests to determine the child's cognitive and
verbal capacities. Defence counsel then raises questions about the Esplin et al.
(1988) study similar to those expressed by Wells and Loftus (1991) in their
"alternative interpretation" of the Esplin et al. findings. The psychologist's reply
is based on Raskin and Esplin's (1991b) answer to those concerns. The final
interchange in the cross-examination involves defence counsel's assertion that the
psychologist had used a procedure based on meagre research. The psychologist
replies that while the procedure is relatively new in the Anglo-American world,
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content analysis of a child's statement has been a mandatory procedure in-the German
legal system for forty years and psychologists there have reported satisfaction with
CBCA's validity.
Judge's introduction and final instructions:
In his introduction, the judge states that the defendant has been committed for
trial on two charges, aggravated sexual assault and sexual intercourse with a young
person, and has pleaded not guilty to both. He then clarifies the legal criteria
pertaining to each charge as set out in sections 127a and 124 respectively of the
Tasmanian Criminal Code. He emphasises to the jurors that the Prosecution must
show beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes as defined did occur and, if so
occurring, that the defendant was the perpetrator of each crime. In his final
instructions, the judge reiterates the legal criteria for each charge and states the
verdict standard of "beyond reasonable doubt", which applies in criminal cases.
The jUdge's final instructions are fundamentally the same for each of the expert
testimony manipulations, except that after the words, "You have heard the testimony
of Dr. Melton, a psychologist", the following sentence varies according to the nature
of the testimony presented by the psychologist:
For the "children's general capabilities" expert testimony, the judge's words
are: "His testimony has provided the court with results from psychological studies
which have investigated the behaviours displayed by children of various ages."
For the "behavioural/psychological consequences" testimony, the judge says:
"His testimony has provided the court with a description of the behavioural and
emotional reactions commonly observed in sexually abused children".
134
For the "statement validity analysis" testimony, the judge's words are: "His
testimony has provided the court with his assessment of the quality of the content of
Kim Wood's statement, using criteria which he states are able to validly and reliably
differentiate between accounts of actually experienced events and accounts of events
which have not been experienced".
For each expert testimony variation, the judge then immediately follows those
words with: "Bear in mind that Dr. Melton's testimony is merely to provide
information which you are free to use or reject in your decision making. You are the
trier of fact and are solely responsible for any decisions you make".
Manipulation 3 :
Manipulating the mode of presentation of the psychologist's testimony:
adversarial and nonadversarial roles.
In the court-appointed role, the psychologist was called and questioned by the
judge who made it clear that the witness was court-appointed and was not present to
support either the prosecution or defence case. The psychologist said that he had no
communication whatever with either counsel for the defence or the prosecuting
i
counsel. When appearing as a witness for the prosecution, the psychologist was
called and questioned by the prosecuting counsel, and also indicated clearly at the
outset that he was in court as a witness for the prosecution. Following the
introductory role-establishing questions, the same questions and answers were used
in both the adversarial and non-adversarial expert roles. In each mode of
presentation the same cross examination was conducted by defencecounsel.
9.2.4 Procedure
Jurors participated in gender-balanced groups of six. After viewing the trial
each juror was given a sheet listing the legal definitions of the charges ot aggravated
sexual assault (Tasmanian Criminal Code, s.127a), and sexual intercourse with a
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young person (Tasmanian Criminal Code, s.124), and also the witnesses in the trial
and their roles. As in the previous experiments, jurors completed pre-deliberation
rating sheets (Appendix 8.1) before deliberation began. Recognition recall of case
facts and the expert testimony facts were completed prior to deliberation so that
jurors' recall would not be aided by any discussion which might occur during
deliberation, or impeded by incorrect information suggested during deliberation.
Before deliberation began, jurors were told that they would be asked to indicate their
verdicts after a thirty minute deliberation period, and if not unanimous, a further
fifteen minutes of deliberation would be required.
The dependent measureswere in these categories:
Reactions to the child witness:
On a 9-point scale, jurors were asked to rate the child's confidence, consistency,
reliability of memory, susceptibility to suggestion, attractiveness, reality
monitoring ability, the likelihood that the child had misinterpreted the defendant's
action, general credibility, and any features of the child's testimony considered
particularly convincing or unconvincing.
Ratings of other witnesses:
Jurors were asked to rate the credibility of the mother and the defendant, and the
extent to which testimony by the mother and medical doctor strengthened the child's
evidence.
Probabilistic ratings of alternative interpretations of the central issue :
In percentage terms, jurors were asked to rate the likelihood that
1) the defendant touched the child's genitals unintentionally and the child
somehow misinterpreted what happened,
2) the defendant did penetrate the child's vagina with his finger or fingers
(aggravated sexual assault)
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3) the defendant did penetrate the child's vagina with his penis (intercourse
with a young person).
Evaluations of the expert and expert testimony:
On 9-point scales jurors rated the degree to which the expert testimony was
scientific, helpful, relevant, and understandable, and the seriousness of gaps in the
research which had been acknowledged by the expert. They also rated the
psychologist expert in terms of his impartiality, confidence, honesty, competence,
credibility, intelligence and trustworthiness.
Interest and fairness of the trial:
Jurors rated how interested they were and how fair they considered the trial to
be on 9-point scales.
Relative influence of the witnesses :
Jurors were asked to distribute 100 percentage points to show the relative
influence that each witness' testimony had in influencing their final verdicts.
Verdicts and degree of certainty :
Before deliberating, jurors were asked to render verdicts on both charges and on
a 5-point scale, the degree of certainty they felt about each verdict. They were also
required to render verdicts and indications of certainty after deliberating.
Recognition recall of case facts (Appendix 8.2)
and recall of the psychologist's expert testimony (Appendix 8.3) :
All jurors were given 12 items and asked to indicate whether the item was or was
not part of the information presented at the trial. It was emphasised that they were
not being asked whether the statement was true or false but simply whether it was
part of the evidence presented or not. Jurors were also given six items drawn from
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the appropriate psychological expert testimony and asked to indicate whether the
item was or was not part of the psychologist's testimony. As it was,not intended to
make comparisons of expert testimony recall across the differing types of expert
testimony, no attempt was made to achieve comparable levels of difficulty for these
items, other than face value.
CBCA exemplars (Appendix 8.5)
Identilication of CaCA exemplars in the child's testimony
Jurors were asked to indicate whether they identified exemplars of the CBCA
criteria in the child's testimony by circling "yes" or "no" to questions such as,
"Did Kim reproduce any conversation that occurred between herself and her father
at or near the time of the alleged incident?", 'Was there an unplanned interruption
or unexpected complication just before, during or just after the alleged incident ?"
caCA exemplars as credibility indicators
To ascertain whether the presence 'of CBCA criteria enhance, diminish or fail to
affect perceived witness credibility, jurors were asked to think over how each of
twelve CBCA criteria might influence their ideas about the believability of any
child's statement about alleged sexual abuse. To items such as "The child
spontaneously corrects any of her answers", jurors were asked to rate whether they
thought the presence of the feature in a child's testimony would make the child's
statement more credible or less credible or make no difference to credibility.
9.3 RESULTS
Pre-trial survey
Jurors were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, but it was
possible, given the large number of questions in the pre-trial survey that a
significant difference in pre-existing attitudes might be found in jurors assigned to
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a particular experimental condition. Analysis of the relationship between each of the
pre-trial survey questions and the independent variables showed that there was a
significant difference on one question in one experimental condition. Those jurors
assigned to the enhanced statement group were significantly more likely to agree
with the proposition, "In the current social climate, it is almost impossible for a
person accused of child sexual abuse to get an impartial trial" than those in the
standard testimony condition (M = 5.3 vs. M = 4.3), E(l,143) = 8.5, 12.<.01. Thus,
jurors who subsequently saw the child's enhanced statement expressed, prior to
viewing the trial, greater concern for the defendant in the case, specifically with
regard to the possibility of bias disadvantaging the defendant's position. One can only
speculate as to what the implications of this difference, if anything other than
chance, may be. It is possible that jurors in the enhanced testimony condition may
have been more alert to indications of impartiality. It is also possible that they
approached their tasks as jurors with a greater commitment to minimising
partiality in their own decision making.
There were substantial gender differences in responses to items on the pre-trial
survey. Female jurors were significantly more likely to agree with the statements:
that children are unlikely to fantasize about sexual activity with parents or other
adults (12.<.01),
that the majority of child sexual abuse cases involve a relative or step-parent of
the child (12.<.05),
that children aged 8 or 9 have no difficulty in distinguishing fantasy from reality
(12.<.05),
that delays in reporting child sexual abuse to the police or other authorities are
quite common (Q<.Ol),
that steps should be taken to. increase the conviction rate in child sexual abuse
cases (12.<.05).
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Females showed significantly higher levels of disagreement with the statements:
that it would be wrong to convict someone of a crime if the only eye-
witness was a 9-year-old (/2.<.05),
that children who retract their stories about sexual abuse were probably lying in
the first place (11.<.01),
that children aged 8 or 9 can be easily manipulated into giving false reports of
sexual abuse (Q.<.O 1),
that the memories of children aged 8 or 9 for emotionally traumatic events are
not as accurate as adults (11.<.05),
that, after sexual abuse prevention training, children are likely to misinterpret
harmless expressions of affection by adults as sexual abuse (11.<.01),
that the legal system should not be involved in cases where there is sexual abuse
within a family (12.<.05)
Mean ratings by juror gender on each of the pre-trial survey items are shown in
Table 9.1. Ratings on items 6, 8, 14 and 16 were reversed so that higher ratings
indicated attitudes more favourable to child witnesses.
Stepwise regression analyses were' conducted to determine whether any of the
pre-trial survey questions were predictive of trial verdict ratings. The most
salient predictor of verdict ratings on both charges were the responses to question 6
on the questionnaire, that is, disagreement with the proposition that it would be
wrong to convict someone if the only witness was a 9-year-old was positively
correlated with higher ratings of defendant guilt. On the aggravated sexual assault
charge, a further contribution to verdict rating variance was made by responses to
statement 18 on the survey 'Children aged 8 or 9 have no difficulty in
distinguishing fantasy from reality", These two variables, statements 6 and 18,
accounted for 11% of verdict rating variance, E(2,141) = 9.07.
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Table
Item
9.1 Mean ratings by juror gender on
Description of Item content
pre-trial survey items
Mean ratings .E
Male Female
Perceptions of children as witnesses
2 Children unlikely to fantasize about CSA
5 Children are no more influenced by leading
questions than are adults
6 It would be wrong to convict someone of a
crime if the only witness was a 9-yr-old
7 The closer the relationship between abuser
and child, the longer to disclosure
8 Children who retract were probably lying
13 Juror's ability to tell if child witness is lying
14 Children can be easily manipulated into falsity
16 Memories of children for traumatic events
are not as accurate as adults
18 Children have no difficulty reality monitoring
19 After sex abuse education children more likely
to misinterpret harmless adult affection
2 1 Delays in reporting CSA are common
5.60 6.47
3.66 3.77
6.41 7.17
7.34 7.62
6.27 7.40
3.75 4.32
4.07 5.47
6.39 7.16
4.90 5.80
5.21 4.00
7.38 8.02
4.87 .028·
0.09 .750
5.48 .021·
1.20 .274
13.65 .000 •
3.04 .084
19.53 .001 •
5.17 .024 •
6.56 .011 •
15.25 .001 •
8.15 .005·
6.84
2.52
2.95
4.20
Perceptions of trial procedures and the legal system
4 Most child sex abuse cases are tried in court
10 Increased conviction rates in sex abuse cases
12 Legal system should not be involved in cases
of intra-familial sexual abuse
15 Fair trial impossible for one accused of CSA 5.01
23 If an offence cannot be proved in a 'eoun of 2.82
law it has not, in effect, been committed
24 Child sexual abuse cases are among the most 7.07
difficult to prosecute and secure convictions
Perceptions of perpetrators / alleged perpetrators
1 Sexual abusers have noticeable dysfunctions
in other areas of their lives, such as work
3 Stepfathers more likely to abuse than fathers 4.80
11 Most CSA cases involve relatives/step-parents 6.72
25 Treatment not punishment for CSA convictions 5.62
Perceptions of experts and expert testimony
g Experts can identify when children lie about GSA 4.70
17 Medical experts can tell if child has been abused 3.62
20 A court-appointed expert is more likely to be 4.96
honest than an adversarial expert
22 Research gaps more likely to be acknowledged 5.66
by court-appointed than adversarial expert
2.56
7.50
1.82
4.59
2.26
7.47
3.84
4.57
7.29
5.54
4.62
3.58
4.84
5.37
1.69 .190
5.30 .023 •
5.25 .023 •
1.37 .243
2.49 .116
1.82 .179
1.02 .315
0.32 .573
4.15 .043 •
0.03 .850
0.05 .820
0.01 .922
0.09 .757
0.62 .431
141
On the sexual intercourse charge, verdict ratings were significantly positively
correlated with pre-trial responses to survey statement 21, that delays in
reporting child sexual abuse are quite common, and negatively correlated with
statement 23, that an offence, has not, in effect been committed if it cannot be proved
in a court of law. Responses to items 6, 21 and 23 on the survey accounted for 16%
of verdict rating variance, [(3,140) = 8.96.
Ratings of the child witness
A multivariate F test (3x2x2x2 Manova) using type of expert testimony, expert
role, child's statement quality and juror gender as the independent variables was
calculated on the jurors' ratings of those child-based variables addressed in the
general capabilities testimony: memory, resistance to suggestion and reality
monitoring. Ratings of those jurors who heard the general capabilities testimony
were significantly higher than the ratings of those who heard either the
psychological consequences testimony or the SVA testimony (Wilks' Lambda:
[(6,236) = .86, R< .01). There was also a significant juror gender effect with
female jurors' ratings significantly higher than male jurors' ratings (Wilks'
Lambda: [(3,118) = .84, R<.OOl). Univariate analyses indicated significant juror
gender effects on three other child based variables. Female jurors (M = 7.43) gave
\
the child significantly higher ratings for consistency than did male jurors (M =
6.70), E(l,120) = 8.49, 12.<.01, and females rated the child as more attractive (M
= 6.41) than did the male jurors (M. =5.96), [(1,120) = 4.93, R<.05. Females
also considered it more unlikely (M = 7.5) than did male jurors (M. = 6.29) that
the child had misinterpreted the defendant's actions, [(1,120) = 14.18, 12.<.001.
There were significant main effects for type of testimony on ratings of the child's
confidence, and on the degree to which the abuse was considered harmful to the child,
assuming it occurred. Jurors who heard the psychological consequences testimony
rated the child's confidence as lower (M = 5.87) than either those who heard the
general capabilities testimony (M = 6.74) or those who heard the SVA testimony (M
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= 6.67), E(2,120) = 3.77, 11.<.05. Those who heard the psychological consequences
testimony rated the degree of harm significantly greater (M = 7.34) than either
those who heard the general capabilities testimony (M = 6.8) or those who heard the
SVA testimony (M = 6.30), E(2,120) = 4.57, D,<.05.
There was a significant main effect for the quality of the child's statement on
jurors' ratings of the child's confidence, E(l,120) = 4.70, 1l..<.05, but this was
attributable to the significant interaction between child's statement quality and
. .
juror gender, E(l,120) = 7.85, D,<.01. While male jurors' ratings of the child's
confidence were not significantly affected by statement quality, female jurors who
saw the enhanced statement rated the child as significantly more confident (M =
7.20) than the female jurors who saw the standard statement (M = 5.79). On
ratings of the child's overall credibility, there was a significant effect only for
juror gender, with females <M. = 7.53) giving higher ratings than male jurors (M =
6.56), E(1,120) = 12.91, D,<.001.
Statement quality x expert role x expert testimony Interactions.
Univariate Anova analyses of the effects of the independent variables on juror's
ratings of the child-based variables showed two significant three-way interactions.
The interaction of statement quality x expert role x expert testimony on jurors'
ratings of the child's memory was significant and attributable to the low ratings by
those jurors in the standard statement conditions who heard the court-appointed
expert's testimony concerning the SVA results and by those who heard the expert's
testimony on the psychological consequences of abuse. The interaction of these same
variables was significant on jurors' ratings of the child's reality monitoring
ability, and again this was attributable to the low ratings given by jurors in the
standard statement condition who heard the court-appointed expert's SVA testimony.
Table 9.2 shows the cell means for the three-way interactions on both variables and
significant differences between the cell means.
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Table 9.2. Mean ratings of the child's memory, and reality monitoring in relation
to three-way interaction; statement quality x expert role x type of expert testimony.
Memory Significant Realltv Significant
Differences Monitoring differences
wjth other means withotbsr means
Statement Expert Expert
Oueltt» ~ Testimony
Standard C.A. SVA 5.79 (vs. S/C.A.lGen) • 6.21 (VS. S/Pros/SVA) •
(vs. ElC.A.lPsy) • (vs. ElC.A.lSVA) •
(vs. E/Pros/Gen) • (vs. E/C.A.lPsy) •
(vs. E/Pros/SVA) •
(vs. E/Pros/Gen) •
Standard C.A. Psych 5.79 (vs. S/C.A.lGen) • 7.12 n.s
(vs. ElC.A.lPsy) •
(vs. E/Pros/Gen) •
Standard C.A. General 7.25 n.s 7.25 n.s
Standard Pros SVA 6.33 n.s 7.42 n.s
Standard Pros Psych 6.42 n.s 7.00 n.s
Standard Pros General 6.42 n.s 6.42 (vs. ElC.A.lPsy) •
Enhanced C.A. SVA 6.67 n.s 7.50 n.s
Enhanced C.A. Psych 7.33 n.s 7.71 n.s
Enhanced C.A. General 6.63 n.s 6.67 n.s
Enhanced Pros SVA 6.83 n.s 7.50 n.s
Enhanced Pros Psych 6.17 n.s 7.08 n.s
Enhanced Pros General 7.17 n.s 7.50 n.s
• 1l.<.05
AnalysIs of verdIcts
Aggravated sexual assault verdict
Chi-square analyses of the effects of the independent variables on aggravated
sexual assault verdicts showed significantly more pre-deliberation guilty verdicts
by female jurors, X 2 (1, N=144) = 7.25, 12.<.01, and also by jurors in the
enhanced statement condition prior to deliberation, X 2 (1, N=144) = 3.70, 12.=.05,
and after deliberation, X 2 (1, N=144) = 7.54, 11.<.01. Table 9.3 shows the
frequency of guilty and not guilty verdicts for the standard and enhanced versions of
the child's statement on both charges, before and after deliberation.
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Table 9.3 Pre- and post-deliberation verdicts by quality of child's testimony
Enhanced testimony Standard testimony
Guilty Not gullly Guilty Not guilty
Aggravated sexual assault
Pre-deliberation 59 13 49 23 (X2(1,144) =3.70. R=.05)
Post-deliberation 62 10 48 24 (X2 (1,144) =7.54, R<.01)
Sexual intercourse
Pre-deliberation 38 34 36 36 (X2 (1,144) =0.11, n.s)
Post-deliberation 40 32 30 42 (X2 (1.144) =2.78, n.s)
----------------------------------------------------------
While there was no significant main effect for expert role, chi-square analyses
within each of the three types of testimony showed that expert role had a significant
effect only with those jurors who viewed the SVA expert testimony, X2 (1,n=48) =
4.54, Q.<.05, with the greater number of guilty votes being rendered by those who
saw the prosecution expert. Further analysis of this voting pattern indicated that
the significant effect was largely attributable to the verdict difference on the
standard quality interview alone, a difference which approached significance
(1l=.08). Thus, while the sample size for those who saw SVA testimony in
conjunction with the standard quality in~erview was small (n = 24), there was some
indication that, in this condition, those who viewed the court-appointed testimony
may have been more inclined to accept the expert's jUdgement that the child's
statement was only of moderate quality and were therefore less inclined to vote
guilty, whereas those who saw the prosecution expert appeared to be less accepting
of the expert's assessment of the child's statement as moderate, and more inclined to
vote guilty. Alternatively, some who saw the prosecution expert deliver his
assessment of the child's statement as "moderate" may have presumed that the
expert was there to give testimony favourable to the child, and therefore interpreted
"moderate" as signifying "moderately good" rather than "moderately bad", These
interpretations may also explain the low ratings noted above which jurors gave to
the child's memory and reality monitoring ability in the standard interview! court-
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appointed/SVA testimony condition. The different verdict patterns with varying
types of expert testimony are shown in Table 9.4. The variability in verdict
patterns with different types of expert testimony is discussed further in section
11.3 of Chapter 11.
Table 9.4 Frequency of pre- and post-deliberation guilty verdicts on both
charges with each type of expert testimony.
(Percentages of guilty verdicts in parentheses)
Interview quality
Enhanced Standard
Generalised testimony
Pre-deliberation
Aggavated sexual assault 19(79) 19(79)
Sexual intercourse 12(50) 13(54)
Post-deliberation
Expert role
Court-ap Prosec
19(79) 19(79)
15(63) 10(41)
Gender of juror
Female Male
21 (88) 17(71)
16(67) 9 (37)*
Aggravated sexual assault 19(79) 19(79)
Sexual intercourse 11 (46) 12 (50)
PsychQloglcal conseqyences testimony
Pre-deliberation
19(79) 19(79) 22(92) 16(67)*
17(71) 6 (25)* * 15(63) 8 (33)*
Aggravated sexual assault 18(75) 14(58)
Sexual intercourse 10(42) 14 (58)
Post-deliberation
Aggravated sexual assault 19(79) 14(58)
Sexual intercourse 8 (33) 13 (54)
S.Y.A. testimony
Pre·deliberation
Aggravated sexual assault 22(92) 16(67)
Sexual intercourse 16(67) 9 (38)*
Post-dellberetion
15(63) 17(71)
12(50) 12(50)
16(67) 17(710
10(42) 11(46)
16(67) 22(92)*
12(50) 13(54)
19(79) 13(54)
14(58) 10(42)
20(83) 13(54)*
14(58) 7 (29)*
21 (88) 17(71)
16(67) 9 (37)*
Aggravated sexual assault 24(100) 15(63)* * 18(75) 21(88)
Sexual intercourse 21(88) 5 (21)* * 10(42) 16(67)
20(83) 19(79)
14(58) 12(50)
* p<.05: .* p<.01
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Verdicts for the charge of sexual Intercourse with a young person
Chi-square analyses of the effects of the independent variables on the sexual
intercourse verdicts showed a significant main effect for gender only, with
significantly more females voting guilty, X2 (1, N=144) = 9.0, 12.<.01.
Balance of verdicts within Juries.
Table 9.5 shows the balance of verdicts within juries before and after the
deliberation process. On both charges there is considerable movement towards a
unanimous verdict following deliberation.
Table 9.5 Number of jury panels with a particular balance of verdicts
before and after deliberation.
Unanimous Majorityfor Balanced Majority for Unanimous
Not guilty Not guilty (3 - 3) Guilty GUilty
Aggravated sexual assault
Pre-deliberation 0 1 2 19 2
Post-deliberation 1 0 3 11 9
Sexual intercourse
Pre-deliberation 0 6 10 8 0
Post-deliberation 5 4 6 5 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Scaled verdict ratings
Results for pre-deliberation scaled verdicts showed the same pattern of main
effects as did the analysis of dichotomous verdicts. On the charge of aggravated sexual
assault, those who saw the child's enhanced testimony gave significantly higher
verdict ratings of defendant guilt (M = 7.91, Sll. = 2.66) than those who saw the
standard testimony (M...= 6.95, SD = 3.08), E(1,120) = 4.49, 12.<.05. There were
also juror gender differences with female subjects giving significantly higher
verdict ratings of defendant guilt on the aggravated sexual assault charge, E(120) =
6.30, 12.<.05, and on the sexual intercourse charge, E(120) = 9.0, 12.<.01.
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Likelihood of occurrence of the central trial Issues
Ratings of the likelihood that the defendant had penetrated the child's vagina with
his finger(s), which is the legal criterion for aggravated sexual assault, were, as
might be expected, significantly different for those who voted guilty (M = 82.8%)
and those who voted not guilty (M = 38.7%), but there was a significant interaction
between juror gender and verdict. The 47 males who rendered pre-deliberation
guilty verdicts on the aggravated sexual assault charge maintained significantly
lower levels of likelihood that the defendant had penetrated the child's vagina (M =
76.3%) than did the 61 female jurors who rendered a guilty verdict on this charge
(M = 87.9%), E(1,106) = 7.82, 12.<.01.
On the more serious charge of intercourse with a young person, the 74 subjects
who voted guilty had significantly higher ratings (M = 79.8%) of the likelihood that
the defendant had penetrated the child's vagina with his penis than the 70 subjects
who voted not guilty (M = 37.8%). There was no significant interaction between
verdict and juror gender, but the differences were in the same direction as the first
charge; the 28 males who voted guilty on the sexual intercourse charge indicated a
mean likelihood of 74.6% that the defendant had penetrated the child's vagina with
his penis, while the 46 females who voted guilty on this charge had a mean likelihood
of 83.0%.
Evaluations of the expert and expert testimony
In the court appointed role the expert was perceived as more competent (M..=
7.47) than as a witness for the prosecution (M = 6.86), 12.<.05, more trustworthy
(M =7.41 vs. M =6.79, 12.<.05), more helpful (M =6.68 vs. M =5.80, 12.<.05) and
more scientific (M = 6.68 vs. M = 5.98, 1l.<.05). An admission of gaps in the
research was seen as significantly less serious when made by the court appointed
expert (M = 5.4, .so = 1.93) than when made by the prosecution's expert (M =
6.19, SD = 1.77,Il.<.01).
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The mean rating for comprehensibility of the SVA testimony (M = 6.61) was
significantly lower than the ratings given by jurors for the comprehensibility of the
psychological consequences testimony (M = 7.33) and the general capabilities
testimony (M = 7.60), E(2,120) = 4.47, 1l.<.05.
Perceptions of the expert differed considerably according to verdict preference.
Overall, those who voted guilty on the aggravated sexual assault charge considered
the expert's testimony to be very significantly more helpful (M = 6.76) than those
who voted not guilty (M = 4.69), E(l,143) = 30.49, 1l.<.001. In each of the expert
role conditions, differences were highly significant on ratings of the degree to which
the testimony was helpful in relation to aggravated sexual assault verdicts. For
those jurors who saw the court-appointed expert, the mean ratings for helpfulness
of the expert testimony were 7.35 for guilty voters and 5.18 for not guilty voters,
E(l,71) = 23.8, 1l.<.001. For those who viewed the prosecution expert, mean
helpfulness ratings were 6.25 for guilty and 3.92 for not guilty voters, E(l,71) =
15.19, 1l.<.001.
On the sexual assault charge, differences in perceptions of the expert on other
variables as well as helpfulness appear to have been salient in verdict decision
making. On this charge, the 74 jurors who voted guilty rated the expert's testimony
as more helpful (M =6.73 vs. M = 5.72), E(l,143) = 8.4, 1l.<.Ol, and the expert
as more trustworthy (M = 7.46 vs. M = 6.71), E(l,143) = 9.5, 1l.<.Ol, and more
honest (M = 7.99 vs. M.. = 7.20), E(l,143) = 9.8, 1l.<.01. This pattern of
differences in perceptions of the expert was consistent within each expert role
condition.
Interest In the trIal
Jurors exposed to the nonadversarial expert testimony expressed significantly
more interest (M = 8.13, SD = 0.97) than those who viewed the adversarial expert
(M = 7.73, .all = 1.3, 1l.<.05).
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Relative Influence of the witnesses
The means for the percentage of influence accorded to each witness's testimony
are shown in Table 9.6. For those who voted not guilty on the aggravated sexual
assault charge there was no difference in the degree of influence of the child's and the
defendant's testimony, but for those who found the defendant guilty, the child's
testimony was three times more influential than the defendant's. For those voting
guilty on the sexual intercourse charge, the child's testimony was four times more
influential than the defendant's.
Table 9.6 Means (and SO's in parentheses) for percentage of influence that each
witness's testimony had in verdict decisions for guilty and not guilty
voters on the aggravated sexual assault and sexual intercourse charges
Aggravated sexual assault
Witness Pre-deliberation Verdict p
G.u.il.l¥ Not guilty
Child 46.8 (16.3) 28.3 (17.9) <.001
Mother 10.5 (7.2) 12.8 (11.1) n.s.
Medical doctor 11.7 (7.1) 14.6 (10.7) n.s.
Psychologist 15.5 (9.9) 18.0 (13.9) n.s.
Defendant 15.6 (11.6) 26.2 (14.2) <.001
Sexual Intercourse charge
Witness Pre-deliberation Verdict p
GYilty Not gyilty
Child 49.4 (18.5) 34.8 (15.3) <.001
Mother 10.2 (7.6) 11.9 (9.1) n.s.
Medical doctor 11.8 (7.7) 13.1 (8.8) n.s.
Psychologist 15.9 (9.7) 16.4 (12.4) n.s.
Defendant 12.6 (9.8) 24.1 (13.5) <.001
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Recognition recall of trial facts :
There was no significant difference on recall of the twelve case facts between
those exposed to the court-appointed expert (M. = 9.97, £l = 1.38) and those
exposed to the prosecution expert (M = 10.18, SJ1-1.67). However, differences
between these groups on recall of the expert testimony did approach significance (~=
.07), with those exposed to the nonadversarial expert tending to exhibit poorer
recognition recall (M = 4.02, SD = 1.27) of the six items than those exposed to the
adversarial expert (M = 4.38, SD = 1.15).
Regression analysis of child-based ratings
on pre-deliberation verdict ratings
Stepwise regression analysis involving the child-based ratings, confidence,
consistency, memory ability, resistance to suggestion, reality monitoring,
harmfulness of the alleged act, the child's attractiveness, and the likelihood that the
child did not misinterpret the defendant's actions, indicated that the best predictor of
pre-deliberation aggravated sexual assault verdict ratings was the likelihood that
the child had not misinterpreted the defendant's actions, followed by ratings of the
child's ability to distinguish fact from fantasy, and memory ability (R2 = .387;
[(3,140) = 29.40). For pre-deliberation sexual intercourse verdict ratings, the
likelihood of not misinterpreting the incident was also the most salient predictor,
followed by memory ability (B.2 = .257; . [(2,141) = 24.43).
Jurors' opinions on SVA criteria as statement credibility Indicators
The proportion of jurors indicating that the presence of a given SVA criterion
would enhance the credibility of the child's statement was highest (73.6%) for
criterion 8, "Unusual details" and lowest for criterion 15, "Admitting lack of
memory". The criterion which was considered by the highest proportion to detract
from credibility was criterion 14, "Spontaneous corrections". Table 9.7 shows the
percentage of jurors who nominated each criterion as a feature which would enhance
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credibility. Table 9.8 shows the order in terms of the percentages of jurors who
nominated the presence of the criterion as a feature which would make the statement
less credible. On both the aggravated sexual assault charge and the sexual
intercourse charge, there were no significant differences between those jurors who
voted guilty and those who voted not guilty in terms of the number of criteria
nominated as enhancing a statement's credibility, or the number of criteria
considered to diminish statement credibility.
Identification of SVA criteria features In child's statement
To test the hypothesis that those who voted guilty would identify more SVA
features as present in the child's statement, analysis of verdicts by number of
features identified was conducted separately for the enhanced and standard testimony
groups. For those jurors who saw the enhanced testimony, there was a significant
difference between the number of SVA features (M = 6.37) identified by those (n =
59) who voted guilty on the aggravated sexual assault charge and those (n=13) who
voted not guilty (M. = 4.76), E(1,70) = 6.39, 1l<.05. On the sexual intercourse
charge, the difference between the number of SVA features (M = 6.62) identified by
those (n = 38) who voted guilty also differed significantly from the number of
features (M = 5.50) identified by those (n = 34) who voted not guilty, E(1,70) =
5.02, 12.<.05.
For jurors who saw the standard testimony, there was a significant difference
between the number of SVA features (M = 1.95) identified by those (n = 49) who
voted guilty on the aggravated sexual assault charge and the number of features
identified (M = 1.34) by those ui = 23) who voted not guilty, E(1,70) = 5.6,
12.<.05. On the charge of sexual intercourse with a young person, the difference
between the number of features (M = 1.97) identified by the 36 guilty voters and
the number of features (M = 1.55) identified by the 36 not guilty voters approached
significance (12.=.09).
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Table 9.7 : Percentages of jurors indicating each SVA criterion as increasing
statement credibility
SVA
criterion
number
Description of feature Percentage indicating
feature would increase
statement's credibility
8
12
6
10
9
17
18
7
13
16
14
15
Unusual details : The child reports details of persons objects
or events which were unusual but meaningful in the context
of the alleged incident
Accounts of subjective mental state: The child reports her
own thoughts and feelings at the time of the alleged
incident
Reproduction of conversation : The child reports the words
of conversation that occurred between herself and the alleged
perpetrator at the time of the alleged incident
Accurateiy reported details misunderstood : The child reports
details about the incident which seem to be accurate in a sexually
abusive incident but which are misunderstood by the child
Superfluous details : The child' s statement includes extra
peripheral) details that were related to the situation but that did
not contribute directly to the allegation
Self deprecation: The child describes some aspect of her
behaviour as being wrong or inappropriate
Pardoning the perpetrator: The child makes excuses for the
alleged perpetrator or does not blame him when an opportunity
to blame him occurs
Unexpected complications during the incident: The child
says that there was an unplanned interruption or an
unexpected complication during the alleged incident
Attribution of perpetrator's mental state : The child makes
some reference to her father's thoughts or feelings at the time
of the alleged incident.
Raising doubts about one's own testimony: The child
expresses concern that some part of her statement seems
incorrect or unbelievable
Spontaneous corrections: The child spontaneously corrects
any of her answers
Admitting lack of memory: The child indicates that she did not
remember some aspect of the alleged incident
73.6
69.4
63.9
63.2
54.8
48.6
45.8
43.8
41.7
37.5
27.8
25.0
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Table 9.8 Percentages of jurors indicating each SVA criterion as diminishing
statement credibility
SVA Description of feature Percentage indicating
criterion feature would diminish
number a statement's credibility
14 Spontaneous corrections : 31.9
15 Admitting lack of memory : 25.0
6 Raising doubts about one's own testimony : 22.2
13 Attribution of perpetrator's mental state : 19.4
10 Accurately reported details misunderstood : 12.5
17 Self deprecation : 11.8
18 Pardoning the perpetrator: 11 . 1
9 Superfluous details: 9.0
6 Reproduction of conversation: 8.3
7 Unexpected complications during the incident: 6.9
8 Unusuai details: 4.9
12 Accounts of subjective mental state: 3.5
Check on SVA festlmony Jurors compared fa
those hearing other expert testimonies
Although there were no significant differences in any verdicts or verdict ratings
according to the type of expert testimony, a number of tests were conducted to
determine whether those who heard the SVA testimony enjoyed any subsequent
advantage in terms of ability to identify CBCA features in the child's testimony or
recognition of those features as credibility enhancing. Chi-square analyses
conducted for the enhanced testimony and standard testimony groups separately
showed that those who heard the SVA testimony were not more likely to identify any
single feature as present in the child's testimony than those who heard the other
types of expert testimony. There were no significant differences between the
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number of SVA criteria nominated as enhancing credibility by type of expert
testimony; that is, those who heard the SVA testimony wherein the expert mentioned
some of the criteria used in content analysis did not nominate a significantly greater
number of criteria as enhancing credibility than those who heard either the
psychological consequences or general capabilities testimony.
9.4 DISCUSSION
ImplicatIons of the pre-trIal survey results
Of the pre-trial survey items, the most salient predictor of jurors' subsequent
verdict ratings on both the aggravated sexual assault and sexual intercourse charges
was the extent of agreement or disagreement with the proposition that it would be
wrong to convict someone if the only witness was a 9-year-old. Those respondents
who signalled their apparently greater willingness to convict on the uncorroborated
testimony of a 9-year-old child were more likely to vote the defendant guilty when
acting as jurors in the simulated trial. Overall, a high proportion of subjects
(77%) indicated some degree of disagreement with the statement that it would be
wrong to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of a child, and only 12% agreed
that it would be wrong to do so. In Australia, proceedings against an alleged offender
are rare if appropriate corroboration is not available (Warner, 1991) and if there
is no admission by the alleged offender (Brereton & Cole, 1991), since the
likelihood of conviction in these circumstances is considered too low. Given the
legislative provisions in Australia, which require children's unsworn evidence to be
corroborated, and the judicial cautions against convicting on the basis of children's
sworn, or unsworn, evidence (Davies, 1993; Warner, 1991) it is interesting that,
in this study, only one eighth of the subjects held the opinion that convicting on the
basis of a child's uncorroborated testimony would be wrong. This result suggests
that the recently realised or recommended abolition of corroboration requirements
in various states of the United States (Levine & Battistoni, 1991) and Australia
(Warner, 1987) may be in accord with attitudes held in the general population. In
155
England and Wales the Criminal Justice Act (1989) abolished the corroboration rule
for unsworn evidence of children, following a review of the psychological research
on the witness competency of children.
The pre-trial survey results indicated significant pre-trial attitudinal
differences between male and female jurors. Females were more strongly in
agreement with statements indicating that children aged 8 or 9 have no difficulty in
reality monitoring, are unlikely to fantasize about sexual activity with adults, and
are not easily manipulated into giving false reports of sexual abuse. Females also
were more likely to consider delays in disclosure or reporting to be common, and
were less likely to interpret a child's retraction as an indicator of fabrication.
Females were more inclined to say that the legal system should intervene in cases of
familial sexual abuse. Finally, females indicated greater willingness to convict if
the only witness to a crime was a 9-year-old child. These prior attitudinal
differences seem to be expressed in the significantly higher credibility ratings
accorded the child witness and the higher proportions of guilty verdicts rendered by
the female jurors.
The effect of varying the content quality of the child's statement
It was hypothesised that those jurors who saw the enhanced version of the child's
testimony would rate the child's credibility higher and render significantly more
guilty verdicts, provided that
1) additional features in the enhanced testimony were attended to by jurors, and
2) these features were perceived by jurors as credibility-enhancing.
Jurors who saw the enhanced statement were more likely to vote guilty on the
aggravated sexual assault charge, but verdict differences on the sexual intercourse
charge did not attain significance. While guilty voters and not guilty voters in the
enhanced testimony condition did not differ in the number of criteria nominated as
enhancing a statement's credibility, those who voted guilty on the aggravated sexual
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assault charge identified significantly more of the CBCA features as being present in
the child's testimony than did those who voted not guilty. The same outcome emerged
with verdicts on the sexual intercourse charge.
It was found also in the standard testimony condition, which contained
considerably fewer CBCA criteria, that those who voted guilty identified more
features as present than the not guilty voters. The findings support the hypothesis
that jurors may intuitively use some CBCA features in their assessment of the
credibility of a child's statement.
There was considerable variability in the proportions of jurors indicating each
CBCA criterion as increasing or diminishing perceived credibility. Almost one third
of subjects said they would perceive a child's spontaneous corrections as detracting
from credibility, yet this was one of seven criteria found in 100% of the confirmed
cases studiedby Esplin et al. (1988), albeit, in only 57% of the confirmed cases in
the Anson et al. (1993) study. Only 28% of subjects in this experiment perceived
the presence of spontaneous corrections as credibility-enhancing behaviour, which
suggests that, in this instance, jurors' common knowledge and experience may be a
less than adequate basis for understanding this particular behaviour (Colman &
Mackay, 1992).
Impact of type of expert testimony
The hypothesis that jurors who saw the generalised cognitive abilities testimony
would rate the child higher on the abilities addressed by the expert was supported.
The only other main effects for type of testimony were that jurors who heard the
psychological consequences testimony rated the child as less confident and rated the
degree of harm as greater, outcomes consistent with the content of the evidence
presented by the expert, who said that the child displayed moderate to high levels of
anxiety and other negative psychological and behavioural sequelae.
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The point of interest is that not one of the three types of testimony had a
significantly greater impact on ratings of the child's credibility or on verdicts than
any other. On the aggravated sexual assault charge, the percentage of pre-
deliberation guilty verdicts rendered with the generalised cognitive abilities
testimony was 81%, with the psychological consequences testimony 69%, and with
the statement validity analysis testimony 79%. On the sexual intercourse charge,
proportions of pre-deliberation guilty verdicts were: cognitive abilities testimony
54%, psychological consequences testimony 50%. and SVA testimony 52%.
Perceptions of the expert and relationshIp to verdicts
Whether jurors saw the adversarial or non-adversarial expert, there were
significant differences between guilty and not guilty voters in their ratings of the
expert. With regard to sexual intercourse verdicts, those voting guilty in both
expert role conditions rated the expert as more helpful, more trustworthy and more
honest. The differences between guilty and not guilty voters in their perceptions of
the expert's impartiality did not reach significance, but it may be that some jurors
are uncertain of the meaning of the term "impartiality" and their perceptions of the
expert are more clearly indicated in the ratings of honesty and trustworthiness.
Processing of the expert testimony
Brekke et al. (1991) found that recognition recall of case facts was significantly
higher for the nonadversarial than the adversarial expert condition. They suggested
that this finding may have been due to a reduction in the information load if jurors
were heuristically processing the nonadversarial expert's testimony, that is, being
somewhat less allentive to the details of expert testimony, jurors presumably had a
greater capacity to retain and recall other case facts. Brekke et al. (1991) did find
that recognition recall of the expert testimony was significantly poorer in the
nonadversarial condition. In the present study there was no significant difference on
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recall of case facts between the adversarial and nonadversarial conditions, but the
difference in recall of expert testimony facts did approach significance, with those
exposed to the nonadversarial expert exhibiting poorer recognition recall. This is
supportive of Chaiken's (1980, 1987) heuristic processing hypothesis. However,
Chaiken also proposes that heuristic processing is most likely to occur when either
motivation or ability is low. There is no reason to presume that ability is low in
this sample of subjects and there was no direct measure of motivation, only a less
direct indicator, degree of interest in the trial. On this measure the results were
similar to those found by Brekke et al. (1991). Those jurors exposed to the
nonadversarial testimony were significantly more interested in the trial than those
in the adversarial expert condition.
Brekke et al. (1991) concluded thai while the poorer recognition recall of the
nonadversarial testimony supports both Chaiken's heuristic processing model
(1980, 1987) and Petty and Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood Model (1986a), the
greater interest exhibited by those same jurors raises questions about the mediators
of the effects. However, it is possible that in this study and in the Brekke et al.
study, interest in the trial may not be a good indicator of levels of motivation to
process information carefully. It is likely that those exposed to the nonadversarial
expert showed greater interest because of the novelty of such a role in our Anglo-
American legal system, but were also less systematic in their processing of the
court-appointed expert's testimony because they perceived the expert as more
impartial and trustworthy and therefore relied to a greater degree on the
"statements by experts can be trusted" rule of thumb.
The present findings suggest that there was greater acceptance and less scrutiny
of statements made by the nonadversarial expert in that he was perceived as more
competent, more trustworthy, more helpful and more scientific. Furthermore, gaps
in the research were considered less serious when the nonadversarial expert made
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such an acknowledgement. It is possible that what might be perceived as a chink in
the professional armour of an adversarial expert may be seen as merely a candid
admission of a regrettable hiatus in the literature when coming from a
nonadversarial expert, and may serve to enhance perceived expertise.
Weight accorded to the child's testimony
- the Importance displacement hypothesis
It has been suggested (Ross et al., 1989) that the importance displacement
hypothesis formulated by Goodman and colleagues may not apply in child sexual abuse
cases. The importance displacement hypothesis predicts that the testimonies of other
witnesses are likely to be more influential when the key witness is a child. In this
experiment, jurors were asked to apportion 100 percentage points between each of
the trial witnesses to indicate how much each witness had influenced their final
verdict decision.
Results from this trial scenario, suggest that there may be a high degree of
variability among jurors in the weight accorded to the child's testimony, with those
voting for conviction on either charge rating the child's testimony as considerably
more influential than the defendant's or any other witness's testimony, whereas for
those who voted not guilty there was no significant difference in the degree to which
they perceived the child's and defendant's testimony influencing their decision
making.
It is possible that jurors who voted guilty, having committed themselves to a vote
for conviction, may have retrospectively interpreted and elaborated the degree of
influence the child's testimony had on their decison making, and may also have
retrospectively depreciated the defendant's testimony.
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Certainty requirements for conviction
The finding that relative to female gUilty voters, males who voted guilty on the
aggravated sexual assault charge showed a lower percentage likelihood that the
defendant had penetrated the girl's vagina with his finger suggests that male jurors
may have lower certainty requirements for conviction. This finding does not support
Ellsworth's (1993) hypothesis that the greater the regret a juror feels for a
mistaken conviction relative to a mistaken acquittal the higher the juror's threshold
of conviction. Content analysis of the deliberations in the earlier experiments of
this thesis has indicated that male jurors are more likely to express concern for the
consequences of a guilty verdict for the defendant than do female jurors. This may be
due to male jurors' higher levels of empathy for a male defendant and less
identification with the victim in cases involving sexual crimes (Deitz, Blackwell,
Daley, & Bentley, 1982; Deitz & Byrnes, 1981; McNamara, Vattano, & Viney,
1993) and therefore, presumably, greater concern about a mistaken conviction
relative to a mistaken acquittal. Further discussion of the implications of the
results of all four experiments in this thesis for juror gender differences is
contained in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 10
Discussion and Conclusions:
Impact of psychological expert testimony
and expert roles
10.1 Summary of results concerning the Impact of
psychological expert testimony
The central emphasis in the four experiments of the present thesis was an
investigation of the impact of generalised psychological expert testimony concerning
children's cognitive abilities in a sexual abuse case.
In the first experiment the presence of such testimony resulted in higher juror
ratings of the complainant child's memory expertise, resistance to suggestion and
reality monitoring, but not in significantly more guilty verdicts. However, results
indicated that the exposure to expert testimony may have enhanced the degree of
certainty felt by those who voted guilty.
In the second experiment, the impact of the generalised testimony was found to
vary with the expert's role when the expert was male, but no variation in impact
across roles was noted with the female expert. While expert role did not
significantly affect verdicts, the verdict ratings, which combined verdict with
degree of certainty, were significantly higher when the male expert presented in the
non-adversarial role, than when in the adversarial role. Relative to the court-
appointed male expert, the adversarial male expert was rated as less impartial and
his testimony as less helpful.
Results from the third experiment indicated that variations in the order of
presentation of testimony did not affect the impact of the psychologist's expert
testimony. However, as in the first experiment, those who heard the expert
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testimony, regardless of its position, rated the child higher on cognitive competence
variables than did those jurors who did not see the expert.
in the fourth experiment, the impact of the generalised cognitive abilities
testimony was compared with two other forms of expert testimony, one bearing on
the general psychological consequences of sexual abuse with reference made to
relevant symptoms displayed by the child, and the other involving a probabilistic
assessment of the validity of the child's statement. Jurors who saw the cognitive
abilities testimony rated the child higher on those abilities, but verdicts and verdict
ratings did not differ with varying types of expert testimony. The impact of expert
role was considerably less straightforward in the fourth experiment than in the
second experiment, and varied according to the type of expert testimony given.
In considering the impact of psychological expert testimony in these studies and
the relevance of the present findings to real cases, caution should be exercised for
two reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the compression of a trial scenario
into a brief videotaped presentation may have resulted in the jurors placing greater
weight on the expert's testimony than might occur in a full trial. Secondly, the
impact of the psychologist's testimony may have been attributable, in some degree,
to the "boomerang effect" (Isquith, Levine, & Scheiner, 1993) where the judge's
directions, even those which are cautionary, serve to draw attention to a particular
witness's testimony, and in so doing lead jurors to attach greater weight to it.
10.2 Role of expert witness
The role of the expert witness was manipulated in Experiments 2 and 4. In
Experiment 2, there were significantly fewer guilty votes with the male expert in
the adversarial role than in the court-appointed role, and the court-appointed
expert was rated as significantly more helpful and impartial. In Experiment 4,
where only a male expert was used, there were indications of differing effects on
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verdicts for expert role depending on the nature of the expert testimony presented
(see Table 9.4).
When the expert presented generalised cognitive abilities testimony, there were
no significant differences from expert role on aggravated sexual assault verdicts, but
the sexual intercourse verdicts, while not significantly differing by expert role,
were, nevertheless, in the same direction (court-appointed expert, 63% guilty vs.
prosecution expert, 41% guilty) as the significant differences found in Experiment
2. Differences on sexual intercourse verdicts increased to be significantly different,
after deliberation.
With the psychological consequences testimony, guilty verdicts by expert role
were similar on the aggravated sexual assault and on the sexual intercourse charges.
With this form of testimony it may be that the psychologist appearing for the
prosecution, having made it clear that he had examined the child, was in a better
position to disconfirm expectations of partiality, than he was when delivering a more
impersonal, generalised testimony, involving no communication with or questioning
of the child complainant. In the analysis of deliberations in Experiments 1 and 2,
there were several instances when jurors remarked on the psychologist's failure to
examine or speak to the child, and this may have adversely affected the weight some
jurors gave to the psychologist's testimony.
With the statement validity analysis testimony, those hearing the prosecution
expert were significantly more likely to vote guilty on the aggravated sexual assault
charge. It might be expected that a prosecution expert who gave only moderate
endorsement to the complainant child's statement would thereby disconfirm any
expectations of partiality, and may have his testimony more readily accepted.
However, jurors' responses appear to have been more variable. While a content
analysis of the deliberations of Experiment 4 was not conducted, perusal of the
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videotaped deliberations of the two jury groups in the "Standard interviewl
SVAlprosecution expert" condition revealed a number of comments indicating that
jurors may have been confused by this testimony and tended to dismiss the
psychologist's conclusions and focus primarily on the child's testimony in their
decision making. Although not significant, there was, nevertheless, a substantial
difference between the mean percentages which jurors allocated to the psychologist's
influence on their decision-making in the "standard interview/SVAlcourt-appointed
expert" juries (18%) and the "standard interview/SVAlprosecution expert" jury
groups (11%). The following are comments from the deliberations of the latter
groups:
" The psychologist totally confused me" ijuror 3, group 7).
" I got lost. I switched off halfway through" (juror 2, group 7, referring to
psychologist's testimony).
" I don't think his testimony was one way or the other" (juror 2, group 7).
"... he's a red herring in some ways" (juror 4, group 7, referring to
psychologist) .
" He clarified a few points, but wouldn't sway you one way or the other"
(juror 2, group 7).
" I had trouble working out which one was the prosecution, who was the
psychologist supposed to be representing. I got confused" (iuror 4, group 8).
" The psychologist said very little, went on and on. I wasn't impressed"
(juror 5, group 8).
" I wasn't very clear on whose side he came out on" (juror 4, group 8).
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Findings from these four experiments which have implications for other areas of
jury research are discussed in detail below. The two most robust findings were:
1) the salience of jurors' perceptions as to whether the child may have
misinterpreted the defendant's actions at the time of the alleged incident. In all four
experiments, regression analyses indicated that this variable was most highly
predictive of jurors' verdict ratings, and
2) the consistent pattern of juror gender differences across all four studies,
with females more likely to rate the child's credibility higher and to render guilty
verdicts.
11.1 Juror gender differences
Menkel-Meadow and Diamond (1991) propose that gender is an "important and
salient category for sociolegal analysis" (p. 227), particularly to the extent that
such analyses can illuminate questions regarding the possibility of separate "male
and female legal cultures", Rape trial simulation studies have generally found that
female jurors are significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty (Brekke &
Borgida, 1988; Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Deitz & Byrnes, 1981;
Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch, 1990; Lyons & Regina, 1986; Miller & Hewitt, 1978;
Spanos, Dubreuil, & Gwynn, 1992; Weir & Wrightsman, 1990), although others
have found a non-significant trend in the same direction (Field, 1978; Villemur &
Hyde, 1983). Some have suggested that the critical differential factor is women's
greater degree of empathy for victims (Deitz et aI., 1982; Deitz & Byrnes, 1981;
Weir & Wrightsman, 1990). However, two studies of jurors in actual rape cases
(Lafree, Reskin, & Visher, 1985; Nelligan, 1988) found no basis for positing
gender differences in conviction or acquittal rates.
168
Nelligan (1988) speculated that either the voir dire selection process may serve
to filter out those with differential propensities to acquit or convict, or juror gender
differences are in some way "submerged" during deliberation. His inference is that
it is women's propensities that go under, as previous studies have indicated that
male jurors tend to dominate participation in deliberation (Hastie, Penrod &
Pennington, 1983). Ellsworth (1993) has suggested that, despite several social
role shifts, the ratio of 1.5 : 1 in speaking rates during deliberation for males and
females respectively has not altered from the decade of Kalven and Zeisel (1966) to
the late 1980's (Strodtbeck & Lipinski, 1988), but there was no evidence of such a
gender-related participation imbalance in the experiments that constitute this
thesis. In fact, the only gender differences in deliberation content indicated that
females tended to participate to a greater extent than males. Data from Experiment 2
showed a higher mean number of utterance units for females, and significantly more
discussion of both the child's and the defendant's testimony by female jurors. Gender
differences in verdicts in these four experiments were similar to those found in
studies using rape cases. The pattern of juror gender differences on pre-deliberation
verdicts was also similar to that found by Gabora et al. (t 993) with female
complainant witnesses aged 13 and 17, in a simulated child sexual abuse case. Table
11.1 shows the proportion of each gender group voting for conviction and acquittal in
each of the four studies of this thesis, and for comparison, the results from the
Gabora et al. (1993), Brekke and Borgida (1988) and Ross et al. (1994) studies.
A narrowing of gender verdict differences after deliberation was noted in the
experiments in this thesis, and in the Gabora et al. study. A similar pattern of juror
gender differences on pre-deliberation verdicts with a less pronounced difference
after deliberation, as more females changed their votes from guilt to innocence, was
found by Nagao and Davis (1980), and Brekke and Borgida (1988), using simulated
rape trials.
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Table 11.1. Percentage of guilty votes by juror gender in mock trials
involving charges of a sexual nature
Experiment 1
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Experiment 2
Pre-deliberation
Post -deliberation
Experiment 3
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Experiment 4
(aggr. sexual assault charge)
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Experiment 4
(intercourse charge)
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Gabora et al. (1993)
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Brekke & Borgida (1988)
Pre-deliberation
Post-deliberation
Ross et al. (1994)
Experiment 1
(no deliberation)
Females
74
61
69
65
75
78
85
86
64
60
79
73
64
49
59
Males
46
43
49
49
48
45
65
67
39
38
47
.57
40
38
39
However, gender differences on verdicts were not found in the study by Duggan et
al. (1988), using complainant witnesses aged 5, 9 and 13 in a simulated sexual
abuse case. The difference between the results found by Duggan et al. and the findings
in the other three studies may be in part attributable to the difference in the
scenarios used. The description of the scenario in the Duggan et al. study indicates
that the defendant (neighbour or step-father) was alleged to have fondled the child
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victim. The scenarios employed in the present studies and in those by Gabora et al.
(1993) and Brekke and Borgida (1988) may well have been more emotionally
engaging. In the present experiments there was an allegation of full and painful
penetration of the child by the child's own father. Suggestions in the scenario that
the parents' separation was not devoid of acrimony may also have served to enhance
the juror gender polarization effect. In general, female jurors consistently gave
higher ratings than male jurors on the child-based variables.
While significant gender differences on verdicts were found in the first
experiment conducted by Ross et al. (1994), in their second experiment the
proportion of guilty votes for male jurors (64.6%) was as high as the proportion of
female jurors' guilty votes (66.6%). The authors used a scenario of a 10-year-old
girl alleging sexual abuse by her father. In the first experiment, the mock jurors
saw the complete trial, but in the second experiment the same stimulus material was
used except that the videotape was stopped after the child testified and the defendant's
testimony was not seen by the mock jurors. The findings suggest that viewing the
defendant and hearing the defendant's testimony may be particularly salient for male
jurors' decision-making, perhaps because it affords the opportunity for differential
gender responses in the degree of empathy with a male defendant.
There is evidence that the gender differences in perceptions of the child witness
and in judgements of guilt reflect jurors' prior attitudes and beliefs. Gabora et al.
(1993) gave their jurors two scales prior to the trial, the "Attitudes toward
Women Scale" and the "Child Sexual Abuse Belief Scale". They concluded that the
"female jurors held more pro-feminist attitudes and believed less strongly in
misconceptions about child sexual abuse than male jurors. These initial attitudinal
differences may explain the differences in the way males and females responded to
the trial testimony" (p.117). Brekke and Borgida (1988) using a rape trial as
stimulus did not measure pre-trial attitudes but in commenting on their results
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stated, "women were more favourably disposed toward the victim and rendered
significantly more gUilty votes than did men..... Some of the strongest sex differences
emerged on evaluations of the expert witness and his testimony. Compared with men,
women evaluated the rape expert more favourably and considered his testimony to be
more useful to them in reaching their verdicts" (p. 375).
In Experiment 4, pre-trial survey results indicated significant pre-trial
attitudinal differences between male and female jurors. These gender-related
differences may have been expressed in the significantly higher credibility ratings
accorded the child witness and the higher proportions of guilty verdicts rendered by
the female jurors, not only in Experiment 4, but consistently throughout the
present series of experiments.
11.2 Age of child vlctlmlwltness
The finding in the first experiment of no significant main effects for credibility
according to the age of the child victim differs from the findings of Duggan et aI.,
although it should be noted that the ages in this study (6,9,12) differed from those
in the Duggan et al. study (5,9,13). These differences, though slight, may yet
account for the contrary findings. Duggan et aI., using female victims only, found
that the 13-year-old was considered to be the least credible witness, which they
interpreted as indicating jurors' propensities to attribute partial responsibility to
the 13-year-old victim. From the content analyses of the deliberations in this
study, it is clear that very few jurors who viewed the 12-year-old victims
verbalised attributions of responsibility towards those victims, and when aired,
such suggestions were not supported by other jurors. Duggan et al. suggested that
jurors may view girls "approaching their teenage years" with greater suspicion in
sexual abuse cases. Relative to the 9-year-old victims, the difference between the
credibility ratings for the 12-year-old victims in this study and the 13-year-old
girl in the Duggan et al. study may possibly be due to differences in developmental or
other idiosyncratic factors in the children used.
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An alternative interpretation open to further research is that, for some jurors,
there may be a critical point at the transition from victim age 12 to 13, at which
their perception of the child's level of responsibility and credibility alters. Having
entered the teenage years, a 13-year-old may be perceived as having a greater
degree of knowledge about and responsibility for sexual matters. Further, the
likelihood that jurors, during deliberation, may attribute partial responsibility for
a sexually abusive incident to the child and that such attributions may be supported
by other jurors may increase with the age of the teenager. Gabora et al. (1993)
found no significant difference between jurors' pre-deliberation verdicts with 13-
year-old and 17-year-old complainants, but after deliberation, jurors who saw the
older complainant returned significantly fewer guilty verdicts than those who saw
the younger complainant. Suggestions, during deliberation, that the allegations were
fabricated may also increase with age. Gabora et al. (1993) found that jurors were
more likely to believe that the 13-year-old complainant lacked the knowledge
required for fabricating. Apparent differences in jurors' reactions to various ages
of child victim from one study to another may be explained by looking at the
combination of factors involved in studies which have used child sexual abuse cases.
Table 11.2 summarises comparable aspects of six such studies published to date.
Comparisons of the differing factors in each study suggest that care should be
exercised in generalising from some studies. First, caution should be exercised, as
Nightingale (1993) acknowledges, in generalising from studies that employ trial
narratives. It is likely that jurors' stereotypes about children are more salient in
such studies. Second, doubts have been expressed about the degree to which results
are generalizable when only student subjects are used as mock jurors.
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Table 11.2 Comparison of mock juror studies which have used simulated
child sexual abuse cases
Experiment IriaL me. Ail:..llf G:n!Il:L~~ % Cn:nder &&illS
1illInal llfJ:asl: l:1liIlIJl of chUd present WJl'n Qfjurors
M E
Duggan et. al Videotape sexual 5,9,13 female no Jury- 50 50 Sign diff. het
(1989) molest. eligible 9-yr-olds &
(fondling) citizens 13 yr-olds
defen<lant- on guilty votes.
stepfather! Jurorsattributed
neighbour some blame to
13 yr old.
Goodmanet al. Written oral sex 6,14,22 female no Psych 28 72 6 yr old more
(1989) transcript with u'grads credible than22-
(I page) teacher year-old
Defendant more
guilty with 6-
year-old than
other victims
Gaboraet al. Videotape Multiple 13, 17 female yes Psych 55 45 No main effect
(1993) escalating u'grads of age on pre-
incidents deliberat verdicts
with More guilty
father votes with 13-
year-old on post
-deliber verdicts
Nightingale Written oral sex 6,9,12 female no Psych 47 53 No main effect
(1993) transcript u'grads for victimage
Experiment1 (6 pages) on verdicts
Nightingale Written oral sex 6-14 female no Psych 48 52 As victim age
(1993) transcript incl. u'grads increased, no.
Experiment2 (6 pages) of guilty votes
oecreased
Crowleyet al Videotape sexual 6,9,12 maie& yes Jury- 50 50 No maineffects
(1994) interc. female eligible for age on
Experiment 1 with citizens verdicts or
in this thesis father & Psych credibility
u'grads
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Third, given the common finding of gender polarization effects in cases involving
sexual assault, some degree of care seems appropriate when interpreting results
from studies which do not retain a gender balance among the juror sample. Male
jurors may be less inclined to render guilty verdicts with older female complainants
than are female jurors (Goodman et aI., 1989). Fourth, only two studies
(Experiments 1 and 2, this thesis) have investigated jurors' reactions to both male
and female victim/witnesses, thus retaining a gender balance among the complainant
witnesses. Admittedly, male children may constitute a minority of actual
complainants (20% in the criminal court survey by Lipovsky et aI., 1992) but
unless they are included in an experimental paradigm, any conclusions about jurors'
reactions to victims of different ages, such as those made by Nightingale and other
authors, are applicable only to female children.
In recent experiments, using written trial transcripts of a civil and criminal
(sexual abuse) case to investigate jurors' reactions to child victim witnesses,
Nightingale (1993) found, in her first experiment using child ages 6, 9 and 12,
that there were no significant main effects for victim age, and her expectation that
the 12-year-old might be disadvantaged in the sexual abuse case was not supported
by her data. In her second experiment using the same sexual abuse transcript and
varying the ages of the child victim by each year from 6 to 14, Nightingale found
there was a significant trend towards decreasing guilty votes as the age of the victim
increased, but Nightingale's results do not appear to support her own conclusion of
"a possible negative bias toward child victims that are approaching adolescence" (p.
693). In her first experiment, as in the first experiment in this thesis, there was
no effect of victim age (6, 9, 12) on verdicts. In Nightingale's second experiment,
even though a significant trend for age on verdicts was found, the data suggest that
the outlying ages in the range from 6-14 were largely responsible for the
significant effect. The proportion of guilty and not guilty verdicts was equal for ages
seven, nine, eleven and almost equal for age twelve (10 guilty, 11 not guilty).
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Results for pre-deliberation verdicts from Experiments 1 and 2 are shown in
Table 11.3. Results from Experiment 1 in this thesis, show a relatively consistent
pattern of verdicts of juror gender across differing victim ages and genders. At each
age, 6, 9 and 12, male jurors voted gUilty and not guilty in equal or approximately
equal proportions, whereas at each victim/witness age, female jurors gave
substantially more guilty votes. On pre-deliberation verdict results from
Experiment 2, there is a similar pattern for female jurors at each age by gender of
child, a pattern similar to that found in experiment one. However, the pattern of
verdicts for male jurors is more variable across each age by gender of child than in
Experiment 1.
----------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.3 Pre-deliberation verdicts.. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
Gender & aae of child Male lurors Female lurors
Guilty Not guilty Guilty Not guilty
ExperIment t
Male .. 6 years 6 6 1 1 1
Female.. 6 years 6 6 6 6
Total ... 6 year-old child 1 2 1 2 1 7 7
Male .. 9 years 5 7 8 4
Female .. 9 years 5 7 8 4
Total .. 9 year-old child 1 0 1 4 1 6 8
Male .. 12 years 6 6 10 2
Female .. 12 years 5 7 10 2
Total .. 12 year-old child 1 1 1 3 20 4
Experiment 2
Male .. 6 years 9 15 16 8
Female .. 6 years 17 7 1 7 7
Total ... 6 year-old child 26 22 33 1 5
Male .. 9 years 10 14 16 8
Female .. 9 years 1 1 13 17 7
Total .. 9 year-old child 2 1 27 33 1 5
---------------------------------------------------
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While there were three significant interactions involving child age in
Experiment 2, the only significant main effects of child age in the experiments of
this thesis were those concerned with differences in deliberation content. In
Experiment 1, there was significantly more discussion of the 6-year-old children's
cognitive capabilities than there was for the 9-year-old or the 12-year-old
children. In Experiment 2, the jurors who saw the 6-year-old children entered
into more discussion of reasonable doubt and its relation to verdicts than did those
jurors who saw the 9-year-old children.
11.3 Patterns of verdict preference over all four studies
From an inspection of the pre- and post-deliberation verdict frequencies in
Table 11.4, there are two noteworthy features.
Table 11.4. Comparison of patterns of pre- and post-deliberation verdicts
(Percentage of total verdicts in parentheses)
Pre-deliberation Post- de II be ra II 0 n
£iJJi11Jl Not guilty £iJJi11Jl Not guilty
Exp 1 (All S's.. N=144) 86 (60) 58 (40) 75 (52) 69 (48)
Exp 1 (expert pres.. n=72) 48 (67) 24 (33) 43 (59) 29 (40)
Exp 2 (All 8's.. N=192) 113 (59) 79 (41 ) 109 (57) 83 (43)
Exp 3 (All 8's.. N=120) 74 (62) 46 (38) 74 (62) 46 (38)
Exp 3 (expert pres.. n=96) 62 (65) 34 (35) 63 (66) 33 (34)
Exp 4 (Agg sex ass.. N=144) 108 (75) 36 (25) 110 (76) 34 (24)
Exp 4 (8ex intere.. N=144) 74 (51 ) 70 (49) 70 (49) 74 (51 )
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1} The pattern of votes when only a sexual intercourse charge was oHered is
quite different from the pattern when two charges/verdicts were offered, as was the
case in Experiment 4. There, the proportion of aggravated sexual assault guilty
verdicts was considerably higher and the proportion of sexual intercourse guilty
verdicts considerably lower than in those experiments where only one charge and
verdict outcome was possible. This finding suggests that where there is only the
more serious charge to be considered, some jurors may be voting guilty to the
harsher charge with some degree of reluctance; when a "compromise" between
guilty or not guilty on the more serious charge is offered (i.e., the potential for a
guilty vote on a less serious charge), it is strongly supported.
Other studies (Greenwald, Tomkins, Kenning, & Zavodny, 1990; Poulson, 1990)
have found that, when presented with a choice of verdicts (e.g., manslaughter vs
first degree murder), jurors usually choose the least punishable charge, although in
the Hastie and Pennington (1983) study, when three verdict choices were offered
(first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter) the most favoured pre-
deliberation verdict of manslaughter altered toward a modal post-deliberation
verdict of second degree murder, perhaps the "compromise" verdict in that case.
There is also the possibility of an order effect in decision making. Kruglanski
and Freund (1983) proposed that there may be a "freezing" of hypothesis testing
when jurors are unable or unmotivated to produce alternative hypotheses.
Greenberg, Williams and O'Brien (1986) found that when the first hypotheses
tested were concerned with the harshest verdicts, there appeared to be a freezing
process which led to a bias toward harsh verdicts when less serious charges were
subsequently considered. In Experiment 4, the order of verdict consideration was
from lenient to more serious, and it is possible that some jurors considered that
there was at least some degree of intentional penetration of the child's vagina but
also may have been unsure as to the precise nature of the penetration. Thus, the
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verdict which satisfied the criterion of "some intentional penetration, nature
unsure" was one of guilty to the first charge, and at this point some jurors may have
"frozen", feeling they had insufficient evidence for testing further hypotheses.
2) Table 11.5 shows the frequency data from each experiment for those who
changed their verdict from pre- to post-deliberation. Other than the changes in
Experiment 1, for which student jurors were largely responsible, it appears that,
in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, there is little change proportionally from pre-
deliberation to post-deliberation verdicts. Results from a number of studies have
shown that a jury's final verdict appears to be largely predictable from the pattern
of verdict preferences before deliberation (Davis et aI., 1975; Kalvin & Zeisel,
1966; Stasser, Kerr, & Bray, 1982), and in general the results of the present
studies are consistent with these previous findings. However, given the relatively
brief deliberation time and the absence of specific instructions or coercion towards
achieving verdict unanimity, it may be that the extent of change in these studies
under-represents the likely degree of change in real cases. In Experiment 4, the
instruction that jury panels which were not unanimous after 30 minutes of
deliberation would have to deliberate for a further 15 minutes resulted in
substantially more movement towards unanimity than occurred in the other three
experiments in which jurors were told that deliberation would cease after 25
minutes regardless of the degree of unanimity. The additional time would appear to
be a relatively minor impost yet the desire to avoid the extra deliberation appeared
to be produce considerable pressure for change, particularly for those in minority
verdict groups.
By contrast, the substantial change in verdicts among students in Experiment 1
is interesting because those who changed were more likely to be in verdict majority
groups, not minority groups, and further, all changes were in the direction from
pre-delloeration guilt to post-deliberation acquittal. The possibility that students
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are more open to be persuaded by reasoned debate, as raised in Chapter 6, seems to
be inadequate, as such an explanation may account for the frequency of change but not
its uni-directionality. The more plausible explanation, also mooted earlier, is that
students may be more inclined to enter the experimental session with a propensity
towards overbelief in children, relative to jurors from the community (Yarmey &
Jones, 1983).
Table 11.5 Number of mock jurors changing their verdict from pre- to post-
deliberation. Figures are shown by gender of juror, direction of
change and degree of pre-deliberation support in the jury group.
Direction of change Degree of juror support
(Pre- to post-deliberation)
.g,.u.il1~.->NQt guilty Not gyj!ty->~ MinQrity Balancedl3'3l Majority
Experiment 1
Student jurors (N=72)
Male 6 0
Female 7 0
Total change (18%) 1 3 0 2 1 10
Experiment 1
Community jurors (N=72)
Male 0 3
Female 2 0
Total change (7%) 2 3 3 1 1
Experiment 2
Community jurors (N=192)
Male 4
Female 6
Total change (8%) 1 0
Experiment 3
Community jurors (N=120)
Male 3
Femak 1
Total change (7%) 4
4
2
6
1
3
4
3
1
8
7
5
o
Experiment 4 (sexual intercQurse verdicts)
Community jurors (N=144)
Male 7 6
Female 10 7
Total change (21%) 1 7 1 3 14 13 3
----------------------------------------------------------
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Chapter 12
Implications of some major thesis findings
12.1 The effect of expert testimony on Jury process.
When assessing the impact of expert testimony, Wells (1986) maintained that
the effects on both process and outcomes should be considered, suggesting that
"verdicts reached by bizarre or faulty processes are unacceptable, regardless of
whether or not the verdict was correct" (p. 91). In jury studies such as those
reported in this thesis, there is no "correct" verdict. Conclusions can only be
couched in terms of the effects that this or that manipulation had on verdicts.
Nevertheless, the tentative conclusion can be advanced that the addition of expert
testimony on children's cognitive abilities to the trial process appears to have
improved the deliberation and decision-making processes. The basis for this
conclusion is not in any significant differences in verdict outcomes, as results from
Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that expert testimony and expert role did not
significantly affect verdicts, but rather the degree of certainty jurors felt about
verdicts. If a body of expert testimony based on published research and delivered in
a reasonably objective manner leads triers of facts to greater certainty in their
verdicts, then it could be argued that there has been improvement in the decision-
making process.
12.2 The Idiosyncrasies of evidence Interpretation,
and Juror gender "bias".
Results from Experiment 3 suggest that juror decison-making does not involve a
linear, continuous up-dating decision strategy but rather an active construction
process in which evidence from various parts of the trial is organized, elaborated
and interpreted in memory to form what Pennington and Hastie (1993) term a
"narrative story organization" which the juror imposes on trial information.
Pennington and Hastie (1993) suggest that stories are constructed by reasoning
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from a combination of the evidence presented and from the juror's knowledge of
events similar in content to those in dispute. In the scenario used in this series of
experiments, the jurors' perceptions of the likelihood that the child misinterpreted
events was consistently highly predictive of verdicts, suggesting that the most
salient interpretation involved in the story construction and decision-making
processes appears to have been the juror's assessment with regard to these
alternatives:
1) that the child's account of the incident was accurately recalled and reported,
or
2) that the child's recall was accurate in some respects but not in others, or
3) that the child misinterpreted the defendant's action at the time of the incident,
or
4) that, after the event, the child confused what actually happened with what
he/she thought had happened, or
5) that the child was subsequently led to mislabel or misinterpret a nonabusive
act that could be confused with abuse.
The juror's evaluations of the child's memory abilities, reality monitoring and
susceptibility to suggestion are clearly important elements in the juror's deciding
which of these interpretations is to be accepted. So also is the juror's knowledge and
experience of the world. One who has experienced unwanted sexual contact as a child
may be more inclined to empathise with the child. Another juror who may have been
the target of an unfounded accusation of impropriety may be more inclined to favour
the defendant's account. Because there is a unique set of idiosyncratic factors which
determine the knowledge and experience which each juror brings into the
courtroom, care should be exercised before concluding that juror gender differences
indicate some form of gender "bias". It could be argued from these results that
women are biased towards child complainants in sexual abuse cases, or that men are
biased towards male defendants, or equally that "bias" is not an appropriate term to
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characterise the gender differences found. While numerous studies have shown that
many women may have the basis for empathising with the child complainant, given
the high proportion who experienced unwanted sexual contact as minors, it is also
the case that substantial, albeit somewhat lower, proportions of men have
experienced sexually abusive contact as minors. It may be that gender differences in
pre-trial attitudes towards children and subsequent gender differences on
credibility ratings and verdicts are not indicative of gender "bias" but may be more
closely related to women having greater contact time with children and therefore
more opportunities to accurately appraise children's cognitive abilities.
It is of interest that the lower ratings of helpfulness and impartiality accorded
the male adversarial expert witness in Experiment 2 were consistent across gender.
Therefore, if the male prosecution expert was perceived as too closely aligned with a
male-dominated legal system which encourages partiality then it was a perception
shared by both genders of juror.
12.3 Jurors' "Common knowledge".
A further important implication concerns jurors' "common knowledge". The
psychologist expert's testimony on children's cognitive abilities addressed only some
of the criteria used by a juror in assessing credibility. Results from Experiment 4
showed that there may be considerable discrepancy between the indicia of credibility
used by jurors and those suggested by psychological research. The Anglo-American
criminal justice system leaves the evaluation of credibility entirely with the triers
of fact, and the approach used is basically one of social judgement or impression
formation (Kohnken, 1990). While there is no published literature on jurors'
abilities to discriminate between truthful and non-truthful testimony, there is a
substantial corpus of empirical studies on subjects' accuracy in judging the
credibility of statements in controlled settings, and the results show that, in
general, detection accuracy rates are only marginally above chance (Ekman, 1989;
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Kohnken, 1990). Research indicates that those cues which are most relevant for
detecting deceit are often ignored and those least useful are most heavily relied upon
(Ekman, 1989).
In Experiment 4, the three SVA criteria which were most frequently endorsed as
diminishing the credibility of a child's testimony were "spontaneous corrections",
"admitting lack of memory", and "raising doubts about one's own testimony".
Admittedly, much research needs to be done to determine which of the SVA criteria
are valid indicators of credibility when assessing children's allegations, but it is of
some interest that the three criteria which mock jurors most often nominated as
credibility-diminishing in Experiment 4 are also the behaviours one might expect to
see in a child who is tentative, confused or uncertain, and which are commonly
identified by those working with sexually abused children (Sorensen & Snow,
1991). Further, when giving testimony, children often are required to answer
questions which jump from one time-frame to another. Young children, lacking
adult spatiotemporal integrative abilities, may appear to be confused by such a
strategy (Nurcombe, 1986; Oates, 1990).
The likelihood of spontaneous corrections and admissions of lack of memory may
also be increased if the abuse has been accompanied by psychic trauma, which has
been found to impair awareness of sequence and temporal perspective (Terr, 1983).
As confidence is consistently found to be a major cue used by mock-jurors in their
assessments of witness credibility (Goodman, Golding, & Haith, 1984; Luus &
Wells, 1992; Wells & Murray, 1984), jurors, whose "common knowledge" is
rarely likely to include knowledge of factors such as the disclosure process and the
effects of psychic trauma, may tend to discount or devalue the testimony of an
uncertain child witness.
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12.4 Psychological expert testimony as an even-handed summary
of the extant research.
In the past 15 years, there has been a plethora of research into children's
cognitive abilities, especially their susceptibility or resistance to suggestive
influence. After a comprehensive review of the research, Ceci and Bruck (1993)
concluded that "extreme negative opinions about the young child's ability to resist
leading questions are unwarranted... In light of the full corpus of data we reviewed
these extreme opinions are not supported by the available research. This research
shows that children are able to encode and retrieve large amounts of information
especially when it is personally experienced and highly meaningful" (p. 434).
Suggestibility in children, as Davies (1991b) writes, "appears to be a situational
factor rather than a trait" (p. 107).
Ceci and Bruck (1993) rightly express concern also about experts who render
extreme positive opinions and "rarely present a careful summary of the research"
(p. 431). An even-handed summary of the research should make reference to the
findings which indicate that, relative to older children and adults, younger children
are more vulnerable to the effects of misleading information, suggestive questions
and improper interview techniques (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). It was the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division's concerns about the use of such techniques which
were prominent in that court's reversal of Kelly Michaels' conviction (State v,
Michaels, 1994), and the ruling that, before a re-trial can occur, there must be a
pre-trial "taint" hearing to assess the adequacy of the investigative interviews and
the reliability, and admissibility, of the children's testimony. If this common law
precedent of "taint" hearings is adopted by other jurisdictions throughout the United
States, as is anticipated (J.E. Myers, personal communication, August 24, 1994),
then the use of expert testimony regarding children's memory and suggestibility
may be a frequent feature at such hearings (Myers, in press). The importance of the
findings from this thesis is that they provide empirical support for the proposition
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that expert testimony on those issues, presented in a balanced and objective manner,
especially by a court-appointed expert, can assist the judge and jury towards
greater understanding and improve the juridical process.
12.5 Future research directions
The significant interaction effects between expert gender and expert role in
Experiment 2 raised intriguing questions about jurors' perceptions of a male expert
in the adversarial role, but given the lack of a consistent expert role effect in
Experiment 4, future research could be directed to investigating the inter-
relationships between expert role, expert gender and the type of expert testimony
presented.
Although considerably more research is required on the reliability and validity
of the SVA technique, it is conceded (McGough, 1991) that such a technique may be
useful to prosecutors at the pre-trial stage in deciding whether to proceed with a
case or as leverage in plea-bargaining. Other advocates of the SVA technique (Raskin
& Esplin, 1991) foresee its use not just as an investigative tool but as an element in
judicial proceedings. However, McGough's (1991) concern is that expert testimony
based on SVA simply displaces the juror's judgement of witness credibility one step
further: ''The reliability of a witness (his or her statement) is being vouched for by
an expert whose own reliability then comes into issue" (p. 166).
Future research should be directed to expanding the corpus of findings concerning
jurors' responses to SVA expert testimony so that future judicial opinions
concerning the likely impact of such testimony might have an empirical basis on
which to draw.
A possible direction for future research may lie in the incorporation of the
expert as a defence witness in the expert role manipulation. A major difficulty with
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this proposal lies in devising a body of expert testimony which might plausibly be
given by an expert in all three expert witness roles: court-appointed, prosecution,
and defence. The SVA testimony presented in Experiment 4 in which the expert
assesses the quality of the child's testimony as "moderate" could be presented by an
expert in anyone of the three possible roles and further research is planned to study
this role manipulation.
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